@cubiczan/chp-mcp
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceSelf-hosted MCP gateway that applies deterministic, compiled policy to tool discovery, invocation, and outbound data flow, with no model in the enforcement path. Every decision emits a hash-chained receipt sealed with Ed25519 and verifiable using public keys only.Apache 2.0
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authensor-mcp-serverofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenancePolicy enforcement gateway for MCP tool calls, evaluating every tool invocation against declarative YAML policies (allow/deny/escalate-to-human), generating cryptographic hash-chained audit receipts, and including built-in content safety scanning.2MIT- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables MCP clients to govern downstream tool servers by enforcing default-deny authority and attestation on every tool call, with live monitoring, approval, and mid-session revocation.3Apache 2.0
TDQS
Scored across 12 tools
The authorization lifecycle is split across several tools with fuzzy boundaries: evaluate_spend_gate and evaluate_tool_approval both evaluate proposed actions, while approve_spend, issue_approval_receipt, and request_authorization can all produce signed receipts. Detailed descriptions help, but an agent selecting by name alone will struggle to identify the correct phase.
Most tools follow a clear lowercase verb_noun pattern such as evaluate_spend_gate, place_equity_order, inspect_audit_ledger, and authorize_tool_call. The only deviations are the two chp_* utility tools, chp_content_hash and chp_version, which are consistently prefixed but not verb-led.
Twelve tools is within the ideal range for a policy/authorization MCP and the count is not bloated. However, there is some redundancy in the approval and receipt-issuance tools, so a couple of tools could be consolidated without losing functionality.
The core flow is covered end-to-end: evaluate policy, request/approve authorization, issue and verify receipts, execute scoped reference tools, and inspect the audit ledger. Missing pieces are mostly non-critical, such as explicit receipt revocation or allowlist management, but agents can work around these.