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Sytadel MCP Server

Sytadel MCP Server

by ElwinErnst

@sytadel/mcp-server

Model Context Protocol server that exposes Sytadel identity + access primitives as tools consumable from Claude Desktop, Cursor, and any MCP-aware client.

What it is

On its own: a standalone MCP server you point at any running Sytadel control plane (auth-api + zerotrust-api). It turns identity/access operations into typed tools an LLM client can call — the tenant is always derived from the authenticated principal, never from a model-supplied argument.

As part of Sytadel: it is the agentic surface of the suite. It talks to auth-api (identity) through zerotrust-api (policy gateway), so every tool call is subject to the same per-tenant authorization as any other client. It is a client of the plane — it needs auth-api reachable to do anything. See the suite architecture.

Ships 5 tools out of the box:

Tool

Description

list_tenant_users

Memberships of the current tenant with role, active flag, passkey count, last login

list_service_accounts

Client apps + their service accounts with idle days and rotation state

query_session_anomalies

Recent flagged logins (IP / country / device / score)

generate_policy

Compile natural-language RBAC intent → Sytadel PolicySet JSON

run_access_review

Trigger the AI-driven access review and return the full report

Related MCP server: Purple AI MCP Server

Installation

git clone https://github.com/ElwinErnst/sytadel-mcp-server
cd sytadel-mcp-server
npm install
npm run build

Configuration

Auth has two modes — pick one depending on which tools you need:

Full role scope. Every admin-level tool (list_tenant_users, list_service_accounts, run_access_review) works.

export SYTADEL_TENANT_SLUG=your-tenant
export SYTADEL_USER_EMAIL=you@example.com
export SYTADEL_USER_PASSWORD=your-password

Service account mode

Restricted API_CLIENT scope. Read-only tools work (query_session_anomalies, generate_policy); admin tools return 403.

export SYTADEL_TENANT_SLUG=your-tenant
export SYTADEL_CLIENT_APP_ID=<uuid>
export SYTADEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID=<uuid>
export SYTADEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SECRET=syt_...

Endpoint URLs (optional overrides)

export SYTADEL_AUTH_API_URL=http://localhost:3002/api   # default
export SYTADEL_ZT_API_URL=http://localhost:3010          # default
export SYTADEL_TIMEOUT_MS=60000                          # default 60s

Wiring into Claude Desktop

Edit ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "sytadel": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/mcp-server/dist/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "SYTADEL_AUTH_API_URL": "http://localhost:3002/api",
        "SYTADEL_ZT_API_URL": "http://localhost:3010",
        "SYTADEL_TENANT_SLUG": "your-tenant",
        "SYTADEL_USER_EMAIL": "you@example.com",
        "SYTADEL_USER_PASSWORD": "your-password"
      }
    }
  }
}

Restart Claude Desktop. The 5 tools appear in the tool picker.

Wiring into Cursor

Same shape, different path: ~/.cursor/mcp.json (or via Settings → MCP → Add).

Local sanity check

With the Sytadel stack running (docker compose up -d at the repo root):

npm run build
SYTADEL_TENANT_SLUG=sentinel-labs \
SYTADEL_USER_EMAIL=admin@test.com \
SYTADEL_USER_PASSWORD=123456 \
node dist/index.js

The server logs starting stdio server: ... connected — awaiting MCP client and waits for JSON-RPC on stdin.

Design notes

  • No third-party HTTP library. Everything uses native fetch + AbortController.

  • Token cache with 60s early refresh and inflight-request coalescing so parallel tool calls share one auth handshake.

  • Logs to stderr only. stdout is reserved for JSON-RPC framing; any console.log on stdout corrupts the protocol.

License

PolyForm Strict 1.0.0 (source-available, noncommercial use only). See LICENSE.

Available Tools

5 tools
generate_policyA

Compile a natural-language RBAC intent (e.g. "OWNER can do anything, MEMBER can only GET /vaults, default deny") into a Sytadel PolicySet JSON. Returns policy, warnings, cost, tokens, latency. Read-only: the compiled policy is NOT applied — call PUT /policies/:tenantId separately to enforce it.

Inputs: intent (required).

list_service_accountsA

List service accounts (machine credentials) under every client app of the current tenant, with last-used timestamps and auto-rotation state. Useful for spotting dormant integrations.

Inputs: no named parameters.

list_tenant_usersA

List all users of the current Sytadel tenant with their role, active flag, passkey count, and last login. Useful for access reviews and off-boarding checks.

Inputs: no named parameters.

query_session_anomaliesA

Return recent session anomaly events (login from new IP / new country / new device / high score) for the calling user, up to limit rows. Ordered newest first.

Inputs: limit.

run_access_reviewA

Trigger an on-demand AI-driven access review for the current tenant. Claude reviews users, service accounts and recent anomalies, and returns a markdown report plus a machine-readable list of recommendations (revoke, downgrade, disable_service_account, rotate_service_account_secret, delete_passkey, require_password_reset, review_manually).

Inputs: no named parameters.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A4.4/5.0

    Scored across 5 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each tool targets a distinct resource and action: session anomalies, policy compilation, access reviews, user listing, and service account listing. There is no overlap or ambiguity between these functions.

    Naming Consistency4/5

    All tool names use snake_case and a verb-object structure, but the verbs vary (list, query, generate, run). Two tools share the list prefix, but the inconsistent verbs prevent a perfect score.

    Tool Count5/5

    Five tools is well-scoped for a server focused on access review and policy generation. Each tool addresses a key workflow without unnecessary bloat.

    Completeness4/5

    The set covers data retrieval (users, service accounts, anomalies) and generates policies/reviews. However, there is no tool to apply policies or act on review recommendations, creating a notable gap in the full lifecycle.

    Maintenance

    ActivitySlowing
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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