Cyan Eclipse Agent Wallet MCP
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| AGENT_WALLET_LEDGER | No | Override the path to the ledger file where state persists (defaults to ledger.json beside the server). |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| create_walletA | Create a sandbox agent wallet owned by a named human. A wallet cannot spend until its owner grants a policy. Optional desk binding (desk_id + desk_pubkey): the wallet takes the desk key's real EVM address and every spend then requires that desk key's signature. |
| get_walletB | Wallet summary: balance, frozen state, spend today, active policy. |
| set_policyB | The owner grants the spending scope: per-transaction cap, daily cap, approval threshold, recipient allowlist, expiry, purpose. Returns a plain-language liability receipt. Responsibility follows this scope. |
| fund_walletB | SANDBOX faucet: add simulated test USDC so demos and tests can run. Not real money. |
| check_paymentA | Dry-run a payment against the policy. Returns allow / approve / deny with the reason. Agents should call this before pay. |
| payB | Execute a payment if it is inside the granted scope. Outside scope: rejected, or routed to the human approval queue if it only exceeds the approval threshold. Desk-bound wallets must pass authorization {nonce, signature} from the bound desk key. |
| approve_paymentB | Owner approves a pending payment request; it executes immediately. |
| deny_paymentC | Owner denies a pending payment request. |
| audit_logC | The append-only audit trail: policy grants, payments, rejections, approvals, revocations. The evidence of what was authorized. |
| revokeB | KILL SWITCH: freeze the wallet instantly. All spending stops; the revocation is timestamped in the audit log. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 10 tools
Each tool maps to a distinct action on a single resource: create/get wallet, set policy, fund, dry-run check, execute pay, approve/deny pending requests, audit trail, and revoke. The check_payment vs pay split is explicitly clarified as dry-run vs execute, and approve/deny are clearly owner-side actions on pending requests. No two tools appear to do the same thing.
Most tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (create_wallet, get_wallet, set_policy, fund_wallet, check_payment, approve_payment, deny_payment). Minor deviations exist with bare verbs (pay, revoke) and a noun-like name (audit_log), but the convention is still predictable and readable.
Ten tools is well-scoped for a wallet with policy enforcement: creation, inspection, policy, funding, pre-flight check, payment, approval flow, audit, and kill switch each earn their place. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.
The core lifecycle (create, policy, pay, approve/deny, audit, revoke) is well covered, but the approval workflow has a notable gap: there is no tool to list pending payment requests, so approve_payment/deny_payment require IDs an agent cannot discover. There is also no unfreeze/unrevoke or wallet-listing operation, which limits recovery and multi-wallet workflows.