Have I Been Pwned MCP Server
我被黑了吗 MCP 服务器
模型上下文协议 (MCP) 服务器提供与Have I Been Pwned API 的集成,以检查您的帐户或密码是否在数据泄露中受到损害。
特征
该 MCP 服务器提供四个主要工具:
check_email :检查数据泄露中是否发现了电子邮件地址
check_password :检查密码是否在数据泄露中被泄露(使用 k-anonymity)
get_breach_details :获取有关特定数据泄露的详细信息
list_all_breaches :列出系统中的所有违规行为,可选择按域进行过滤
Related MCP server: Shodan-MCP-Server
安装
通过 Smithery 安装
要通过Smithery自动为 Claude Desktop 安装 hibp-mcp-server:
npx -y @smithery/cli install @Cyreslab-AI/hibp-mcp-server --client claude先决条件
Node.js(v14 或更高版本)
npm(v6 或更高版本)
Have I Been Pwned API 密钥(在haveibeenpwned.com/API/Key获取)
设置
克隆此存储库:
git clone https://github.com/Cyreslab-AI/hibp-mcp-server.git cd hibp-mcp-server安装依赖项:
npm install构建服务器:
npm run build在您的 MCP 设置文件中配置服务器:
对于 Claude VSCode 扩展,添加到
~/Library/Application Support/Code/User/globalStorage/saoudrizwan.claude-dev/settings/cline_mcp_settings.json:{ "mcpServers": { "hibp": { "command": "node", "args": ["/path/to/hibp-mcp-server/build/index.js"], "env": { "HIBP_API_KEY": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE" }, "disabled": false, "autoApprove": [] } } }对于 Claude 桌面应用程序,添加到
~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json(macOS) 或其他平台上的类似路径。
使用示例
服务器配置完成后,您可以使用 Claude 检查数据泄露:
检查电子邮件
User: Has my email address example@gmail.com been pwned?
Claude: Good news! This email address has not been found in any known data breaches.或者如果发现电子邮件存在违规行为:
User: Has my email address breached@example.com been pwned?
Claude: ⚠️ This email address was found in 3 data breaches.
Breach details:
1. Adobe (2013-10-04)
Domain: adobe.com
Description: In October 2013, 153 million Adobe accounts were breached...
Compromised data: Email addresses, Password hints, Passwords, Usernames
2. LinkedIn (2012-05-05)
Domain: linkedin.com
Description: In May 2016, LinkedIn had 164 million email addresses and passwords exposed...
Compromised data: Email addresses, Passwords
3. Dropbox (2012-07-01)
Domain: dropbox.com
Description: In mid-2012, Dropbox suffered a data breach which exposed...
Compromised data: Email addresses, Passwords
Recommendations:
- Change your password for these services immediately
- If you used the same password elsewhere, change those too
- Enable two-factor authentication where available
- Consider using a password manager检查密码
User: Has the password "password123" been exposed in any breaches?
Claude: ⚠️ This password has been exposed in data breaches 123,456 times!
Recommendations:
- Stop using this password immediately
- Change it on any site where you use it
- Use a unique, strong password for each account
- Consider using a password manager获取违规详情
User: Tell me about the LinkedIn data breach
Claude: # LinkedIn Data Breach
**Date:** 2012-05-05
**Domain:** linkedin.com
**Accounts affected:** 164,611,595
**Verified:** Yes
**Data leaked:** Email addresses, Passwords
**Description:**
In May 2016, LinkedIn had 164 million email addresses and passwords exposed. Originally hacked in 2012, the data remained out of sight until being offered for sale on a dark market site 4 years later. The passwords in the breach were stored as SHA1 hashes without salt, the vast majority of which were quickly cracked in the days following the release of the data.
**Recommendations:**
- If you had an account on this service, change your password
- If you used the same password elsewhere, change those too
- Monitor your accounts for suspicious activity
- Be cautious of phishing attempts that may use this leaked information列出所有违规行为
User: List all Adobe data breaches
Claude: Found 1 breaches for domain adobe.com:
1. Adobe (2013-10-04)
Domain: adobe.com
Accounts affected: 152,445,165
Compromised data: Email addresses, Password hints, Passwords, Usernames安全说明
密码检查功能使用 k-匿名来检查密码,而无需将完整密码发送到 Have I Been Pwned API
仅将密码 SHA-1 哈希的前 5 个字符发送到 API
API 返回与前缀匹配的哈希后缀列表,校验在本地完成
API 密钥配置
此服务器需要 Have I Been Pwned API 密钥才能使用大部分功能(密码检查除外)。您可以在haveibeenpwned.com/API/Key获取 API 密钥。
API 密钥应作为 MCP 设置配置中名为HIBP_API_KEY的环境变量提供。
执照
麻省理工学院
Available Tools
4 toolscheck_emailB
Check if an email address has been found in data breaches
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | Email address to check | ||
| include_unverified | No | Include unverified breaches in the results | |
| truncate_response | No | Truncate the response to only include breach names |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the tool's function but lacks details on permissions, rate limits, data sources, or response format. While it implies a read-only operation, it does not explicitly confirm safety or describe potential errors or limitations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, clear sentence with zero wasted words. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and efficiently communicates the tool's function without unnecessary elaboration.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity (3 parameters, no output schema, no annotations), the description is minimally adequate. It covers the basic purpose but lacks behavioral context and usage guidelines, leaving gaps in understanding how to effectively invoke the tool or interpret results.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents all parameters. The description does not add any meaning beyond what the schema provides, such as explaining the implications of 'include_unverified' or 'truncate_response' in practical terms. Baseline 3 is appropriate as the schema handles parameter documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the specific action ('check') and resource ('email address') with the explicit purpose of determining if it 'has been found in data breaches.' It distinguishes itself from siblings like check_password (different resource) and get_breach_details/list_all_breaches (different scope).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It does not mention sibling tools like check_password for password checks or get_breach_details for detailed breach information, leaving the agent to infer usage context without explicit direction.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
check_passwordB
Check if a password has been exposed in data breaches (using k-anonymity)
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| password | Yes | Password to check |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It mentions the method ('k-anonymity') but does not explain what this entails operationally, such as whether the password is sent in plaintext or hashed, any rate limits, privacy implications, or what the output looks like. This leaves significant gaps for a security-related tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that is front-loaded with the core purpose. There is no wasted verbiage, and every word contributes to understanding the tool's function, making it highly concise and well-structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity of a security tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description is incomplete. It fails to address critical behavioral aspects like data handling, error conditions, or result interpretation, which are essential for safe and effective use in this context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema description coverage is 100%, with the parameter 'password' clearly documented in the schema. The description adds no additional meaning beyond what the schema provides, such as format requirements or examples. Since the schema does the heavy lifting, the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the specific action ('Check if a password has been exposed') and the resource ('in data breaches'), with the technical method ('using k-anonymity') distinguishing it from potential siblings like 'check_email' or 'list_all_breaches'. It uses a precise verb and specifies the domain of operation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'check_email' or 'get_breach_details'. The description lacks context about prerequisites, such as whether the password needs to be hashed or if there are rate limits, and does not mention any exclusions or complementary tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_breach_detailsC
Get details about a specific data breach
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| breach_name | Yes | Name of the breach to get details for |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states it 'Get details' but doesn't describe what details are returned, if it's a read-only operation, any rate limits, authentication needs, or error conditions. This is a significant gap for a tool with zero annotation coverage.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence that directly states the tool's purpose with zero waste. It's appropriately sized and front-loaded, making it easy to parse quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the lack of annotations and no output schema, the description is incomplete. It doesn't explain what details are returned, the format of the response, or any behavioral traits. For a tool that fetches data, this leaves critical gaps in understanding how to use it effectively.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% description coverage, with the parameter 'breach_name' clearly documented. The description doesn't add any meaning beyond the schema (e.g., it doesn't explain what constitutes a valid breach name or provide examples), so it meets the baseline of 3 where the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose with a specific verb ('Get') and resource ('details about a specific data breach'), making it easy to understand what it does. However, it doesn't explicitly differentiate from sibling tools like 'list_all_breaches' (which likely lists breaches vs. getting details for one), so it misses full sibling distinction.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It doesn't mention when to use it over 'list_all_breaches' or other siblings, nor does it specify prerequisites or exclusions, leaving the agent with no usage context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_all_breachesC
List all breaches in the system
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | No | Filter breaches by domain |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries full burden for behavioral disclosure. It mentions 'List all breaches' but doesn't describe return format, pagination, rate limits, authentication needs, or whether it's a read-only operation. This is a significant gap for a tool with zero annotation coverage.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, efficient sentence with no wasted words. It's appropriately sized for a simple tool and front-loads the core purpose immediately.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no annotations and no output schema, the description is incomplete. It doesn't explain what 'breaches' entail, the return format, or behavioral traits. For a tool that likely returns sensitive data, more context on scope and usage is needed.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents the 'domain' parameter fully. The description doesn't add any parameter-specific information beyond what's in the schema, such as examples or constraints. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the tool's purpose ('List all breaches in the system') with a clear verb ('List') and resource ('breaches'), but it's vague about scope and doesn't distinguish from sibling tools like 'get_breach_details'. It doesn't specify whether 'all' means truly comprehensive or limited by some criteria.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'get_breach_details' or 'check_email'. The description implies a broad listing function but doesn't clarify use cases, prerequisites, or exclusions, leaving the agent to guess based on tool names alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
4 tool updates
v1.0.0- First observed
check_email - First observed
check_password - First observed
get_breach_details - First observed
list_all_breaches
TDQS
Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: checking email breaches, checking password exposures, getting details on a specific breach, and listing all breaches. There is no overlap in functionality, making tool selection straightforward for an agent.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (e.g., check_email, check_password, get_breach_details, list_all_breaches). The naming is uniform and predictable, using clear verbs that describe the action and nouns that specify the target.
With 4 tools, the server is well-scoped for its purpose of breach checking and information retrieval. Each tool serves a distinct and necessary function, covering the core operations of the Have I Been Pwned service without being overly sparse or bloated.
The tool set provides complete coverage for the domain: it allows checking for email and password exposures, retrieving details on specific breaches, and listing all breaches. There are no obvious gaps, as these tools cover the primary use cases of the service effectively.
Maintenance
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