hardened-terminal-mcp

A security-hardened MCP server that lets an AI model run a small, explicitly allowlisted set of terminal commands — safely.

Why

Giving a model raw shell access is dangerous: one crafted string can chain commands, read secrets, or escape the working directory. This server turns "let the model run commands" into a bounded, auditable operation instead of an open door. Every command is checked against a deny-by-default policy, run with no shell, jailed to one directory, time- and output-bounded, and logged to an append-only audit trail before it is allowed to run.

Related MCP server: Shell-MCP

Demo

Real output, captured from a jail with ls, cat, echo allowlisted and rm denied:

>>> explain_command("ls -la")
{
  "ok": true,
  "code": "OK",
  "stdout": "",
  "stderr": "",
  "exit_code": null,
  "duration_ms": 0,
  "policy_reason": "command 'ls' is allowed"
}

>>> run_command("ls -la")
{
  "ok": true,
  "code": "OK",
  "stdout": "total 44\ndrwxrwxr-x  2 asaad asaad  4096 Jul 30 18:36 .\ndrwxrwxrwt 24 root  root  36864 Jul 30 18:36 ..\n",
  "stderr": "",
  "exit_code": 0,
  "duration_ms": 4,
  "policy_reason": "command 'ls' is allowed"
}

>>> run_command("rm -rf /")
{
  "ok": false,
  "code": "POLICY_DENIED",
  "stdout": "",
  "stderr": "",
  "exit_code": null,
  "duration_ms": 0,
  "policy_reason": "command 'rm' is on the denylist"
}

>>> run_command("cat /etc/passwd", cwd="/etc")
{
  "ok": false,
  "code": "CWD_ESCAPE",
  "stdout": "",
  "stderr": "",
  "exit_code": null,
  "duration_ms": 0,
  "policy_reason": "cwd escapes jail root: '/etc'"
}

Quickstart

Requires Python 3.12+. Install with uv:

uv sync

Write a minimal policy.toml:

jail_root = "/srv/htmcp/sandbox"   # commands are jailed here; REQUIRED

[allowlist]
commands = ["ls", "cat", "echo"]

[denylist]
commands = ["rm"]

Register it with your MCP client:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "hardened-terminal": {
      "command": "uv",
      "args": ["run", "hardened-terminal-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "HTMCP_JAIL_ROOT": "/srv/htmcp/sandbox",
        "HTMCP_POLICY_FILE": "/srv/htmcp/policy.toml"
      }
    }
  }
}

How it works

flowchart LR
    client([MCP client / model]) -->|run_command / explain_command| server[server.py]
    server -->|explain| policy[policy engine<br/>deny-by-default, no shell]
    policy -->|deny| result[CommandResult envelope]
    policy -->|allow| jail{cwd inside jail?}
    jail -->|escape| result
    jail -->|ok| exec[executor<br/>shell=False, env scrub, timeout, cap]
    exec --> redact[redaction<br/>before truncation]
    redact --> result
    result --> client

    server -. attempt record<br/>BEFORE execution .-> audit[(append-only<br/>audit.jsonl)]
    server -. outcome record<br/>AFTER execution .-> audit

The audit log is a side branch, not on the return path: the attempt record is written before the executor runs, and the outcome record after. explain_command follows the same path with execution skipped.

Security guarantees

Threat model

Does not defend against (out of scope by design):

• A dangerous command you allowlisted. If you allow an interpreter or a shell-like tool (bash, python, sh, find -exec, awk, env, …), the model can do anything that tool can. Policy strength is entirely the operator's allowlist.

• Kernel / sandbox escapes. The jail is a path-containment check, not a kernel sandbox — there are no namespaces, cgroups, or seccomp. A local-privilege or kernel exploit reachable from an allowlisted binary is not contained.

• Host access to the audit log. The trail is tamper-evident to the server, not tamper-proof. Anyone with filesystem access to audit.jsonl can read, alter, or delete it.

• Redaction completeness. Redaction is pattern-based and best-effort; a novel secret format the patterns don't recognise can pass through.

Compared to a naive terminal MCP server

Many quick MCP servers wrap subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True). That is convenient and unsafe. This table is factual, not a claim of perfect security.

Reference

Both tools return a CommandResult:

CommandResult {
  ok: bool                 # true only for OK / OUTPUT_TRUNCATED
  code: ResultCode         # see taxonomy below
  stdout: str              # redacted; empty for explain / non-executing paths
  stderr: str              # redacted
  exit_code: int | null    # process exit code; null when nothing ran
  duration_ms: int
  policy_reason: str | null  # human-readable allow/deny reason
}

• run_command(command: str, cwd: str | None = None) — evaluate command against policy and, if allowed, run it sandboxed. cwd (if given) must resolve inside the jail root, else CWD_ESCAPE. Every call is audited.

• explain_command(command: str) — dry run: return the policy verdict only, with empty stdout/stderr and exit_code = null. It never reaches the executor.

Each code maps to exactly one condition.

Env values override the file. Startup fails loudly on a missing/invalid policy, an unset or non-directory jail root, an invalid operator regex, or an audit log located inside the jail root.

# jail_root is REQUIRED (here or via HTMCP_JAIL_ROOT). Keep the audit log OUTSIDE it.
jail_root = "/srv/htmcp/sandbox"

audit_log = "/var/log/htmcp/audit.jsonl"
audit_fail_mode = "closed"   # "closed" = don't run if unloggable; "open" = run + warn

[allowlist]
commands = ["ls", "cat", "echo", "git"]

[denylist]
commands = ["rm", "shutdown", "curl"]   # denylist always wins

# Allowed in general, denied for specific argument patterns (order-independent).
[[rules]]
command = "git"
deny_args = ["push --force", "push -f"]
reason = "force-push rewrites shared history"

[redaction]
enabled = true
entropy_fallback = false   # noisy on hashes/UUIDs/base64 — see Caveats
extra_patterns = []        # e.g. [{ name = "internal_id", regex = "INT-[0-9]{8}" }]

Honest caveats

This is a hardening layer, not a vault. Read these before deploying.

• Redaction is best-effort, not a guarantee. It is regex/pattern-based. It catches common secret shapes (see the pattern list) but a novel or unusual format will pass through. Do not rely on it as your only secret control, and do not allowlist commands that print secrets you can't afford to leak.

• The audit log is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof. The server writes append-only with per-record flush+fsync, so it won't lose records to a crash. But anyone with host filesystem access can read, edit, or delete audit.jsonl. Protect it with OS permissions and ship it off-host if you need integrity.

• The jail is a path check, not a kernel sandbox. Containment is a resolve + is_relative_to check on the cwd. There are no namespaces, cgroups, or seccomp. A process that can escape via a kernel bug or an allowlisted escape hatch is not contained. For stronger isolation, run the whole server inside a container/VM.

• Policy strength is entirely the operator's allowlist. The engine faithfully enforces what you configure. Allow bash, python, env, find, or any tool with -exec/eval semantics and you have handed over a general-purpose shell. Keep the allowlist minimal and argument-scoped.

Testing

uv run pytest

84 tests, isolated with tmp_path (they never touch a real policy or audit log):

• test_policy.py (22) — deny-by-default, denylist-wins, case/spacing bypasses, metacharacter rejection, argument rules

• test_executor.py (7) — shell=False, timeout+kill, output cap, env scrub, cwd validation, refused commands

• test_server.py (16) — one test per ResultCode, both tools, envelope shape, cwd escapes, explain-never-executes

• test_audit.py (15) — attempt/outcome records, fail-closed vs fail-open, schema, no output content, redacted command_raw/argv, jail-root rules

• test_redact.py (23) — one case per pattern, no-false-positives (paths, SHAs, UUIDs, cp -p), entropy on/off, redaction before truncation

• test_smoke.py (1) — import/health smoke

CI runs the suite plus gitleaks on every push and pull request (see .github/workflows/ci.yml).

Related work

• Asaad-Suliman/MCP-file-organizer — a companion safe-MCP-server project applying the same deny-by-default, audited, least-privilege approach to filesystem operations.

• Asaad-Suliman/safe-mcp-suite — this server's successor: the terminal server and the file organizer rebuilt together on one shared, deny-by-default safety core.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.