CSL-Core
Related Servers
Alternatives to CSL-Core
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseAqualityAmaintenanceProof-of-behavior enforcement for AI agents. Declare behavioral constraints, enforce at runtime, produce SHA-256 hash-chained audit trails. Supports covenants (permit/forbid/require), real-time verification, and cross-agent trust handshakes.440MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceDeterministic policy enforcement for AI agent tool calls. It evaluates every tool call against user-defined rules before execution, with no LLM in the authorization path.3MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityAmaintenanceA runtime gate for coding agents. Blocks the tool calls that wreck a repo (force-push main, rm -rf, secret exfiltration, CI wipe) and lets normal build and commit work through. Machine-checked git-branch core (z3); the rest is high-precision heuristics. Tested on 3,790 real CI commands, 0 false blocks.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityNot gradedmaintenanceEnables formal verification of LLM outputs against compliance ontologies using Z3 SMT solver. Validates that AI-generated content adheres to regulatory requirements like HIPAA or mortgage compliance rules.MIT
- AlicenseBqualityAmaintenanceEnables deterministic verification for AI assistants by executing Python code that uses symbolic engines like SymPy and Z3 for math, logic, and code analysis.2Apache 2.0

agentguardofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityAmaintenanceEnforces policy controls for AI agents, including spend limits, action approvals, kill switch, scoped credentials, dry-run diffs, loop prevention, and auditable hash-chained logs.MIT
TDQS
Scored across 11 tools
Most tools are clearly distinct, especially the verification tools which have explicit guidance on when to use which (verify_policy vs tla_verify vs simulate_policy). The venom_* tools form a coherent workflow, though venom_inventory and venom_agent share the inspection space—inventory gives all agents, agent gives one—but the distinction is clear from descriptions. No major overlap or misselection risk.
Mixed naming conventions: venom_* tools use a clear prefix, but the rest are a mix of verb_noun (explain_policy, scaffold_policy), verb_verb (verify_policy, simulate_policy), and noun_verb (tla_verify, universe_info) patterns. While readable, there is no single consistent verb_noun pattern across the set.
11 tools are well-scoped for a CSL policy management and verification server. Each tool covers a distinct facet: inventory, agent inspection, policy context, drafting, exemptions, explanation, scaffolding, simulation, TLA+ verification, universe analysis, and Z3 verification. No tool feels redundant or missing.
The surface covers the full lifecycle of CSL policy work: inspection, drafting, verification, simulation, formal analysis, and exemption handling. One potential gap is direct activation or deployment of policies, but the descriptions explicitly state that activation is done via CLI by the operator, which aligns with the tool's design. No critical dead ends for the stated purpose.