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Create my app wallet (headless)

create_app_wallet
Idempotent

Create a DFM app wallet without a browser by generating a local P-256 owner key and signing a Privy policy request, so an agent can manage onchain funds headlessly.

Instructions

Create this agent's DFM APP WALLET without a browser. Generates a P-256 owner key on THIS machine (/root/.config/dfm/app-wallet-owner.pem or DFM_APP_WALLET_OWNER_KEY_PATH, mode 0600; reused if it exists, never overwritten), sends DFM only the public key, and signs the one Privy request that sets DFM's policy-bound signer (cash-out to the sign-in wallet only). The signer id and Privy app id are pinned in this MCP, not taken from the server; the per-wallet POLICY id is trusted to DFM (its content can only be read with Privy's app secret). Call it again when DFM reissues the policy. DFM never holds the key. Needs a SIWS sign-in (a local keypair, DFM_AGENT_KEYPAIR_PATH) — a dfm_ API key cannot create custody. Idempotent: returns the existing app wallet if there is one. Moves no funds.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.2.1967

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only carry readOnly/openWorld/idempotent hints; the description adds substantial context beyond them: exact key file path and 0600 mode, reuse-never-overwrite behavior, that only the public key is sent to DFM, the single policy-binding Privy signature, which ids are pinned locally vs trusted to DFM, and 'DFM never holds the key / moves no funds'. That is exactly the behavioral disclosure annotations cannot provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Long and dense, but front-loaded with the core action and free of filler; each clause (key handling, auth, idempotency, no-funds) carries distinct operational meaning. Splitting the security/policy details into a second sentence would help readability slightly, but nothing is padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter, no-output-schema tool, the description covers everything an agent needs: required auth (SIWS keypair), environment paths, what is returned on repeat calls, and the absence of fund movement. Nothing material is left for the agent to guess.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool takes zero parameters, so the baseline is 4; there is no schema surface the description needs to compensate for, and the path override (DFM_APP_WALLET_OWNER_KEY_PATH) is described as an environment input rather than a call argument.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Create this agent's DFM APP WALLET') and immediately scopes it with the discriminator 'without a browser' / 'headless'. An agent can separate it from create_identity_wallet, app_wallet, and create_api_key without opening a schema, and the title reinforces the distinction.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clearly gives prerequisites ('Needs a SIWS sign-in ... a dfm_ API key cannot create custody') and a re-invocation rule ('Call it again when DFM reissues the policy'). It does not name the sibling alternative to use when a browser or identity wallet is intended, so it stops short of full when-not/alternatives coverage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.