Stop agent

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses that the signal reaches the entire process group so child shells/builds (cargo, check_task) are killed, and that the call is idempotent. It omits what happens to the agent's recorded state/result after the kill and whether permissions are required.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One front-loaded sentence with no filler; the core action comes first and the process-group consequence and idempotency follow compactly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive control action with no annotations or output schema, the description covers the key risk (collateral process-group kill) and repeat-call safety. Only post-condition state and return behavior are left unstated, which is minor.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single 'agent' parameter is fully documented in the schema ('Agent ID or name'), so the baseline is 3. The description adds no further semantics about how the identifier is resolved when both an ID and a name could match.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb ('Interrupt') plus resource ('running or approval-parked agent') and an explicit scope (the whole process group). It does not name the plural sibling stop_agents, so an agent must infer the difference between stopping one agent and stopping several.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'Running or approval-parked agent' implies the applicable state, but there is no explicit when-not guidance, no prerequisites (permissions, whether the agent must be idle), and no mention of the alternative stop_agents for multi-agent cases.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.