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CryptoAPIs-io

@cryptoapis-io/mcp-signer

Official

tezos_sign

Sign Tezos operations locally for tz1, tz2, or tz3 keys: decodes and validates reveal/transaction ops against expected destination, amount, and fee, then returns signed hex to broadcast.

Instructions

Sign a Tezos operation locally for tz1 (ed25519), tz2 (secp256k1) or tz3 (P-256) keys. Action sign-forged-operation: pass the forgedOperation hex from prepare_transactions_tezos and the secret key (edsk…/spsk…/p2sk…). Before signing, the operation is decoded and checked: only reveal/transaction ops from the key's own address are signed, and expected (destination, amount in mutez, maxFee) must match — always pass what the user asked for. Returns signedOperation (hex to broadcast with broadcast_signed_transaction), operationHash (o…), signature and the decoded contents. SECURITY: Private keys may be logged by MCP clients or stored in conversation history — use only in trusted local environments.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.5.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses local signing, pre-signing decoding and validation, operation-type restrictions, expected-field matching, return fields, and a prominent security warning about private-key logging. This is rich, actionable behavioral context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with purpose and action, then validation, return values, and security in a logical order. Most sentences earn their place, but some clauses are densely packed (e.g., 'Action sign-forged-operation') and the security warning, while valuable, adds length.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no annotations, no output schema, and an empty input schema, the description must carry the full load. It covers purpose, workflow, validation, returns, and security well, but the absence of a structured parameter schema means required/optional status and exact argument shapes remain only prose-inferred, leaving a structural gap for invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema is empty with zero parameters, so the description is the sole source of parameter information. It names forgedOperation (hex from prepare_transactions_tezos), secret key formats (edsk…/spsk…/p2sk…), and the expected object fields (destination, amount in mutez, maxFee), adding substantial meaning beyond the empty schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Sign) and resource (Tezos operation), names supported key types (tz1/tz2/tz3), and specifies the action (sign-forged-operation). The Tezos focus clearly differentiates it from sibling sign tools like evm_sign and kaspa_sign.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear workflow context: obtain forgedOperation from prepare_transactions_tezos, then broadcast the result with broadcast_signed_transaction. It also states validation constraints (only reveal/transaction ops from the key's own address) and the need to pass the user's intended expected values, but does not explicitly name an alternative signing tool to use for other chains.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.