picus_get_threat

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations provided; description lists included return fields (description, severity, etc.) but omits behavioral traits such as idempotency, authentication, or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two efficient sentences with front-loaded purpose and no extraneous content.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Description thoroughly explains return content for a single-parameter retrieval tool, though it omits error handling or potential edge cases.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%; description does not clarify the 'threat_id' parameter beyond its type and requirement, failing to add meaningful context.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description clearly states the action ('Get') and resource ('full detail for a single threat'), distinguishing it from sibling tools like picus_search_threats and picus_list_threat_actions.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Description implies usage for retrieving a specific threat's details but lacks explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like search or list endpoints.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.