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verify_trust_passport

Read-onlyIdempotent

Validates signed Passport JSON or proof bundles against issuer and public key history, returning signature validity, integrity facts, and warnings.

Instructions

Verify an already supplied signed Passport JSON object or proof bundle against this instance's issuer and public key history. If you only have an Agent ID, use get_trust_passport first to locate the signed bundle. Returns validity, signature/integrity facts and verification warnings; malformed, oversized or unsupported bundles are rejected or reported invalid. Never fetches supplied URLs. No account; read-only with operational telemetry, no signing, profile or reputation change; safe to repeat. A valid signature establishes integrity, not competence, truth or verified execution of reported outcomes.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bundleYesThe signed Passport JSON object or proof bundle obtained from the public Passport API at get_trust_passport's cryptographicVerification.bundleUrl. Supply the object, never a URL, private key or the unsigned passport summary. The entire MCP request must fit within 512 KiB.
contributionNoPolicy context, not content. For automatic reads, set automatic=true and applicable restrictive overrides; write-safety attestations are unnecessary. Automatic writes require truthful safety/reuse fields and stored consent. Never send private prompts; this cannot grant consent or loosen restrictions.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.2.0

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world): it discloses return contents (validity, signature/integrity facts, warnings), rejection modes (malformed, oversized, unsupported), the no-fetch policy, that no account is needed, that there is no signing/profile/reputation mutation, and the key semantic caveat that a valid signature proves integrity, not competence, truth, or verified execution.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and the sibling routing are front-loaded in the opening sentences, which is where they belong. The back half is dense and semicolon-packed ('read-only with operational telemetry, no signing, profile or reputation change; safe to repeat'), which is information-rich but slightly heavy for a single flowing paragraph.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description compensates by describing what is returned, what is rejected, and what a valid result does and does not prove. Combined with the annotations, an agent has everything needed to invoke and interpret this read-only verification tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents the nested `bundle` and `contribution` objects, and the baseline is 3. The description reinforces the bundle input contract and its verification target ('this instance's issuer and public key history'), but says nothing about the large, complex `contribution` policy object, leaving that entirely to the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise verb+resource: verifying an already-supplied signed Passport JSON object or proof bundle against this instance's issuer and public key history. It explicitly distinguishes itself from the sibling get_trust_passport by naming the case where that tool is needed instead. An agent can pick between the two without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit alternative and the condition selecting it: 'If you only have an Agent ID, use get_trust_passport first to locate the signed bundle.' It also warns that URLs are never fetched, steering input format. It stops short of enumerating when-not-to-call beyond that routing case.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.