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Glama
adversarial-rea

adversarial-rea

by Cultistsid

Server Configuration

Describes the environment variables required to run the server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ADV_REA_ALLOWED_ROOTSNoFor an MCP client that should see only one directory, set ADV_REA_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/absolute/path/to/targets in its server environment. Without it, any readable local regular file can be submitted for inspection.

Instructions

Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.

This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.

Capabilities

Features and capabilities supported by this server

Protocol revision2025-11-25

CapabilityDetails
tools
{}

Tools

Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions

NameDescription
analyze_binaryC

Extract binary metadata, symbols, strings, and security info from a target

get_symbolsC

Extract symbols (functions, imports, exports) from binary

get_stringsC

Extract and classify strings from binary (credentials, URLs, paths, etc.)

check_securityA

Check binary security mitigations (PIE, NX, canary, RELRO, FORTIFY)

disassembleC

Disassemble binary or specific function

get_sectionsB

List binary sections with sizes and attributes

get_headersC

Extract binary headers (architecture, entry point, etc.)

find_dangerous_patternsC

List unverified imports, strings, and mitigation signals for manual review

trace_callsC

Observed direct native call instructions; flow and exploitability remain unknown

inspect_carrierC

Bounded file/container metadata only; does not claim vulnerability analysis

inspect_flow_fixtureC

Reproduce in-memory flow in a bounded .flow.json fixture only; not native evidence

find_gadget_candidatesC

Byte-verified ELF64 x86_64 gadget candidates, not runtime exploit addresses

Prompts

Interactive templates invoked by user choice

NameDescription

No prompts

Resources

Contextual data attached and managed by the client

NameDescription

No resources

TDQS

B3.2/5.0

Scored across 12 tools

Disambiguation3/5

Most specialized tools target distinct artifacts (symbols, strings, sections, headers, security flags, disassembly), but analyze_binary acts as an umbrella that overlaps several of them. find_dangerous_patterns also overlaps with check_security, get_symbols, and get_strings, so an agent may be unsure whether to call the aggregate or specialized tools.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most names follow a predictable verb_object pattern: get_symbols, check_security, find_dangerous_patterns, inspect_carrier, and trace_calls. The main deviation is disassemble, which is a bare verb, and some tool names are more verbose than others, but the set remains readable and consistent overall.

Tool Count5/5

Twelve tools is well within the appropriate range for a binary analysis server. Each tool appears to cover a specific static-analysis concern, from headers and sections to symbols, strings, security mitigations, disassembly, call tracing, and gadget candidates.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the core static binary-analysis lifecycle: metadata, headers, sections, symbols, strings, security checks, disassembly, dangerous pattern inspection, call tracing, and gadget discovery. Minor gaps remain around operations like byte-level inspection, cross-references, binary diffing, or patching, but the main analysis workflows are represented.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo recent community issues