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@brightbeamai/chap-coordinator-mcp

@brightbeamai/chap-coordinator-mcp

Official
by BrightbeamAI
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
Python
Remote

Revoke signing key

chap.participant.revoke_key
Destructive

Revoke a signing key to block signatures from a lost or compromised device. Admins can revoke another participant's key; revoked keys are refused thereafter.

Instructions

Revoke a signing key, for example after a device is lost. Signatures presented with it are refused from then on. Revoking another participant's key requires the admin role.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "workspace": "<workspace>",
      "from": "<from>",
      "target_uri": "<target_uri>",
      "kid": "<kid>"
    },
    "name": "chap.participant.revoke_key"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kidYesKey id to revoke. It is marked revoked with a timestamp and a reason, and signatures presented with it are refused from then on. A key id that is unknown is refused with -32071.
fromYesParticipant URI, e.g. 'human:alice@example.org' or 'agent:bot@local'.
reasonNoWhy the key was revoked, e.g. 'laptop lost'. Recorded on the key and in the audit entry.
workspaceYesWorkspace identifier, e.g. 'wsp_techcorp_support'.
target_uriYesWhose key is being revoked. Revoking another member's key requires the caller to hold the role 'admin'; otherwise the call is refused with -32011.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.2.13

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false and idempotentHint=false, so the description's job is to add context beyond that. It does: the downstream effect ('signatures presented with it are refused from then on') and the admin authorization requirement are both useful behavioral facts not present in the annotations. It does not address the non-idempotent hint (e.g. what happens on a repeat revoke), leaving one annotation-implied behavior unexplained.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action, followed by the effect and the authorization caveat. No filler, no repetition of the schema, and every sentence carries distinct information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with no output schema, the description covers purpose, consequence and authorization, which is most of what an agent needs. The remaining gap is the non-idempotency and reversibility story (can a revocation be undone? what does a second revoke return?), which the annotations hint at but the description never resolves.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and every parameter (kid, from, workspace, target_uri, reason) is already documented in the schema, including error codes -32071 and -32011. The description's mention of the admin role for another participant's key is the only parameter-relevant addition, and even that is duplicated in the target_uri schema text, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Revoke a signing key') plus a concrete motivating scenario ('after a device is lost'). It is clear what the tool does, though it never names the obvious sibling alternative chap.participant.rotate_key, so an agent must infer the rotate-vs-revoke distinction on its own.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides a clear use context ('after a device is lost') and a hard precondition ('Revoking another participant's key requires the admin role'), which tells the agent when the call is permitted. It stops short of explicit when-not guidance or naming the rotate_key alternative, so it is context-rich but not fully routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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