trustverdict
Scans Docker packages through the package-scanning tool and returns a signed trust verdict, score, and findings.
Scans public GitHub repositories addressed as owner/name and returns a signed trust decision, trust score, adoption score, and findings.
Scans Hugging Face packages through the package-scanning tool and returns a signed trust verdict, score, and findings.
Scans npm packages by name and returns a signed trust verdict, score, and findings.
Scans PyPI packages by name and returns a signed trust verdict, score, and findings.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
trustverdict
Before you connect an agent, a repo, a package or an MCP server, ask whether it deserves trust. trustverdict puts that question to a trust-verification service and brings back its signed answer: a decision you can act on, the one reason that drove it, a 0–100 trust score, and the findings underneath. Eight read-only tools cover the whole surface, and none of them needs an account or an API key — every call is anonymous.
Scan results come back exactly as the service issued them. Nothing is rescored, renamed or summarised locally, because the result is a signed attestation: its value is that it is the service's own output, recomputable offline.
Configuration
One environment variable controls the client:
AGENTAVOW_URL(optional) — the service base URL. Defaults tohttps://agentavow.com.
There is no API key and no auth header.
Related MCP server: mcp-sentinel
Tools
scan_repo— scan a public GitHub repo, addressed asowner/name. The answer leads with the decision, a signed 0–100 trust score, and the adoption score.scan_package— scan a package by name; an optionalecosystemsays which registry it lives on (npm, PyPI, crates, Docker, or Hugging Face).scan_mcp_server— point it at a live MCP serverurl; its tool definitions are checked for poisoning and prompt-injection.verify_trust— resolve anagentidentity and get its current trust score.check_interaction_safety— ask whether a specificinteraction(for example delegating work or trading) with anagentis safe.lookup_identity— resolve a DID (did:web:…ordid:key:…) or search agents by name with onequery.get_trust_badge— a shields-style badge for anagent: the SVG URL plus ready-to-paste README markdown.about_agentavow— how the service reaches a verdict and how to read one. This tool is answered locally and makes no request.
Reading a verdict
Every scan leads with decision — safe, review, or
do_not_connect — and the decision_reason that
triggered it, followed by a summary, the signed
trust_score from 0 to 100, the tier, whether the
subject is certified, the adoption score, and the
findings. A second, binary verdict (safe or
needs_review) carries its own verdict_reason:
clean, blocking_findings, thin_coverage, or
low_signals. Scan attestations are Ed25519-signed
(JWS) and can be recomputed offline.
Validation and errors
Validation runs before any request. An empty or missing
argument fails with <arg> must be a non-empty string,
and scan_repo additionally requires the owner/name
shape, failing with repo must look like owner/name.
An upstream non-2xx reply fails with
agentavow error: HTTP <status>; an unreachable service
fails with agentavow unreachable.
Endpoint provenance
Every request path below is a labelled reconstruction: the service's tool surface, base URL and verdict vocabulary are documented, but the per-tool wire paths are not pinned by the documentation, so these follow the documented base and REST conventions.
POST /api/scan/repo— reconstruction (scan_repo)POST /api/scan/package— reconstruction (scan_package)POST /api/scan/mcp-server— reconstruction (scan_mcp_server)GET /api/agents/<agent>/trust— reconstruction (verify_trust)POST /api/interaction-safety— reconstruction (check_interaction_safety)GET /api/identity?q=<query>— reconstruction (lookup_identity)GET /api/agents/<agent>/badge— reconstruction (get_trust_badge)
The agent segment in the two GET paths and the q=
value are URL-encoded. about_agentavow has no wire at
all.
CLI
Each tool is a subcommand taking one JSON argument string:
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict scan_repo '{"repo":"octocat/hello-world"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict scan_package '{"package":"express","ecosystem":"npm"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict scan_mcp_server '{"url":"https://example.com/mcp"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict verify_trust '{"agent":"did:web:example.com"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict check_interaction_safety '{"agent":"did:web:example.com","interaction":"delegate"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict lookup_identity '{"query":"did:web:example.com"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict get_trust_badge '{"agent":"did:web:example.com"}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict about_agentavow '{}'
npx @reneturcios/trustverdict --versionOutput is the tool's result text (the upstream JSON on
success). Exit codes: 0 on success, 1 on a runtime
error (including a validation or upstream failure), 2
on a usage error.
MCP server
npx -y @reneturcios/trustverdict mcpMCP client config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"trustverdict": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@reneturcios/trustverdict", "mcp"]
}
}
}Docker
docker run -i ghcr.io/cloudcorprecords/trustverdict
docker run --rm ghcr.io/cloudcorprecords/trustverdict scan_repo '{"repo":"octocat/hello-world"}'Development
npm install
npm run build # tsc -> dist/
npm test # tsx --test test/*.test.ts (fake fetch only, no network)
npm run dev # run the CLI from sourceLicense
MIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Rene Turcios
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Signed, offline-verifiable safety scores for the MCP servers, packages & tools an agent connects to
Read-only lookup of tested agent tools and MCP servers: scores, test evidence, deprecation.
Trust infrastructure for AI agents: read a verifiable Trust Rating, claim an identity, earn a badge.
Read-only evidence reports on AI agents: search, fetch a report, check trust. Not a certification.
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