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kvm-pilot

by DustinTrap
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
Python
Remote

amt_enable

Destructive

Open an Intel AMT redirection listener over WS-Man for SOL/IDE-R or KVM access, and set the KVM RFB password when enabling KVM.

Instructions

Enable an Intel AMT redirection listener over WS-Man (Intel AMT/vPro only). CONFIG MUTATION.

feature='sol' opens the SOL/IDE-R listener (16994); feature='kvm' opens KVM redirection (5900) and sets the RFB password. Gated by the config effect gate + per-invocation approval (typed same-path denials, #234). consent_off=true (KVM only) DISABLES the on-screen user-consent prompt — a surveillance escalation — and additionally requires the dedicated KVM_PILOT_MCP_ALLOW_CONSENT_OFF operator gate (see README.md); leaving it false keeps the prompt.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
confirmNoPer-invocation approval when the client cannot prompt a human: set true to approve this exact call under the operator's standing policy. Leave false when the client supports elicitation (a human is asked). Never pre-set it speculatively; a denial returns outcome=not_confirmed.
featureYes'sol' opens the SOL/IDE-R listener (port 16994); 'kvm' opens KVM redirection (5900) and sets the RFB password.
profileNoProfile name from ~/.config/kvm-pilot/config.toml selecting which KVM/BMC (and its managed host) this call targets. Omit to use the server's default (KVM_PILOT_PROFILE).
consent_offNoKVM only: true disables the on-screen user-consent prompt (needs the KVM_PILOT_MCP_ALLOW_CONSENT_OFF gate too). Leave false to keep the prompt.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changedv1.0.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / confirm / description
      Added value: +"Per-invocation approval when the client cannot prompt a human: set true to approve this exact call under the operator's standing policy. Leave false when the client supports elicitation (a human is asked). Never pre-set it speculatively; a denial returns outcome=not_confirmed."
    • addedInput schema / properties / consent_off / description
      Added value: +"KVM only: true disables the on-screen user-consent prompt (needs the KVM_PILOT_MCP_ALLOW_CONSENT_OFF gate too). Leave false to keep the prompt."
    • addedInput schema / properties / feature / description
      Added value: +"'sol' opens the SOL/IDE-R listener (port 16994); 'kvm' opens KVM redirection (5900) and sets the RFB password."
    • addedInput schema / properties / profile / description
      Added value: +"Profile name from ~/.config/kvm-pilot/config.toml selecting which KVM/BMC (and its managed host) this call targets. Omit to use the server's default (KVM_PILOT_PROFILE)."
  2. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructive/non-idempotent annotations, it discloses the approval gate, typed same-path denials, the KVM_PILOT_MCP_ALLOW_CONSENT_OFF operator gate, and — critically — that consent_off=true is a surveillance escalation. That is exactly the kind of consequence an agent cannot infer from annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose and mutation class, then structured per feature. Dense but nearly every clause carries signal; the '#234' tracker reference is the only marginal detail.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers what is changed, the approval requirements, and the consent_off escalation. Return-value detail is absent but not strictly required given the schema and annotations already cover safety.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so feature, consent_off, profile, and confirm are already documented in the schema. The description reinforces feature/consent_off meaning but mostly restates the schema (including the not_confirmed outcome and the operator gate), so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (enable) and resource (Intel AMT redirection listener over WS-Man) and scopes it (Intel AMT/vPro only). No sibling in the list overlaps, and the CONFIG MUTATION label immediately frames the operation class.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explains what each feature value selects and the gating conditions (config effect gate, per-invocation approval), giving clear context for when the call applies. It does not name a when-not or an alternative tool, but none exists among the siblings, so the gap is minor.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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