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BigfootBytes

threatlocker-mcp-server

by BigfootBytes

ThreatLocker Organizations

organizations
Destructive

List, search, and provision ThreatLocker client containers. Retrieve installation auth keys, rotate keys, and get org IDs to scope policies, applications, and computers.

Instructions

Query ThreatLocker organizations.

Organizations are the top-level containers in ThreatLocker. MSPs have a parent organization with child organizations for each client. Enterprises may have organizations per business unit or location.

Common workflows:

  • List child organizations: action=list_children

  • Search for a client org: action=list_children, searchText="client name"

  • List all nested children (full tree): action=list_children, includeAllChildren=true

  • Get installation auth key: action=get_auth_key

  • Get orgs available for moving computers: action=get_for_move_computers

  • Provision a client org: action=timezones (pick an id) → action=create_child, displayName="...", timezoneId="..." → get_auth_key → deploy

  • Rotate the org auth key: action=rotate_auth_key (DESTRUCTIVE — invalidates the old key and breaks existing deploy scripts)

The organizationId is needed for many API calls (policies, applications, etc.) to scope the request to a specific organization.

Pitfalls:

  • get_auth_key returns the install/auth key used to deploy agents and to resolve groups via computer_groups get_by_install_key.

Permissions: View Organizations, Edit Organizations, Super Admin - Child. Pagination: list_children is paginated (use fetchAllPages=true to auto-fetch all pages). Key response fields: organizationId, name, displayName, dateAdded, computerCount.

Related tools: computers (computers in org), computer_groups (groups in org), policies (policies in org)

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNocreate_child: RMM identifier used in deploy scripts (defaults to displayName). A mismatch creates duplicates.
actionYeslist_children=list child orgs, get_auth_key=installation key for current org, get_for_move_computers=orgs available for computer relocation, timezones=list valid timezone ids (for create_child), create_child=create a child organization, rotate_auth_key=generate a NEW org auth key (DESTRUCTIVE: breaks existing deploy scripts)
domainsNocreate_child: org domains (e.g. ["client.com"]).
optionsNocreate_child: org option names (inherits from parent if omitted).
orderByNoField to order by
pageSizeNoResults per page (default: 25, max: 500)
pageNumberNoPage number (default: 1)
searchTextNoFilter by name (for list_children)
timezoneIdNocreate_child: timezone id from action=timezones (required). Use the exact id value, not the display name.
displayNameNocreate_child: human-readable org name (required).
isAscendingNoSort ascending (default: true)
fetchAllPagesNoFetch all pages automatically (max 10 pages). Default: false (single page).
itarCompliantNocreate_child: restrict access/management to inside the USA (default false).
proxyUrlEntryNocreate_child: proxy URL; requires useProxyServer=true.
timeoutOnLoginNocreate_child: login timeout in minutes.
useProxyServerNocreate_child: enable proxy configuration (default false).
response_formatNoOutput format: markdown (default, human-readable) or json (structured)markdown
proxyServerOptionNocreate_child: proxy protocol ("http://"/"https://"); requires useProxyServer=true.
includeAllChildrenNoInclude nested children (default: false)
elevationDefaultHoursNocreate_child: default elevation expiry hours (0=no expiration).
hasDisabledEmailNotificationsNocreate_child: disable user emails except password resets (default false).

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataNoResponse data — shape varies by action
errorNo
successYes
paginationNo
Install Server

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes far beyond the annotations by specifying what the destructive rotation does ('invalidates the old key and breaks existing deploy scripts'), what get_auth_key returns, pagination fetching behavior, required permissions, and key response fields. This gives the agent concrete behavioral expectations for each action.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but exceptionally organized with labeled sections: workflows, pitfals, permissions, pagination, response fields, and related tools. Every section earns its place and adds operational value; the most critical workflow snippets are listed early.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex tool with 21 parameters and six actions, the description covers workflows, destruction warnings, permissions, pagination, response fields, and sibling-tool relationships. An output schema exists, and the description correctly avoids redundant return-value explanation while providing complementary operational context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 100% schema description coverage, the baseline is 3, and the description adds meaningful workflow context around parameters (e.g., timezoneId must come from action=timezones, name mismatches create duplicates, fetchAllPages vs pagination). It does not need to re-explain every parameter because the schema already covers them, but the action-to-parameter orchestration is valuable.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies the tool as the entry point for ThreatLocker organizations and enumerates the distinct actions it supports (list_children, get_auth_key, create_child, etc.). It also defines organizations as top-level containers and distinguishes this tool from siblings like computers, computer_groups, and policies, so an agent can select it confidently.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides explicit common workflows with exact action values and parameter examples, such as listing children with searchText and creating a child org with timezoneId. It also states pitfals, pagination behavior, permissions, and related sibling tools, giving clear when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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