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Cyreslab-AI

CIRCL CVE SEARCH MCP Server

browse_vendor

Read-only

Find products for a vendor sorted by recent vulnerability activity. Enter a vendor name to see their known products and associated CVEs.

Instructions

Browse known products for a vendor, sorted by most recent vulnerability activity

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoNumber of results to return (default: 10, max: 50)
vendorYesVendor name (e.g., "apache", "microsoft", "google")

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vendorYes
showingYes
productsYes
total_foundYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.2.0

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the description doesn't need to restate safety. It does add the sorting-by-recent-activity behavior, which is useful, but it doesn't clarify whether products without any vulnerability activity are included or what 'vulnerability activity' precisely means. The added value is moderate but not deficient.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single, concise sentence that front-loads the action and resource, then adds the sorting detail. Every word earns its place with no redundancy or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple browse tool, the description covers the purpose, the target resource, and the ordering. An output schema exists to describe return values, and the annotations cover safety and open-world semantics. Nothing critical for calling the tool correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% – both 'vendor' and 'limit' are fully described in the input schema, including defaults and constraints. The description adds no parameter-specific meaning beyond the schema, so a baseline score of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Browse'), a clear resource ('known products for a vendor'), and a sorting criterion ('most recent vulnerability activity'). It clearly distinguishes this from siblings like get_cve or get_recent_vulnerabilities, which operate on vulnerability records rather than vendor product lists.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage for browsing vendor products, but it does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus the sibling tools (e.g., get_recent_vulnerabilities for global vulnerability feeds). The differentiation is clear from the purpose, but there are no explicit 'use when' or 'instead of' instructions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.