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Flash-Loan Exploit Simulator & Safe-Harbor Planner

ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty
Read-onlyIdempotent

Simulate flash-loan exploit vectors for a protocol, inspect live TVL, and generate unsigned EIP-5792 Safe-Harbor rescue plans to validate whitehat bounty responses.

Instructions

Calls /api/v1/deep-exploit-bounty ($45.00 Full / $9.50 Essential USDC via x402 v2) for flash-loan exploit vector simulation, live TVL inspection, and unsigned EIP-5792 Safe-Harbor rescue plans.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "protocolName": "<protocolName>"
    },
    "name": "ingravity_simulateDeepExploitAndWhitehatBounty"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
codeNo
tierNoFULL
tvlUsdNo
chainIdNo
poolAddressNoOptional EVM pool or vault address (0x...).
protocolNameYesTarget protocol or pool name.
ownerTreasuryNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, openWorldHint=true, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds important non-schema behavior: it is a paid endpoint ($45.00 FULL / $9.50 ESSENTIAL USDC via x402 v2) and it returns unsigned EIP-5792 Safe-Harbor rescue plans. It still omits payment/auth flow details and rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The definition is a single front-loaded sentence that packs the endpoint, price tiers, and three capability outputs without repetition. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a paid open-world simulator with 7 parameters and no output schema, the definition is thin: it omits parameter semantics, prerequisites/payment flow, and what the simulation response contains. The annotations cover the safety profile, but the low schema coverage leaves the agent under-informed about how to call it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 29% across 7 parameters, so the description needs to compensate and largely does not. It clarifies tier pricing mapping for FULL versus ESSENTIAL, but leaves protocolName's expected format, code, tvlUsd, chainId, poolAddress, and ownerTreasury semantics unexplained beyond the sparse schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: calls /api/v1/deep-exploit-bounty to perform flash-loan exploit vector simulation, live TVL inspection, and unsigned EIP-5792 Safe-Harbor rescue planning. That purpose is distinct from the sibling audit, scan, and firewall tools, though the description does not explicitly name them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, and no alternatives are named. The listed capabilities imply an exploit-simulation and rescue-planning context, but the agent must infer when to choose this over tools like ingravity_auditSolidityContract or ingravity_scanTokenRugpullAndHoneypot.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.