xero-payroll-au-mcp

A read-only MCP server for Xero, forked from XeroAPI/xero-mcp-server (MIT), being built toward Australian Payroll — pay runs, payslips and superannuation lines.

Status: foundation only. This repo currently exposes 18 accounting read tools plus list-tenants, and no Payroll AU tools. The guards that make the rest of the work safe are in place; the AU surface is not built yet. See HANDOFF.md for where things stand.

Why this fork exists

The official Xero MCP server cannot reach Australian payroll at all. Its payroll tools cover employees, leave and timesheets, for NZ and UK only — there is no path in it to a pay run, a payslip, a superannuation line, a super fund, a membership or STP.

That is not an inference from the docs. Verified against upstream at v0.0.16:

Australia's Payday Super regime makes per-employee superannuation data the thing every compliance tool needs to read, and SuperannuationLines[] on a payslip — with its ContributionType, so an SGC line can be told from salary sacrifice — is the reason this repo exists.

Related MCP server: xendit-mcp

What it will and will not do

Read-only, permanently. Not "read-only by convention" — the upstream write tools were deleted, and CI fails the build if a tool that can mutate ever reaches the registry again.

No tax file numbers, BSBs or bank account numbers. Live Xero payroll payloads carry all three. Every tool returns a hand-defined shape, and CI fails the build if a denied field is read or an unreviewed Xero-derived value reaches a caller.

No compliance math. This server reports what Xero says. Calculating shortfalls, deadlines or penalties is a consumer's job, deliberately.

Three things Xero itself does not expose, so this server cannot either — documented so nobody spends a week looking: STP filing status has no API; Auto Super batch status is UI-only, so nothing here can confirm a contribution reached a fund; and there are no payroll webhooks, so incremental polling with If-Modified-Since is the pattern.

The guards

These are the point of the fork, and they run over the entire registered surface on every CI run — not per tool, and not as a review checklist. A 35-tool surface will eventually gain a tool nobody reviewed closely, and that is precisely the one that leaks.

Two design notes worth knowing before you touch them:

• The tool list is a tripwire, not proof. A name records only that somebody typed a string. An allowlisted tool whose handler is later edited to POST would stay green forever on a name check, so read-only is proven by capability instead — and appending to that list is explicitly not an approval step.

• Each guard has a permanent negative control. Five checked-in violations are asserted to make the guards fail, on every run. A guard demonstrated once at merge and trusted forever is indistinguishable, in CI output, from a guard that has silently stopped seeing anything. Both of those risks turned out to be real during the initial build.

Run them alone with npm run guards.

Requirements a caller must satisfy

Australian Payroll requires granular scopes. Connections created on or after 29 April 2026 use them, and accounting.journals.read does not exist for such a connection — so GET /Journals is unavailable and Superannuation Payable has to be read through BankTransactions.

Whoever authorises the connection needs Payroll Admin in that Xero organisation, and there is no API to create a Custom Connection — it is a manual step in Xero's developer portal.

Auth

Two modes, inherited from upstream. Credentials come from the process environment; nothing is stored.

The client is constructed lazily, on first use. That is not a micro-optimisation: it is what lets CI enumerate the tool registry with no credentials present, and CI deliberately holds none — so a test that quietly depended on a live credential could not pass there by accident.

Getting a token

Create a Mobile or desktop app at developer.xero.com/app/manage and register http://localhost:5173/callback as a redirect URI. That app type uses PKCE and has no client secret — an MCP server on someone's machine is a public client, and a secret shipped to a public client is not a secret.

XERO_CLIENT_ID=<your client id> npm run mint-token

It opens a consent URL, receives the redirect, and prints an access token, a refresh token and the organisations you are authorised for. It writes nothing to disk — a helper that saved a token would create the one artefact this design avoids, a credential at rest one git add -A from being committed. Tokens last 30 minutes; re-run it when yours lapses.

Renewal is deliberately the caller's job. The server never sees the refresh token.

Scopes it requests, and two deliberate absences:

• openid profile email offline_access, plus accounting.settings.read, accounting.contacts.read, accounting.transactions.read, accounting.reports.read

• No accounting.journals.read. It does not exist for connections created on or after 29 April 2026 under granular scopes, so requesting it returns invalid_scope rather than a journals feed. Superannuation Payable has to be read through BankTransactions

• No payroll scopes, because no Payroll AU tool exists yet. They arrive with the first one

Whoever authorises the app needs Payroll Admin in that organisation once payroll scopes are added.

Choosing an organisation

A token can be authorised for many Xero organisations, so every tool takes an optional tenantId.

• One authorised organisation → tenantId is optional and everything just works

• Several → a tool errors and names them. It does not pick one

Call list-tenants to see the ids and names. Every successful response also states which organisation the data came from, so a consumer never has to infer it.

That refusal is the point rather than a limitation. Before change 002 the server read whichever organisation the Xero SDK sorted first — which shifts as organisations are updated — and said nothing about which one it had used. For accounting reads that is untidy; for the superannuation data this repo exists to expose, handing someone one client's payroll while they believe it is another's is a confidentiality failure that looks exactly like a correct answer.

Smoke test against the demo company

Proves auth, tenant selection and the live read path end to end:

1. XERO_CLIENT_ID=<id> npm run mint-token, and authorise Xero's Demo Company

2. export XERO_CLIENT_BEARER_TOKEN=<the access token printed>

3. Call list-tenants — the demo organisation should appear

4. Call list-accounts — it should return accounts and name the organisation

What it does not prove. Xero's demo company returns a superannuation rate from before 2022, so it establishes nothing about Payday Super, and no fixture may be captured from it. Recorded fixtures need a real Australian organisation with current payroll data.

Development

npm ci
npm run build
npm test              # includes all three guards and the negative controls
npm run guards        # guards only
npm run inventory     # print the registered tool surface

Enable the pre-commit fixture scan once per clone:

git config core.hooksPath .githooks

It refuses a staged file under fixtures/ containing a TFN, BSB or account number, using the same matcher Guard B uses. It runs at commit time rather than in CI on purpose: PII in a git history can only be remedied by rewriting that history, and this fork's whole structure is built on keeping upstream mergeable. Recorded raw Xero responses belong in fixtures/raw/, which is git-ignored.

Relationship to upstream

upstream stays configured and history is preserved on both sides, so fixes remain mergeable. Divergence is kept in added files where possible. Note that a merge which resurrects a write tool will be caught by Guard A rather than by a reviewer's attention.

Licence

MIT, inherited from upstream. See LICENSE.