synartesis-proxy
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@synartesis-proxyundo the last update_customer call"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.

An agent with write access to a real system runs twenty steps, misreads step seven, and applies the rest to the wrong records. Today your options are to reverse it by hand from the transcript, restore a backup and lose every legitimate change made in the same window, or accept the damage.
Synartesis sits between your MCP client and the servers it talks to. It records every tool call with the state that call replaced, and it can put that state back. What cannot be put back, it refuses to let an agent do unsupervised.
It is not a sandbox: the container your agent runs in is disposable, but the
CRM row it updated over the network is not. It is not a tracing tool: a trace
tells you update_customer ran forty times, not what the values were before.
What it looks like
Both shots are real output from ./demo/filesystem-demo.sh,
pasted rather than typeset. An agent overwrote a file and tried to move another.
One command puts the first back and reports that the second never happened:

skip is the interesting row. move_file is irreversible on that server, so it
was never applied in the first place — there is nothing to undo.
Now the same damage, except a colleague edited the file before you got to the undo. Writing the old contents back would destroy their work, so it does not:

It stops at the record that moved and exits non-zero. Anything already put back
stays put back, and it prints the three ways on: leave it, restore the resource
and --replan, or --force to overwrite deliberately.
Related MCP server: mcp-compensator
Install
npm install -g synartesisThen, from anywhere:
synartesis installThat finds what Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor or Codex already list,
writes one policy covering all of it, and points each entry at the proxy.
Servers it recognises get the policy that ships for them and work immediately;
the rest are drafted with every tool held until you say how to undo it. Your
config is copied aside first, synartesis uninstall puts it back, and
synartesis status says what is covered.
Each server keeps its own entry and its own proxy, so no tool is renamed — the agent sees exactly the names it saw before. Your agent needs nothing installed.
Needs Node 22 or newer. npm ships a prebuilt SQLite binding, so no toolchain is required unless you build from a clone.
Then just:
synartesisOne screen: what agents have done, what is held for approval, every AI on the machine, and undo — all on the arrow keys.
The desktop window
The same engine, with a conversation in front of it. You talk to a model — any model — and every tool it calls goes through the proxy on its way out, so the undo is not a feature the window implements. It is one it can already offer.

Every call gets a card: which server, which tool, the class Synartesis gave it, and whether the state it replaced was captured. The ledger at the top counts the same thing for the whole conversation. Nothing there is a promise about what should have happened — it is read back out of the journal after the fact.
A call that cannot be undone does not happen behind your back. It stops, and waits for you, with the reason it cannot be reversed written out:

And putting it back is the same two steps the CLI takes: the real plan first, built from the journal, then the confirmation.

It talks to Claude, Gemini, Mistral, OpenAI, or anything speaking
/v1/chat/completions — including Ollama, LM Studio and vLLM on your own
machine, which cost nothing and send nothing anywhere. Keys are pasted by you,
kept in the OS keychain through Electron's safeStorage, and never written to
the journal or a log. There is a parchment and a dark setting:

Getting it. synartesis desktop opens it, and says where to get it if it is
not installed. It is a separate download on purpose: shipping a browser engine
inside a CLI would put 200 MB into every install of a command that is a few
hundred kilobytes.
On macOS it installs the way anything does — open the .dmg, drag Synartesis to
Applications — and on Windows the .exe installer puts it where the Start menu
can find it. After that, either the icon or synartesis desktop opens it; the
command looks where each platform actually installs things rather than asking
you to remember a path.
The builds are not signed yet, and the first launch says so. macOS refuses
an application it cannot check with Apple: open System Settings → Privacy &
Security and press Open Anyway, or xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Synartesis.app to say the same thing in one line. Windows shows
a SmartScreen warning, behind More info. Both of those are the operating
system telling you the truth — nobody has vouched for this binary — and the
honest fix is a Developer ID certificate rather than a page telling you to
click past it. Building from the clone below avoids the question entirely,
since an application you built is one you have already vouched for.
To build it yourself instead:
pnpm install && pnpm app:distThat writes an installer for the machine it runs on to app/release — a .dmg
and a .app on macOS, an .exe on Windows, an AppImage and a .deb on Linux.
It is unsigned, so it runs where it was built and Gatekeeper refuses it
anywhere it has been downloaded to: signing and notarisation need an Apple
developer account, and app/README.md lists exactly what they
want. The release workflow builds all three platforms on their own machines
and attaches the installers to the release for a tag. Both the window and the terminal share
one journal, so either can undo what the other did.
What it can and cannot do
Every tool gets one of four classifications, written down in a manifest:
Class | Meaning | Example | What happens |
| Changes nothing |
| Recorded, forwarded |
| Prior state can be restored exactly |
| State captured before the write; written back on undo |
| Cannot be reversed, but can be offset |
| A different call neutralises it |
| Neither |
| Suspended until a human approves it |
A tool your manifest does not mention is treated as irreversible. That is
deliberate: silently forwarding an unknown destructive call is the one failure
worth avoiding most.
Has anybody touched it since?
Synartesis records what an agent does, not what happens to a file. Nothing you do by hand goes through the proxy — which is exactly what makes the drift check work: when undo reads a file and finds bytes it never recorded, it knows somebody else has been there.
To ask before you find out the hard way:
synartesis show <session> --liveIt reads every resource the session touched as it is now and says which still
match. Nothing is written, no reversing call is sent, and unlike
undo --dry-run it does not stop at the first conflict — five writes get five
answers. l in the screen does the same.
If you decide the recorded value is the one worth keeping, undo --force prints
every line it would write over and stops; --force --yes goes ahead.
What each policy has actually been tested against
A policy that has met a real server and one written from its documentation are not the same kind of claim, and the difference only shows up at the moment somebody needs undo to work. So a policy can say which it is:
servers:
gh:
command: github-mcp-server
provenance: documented # or: liveOf the four that ship, three say live — they were written against the real
server and corrected where it disagreed with its own docs. github says
documented: it has never been run against a real account, and its own header
has always said so. Now check says it, the proxy says it at every start, and
install says it at the moment the policy is adopted — rather than leaving it in
a file for you to find afterwards.
Absent means no claim either way, which is the right default for a policy you wrote yourself: the tool has no business grading your work. Nothing is inferred from silence, and all three states are printed, because if silence meant "fine" then an ungraded policy and a known-untested one would look identical.
Undoing something that was never read first
Most undo rides on a pre-read: the value before the write is captured, and before putting it back, undo reads the world again and refuses if it has moved.
A compensable action has no such read. create_entities makes something that
did not exist a moment earlier, so there is nothing to capture — it has a
compensating action instead, a delete that offsets the create. Which means undo
had nothing to compare against and compensated regardless. If you had added to
that record in the meantime, the delete took your work with it and the run
reported success.
A policy can now declare a read used only for that check:
- match: "memory.create_entities"
class: compensable
inverse:
tool: "memory.delete_entities"
args: { entityNames: "$result.entities[].name" }
verify:
tool: "memory.open_nodes"
args: { names: "$result.entities[].name" }It is resolved after the call, so $result is available and it can name a
resource the call itself created. Undo then halts on drift the same way it does
everywhere else, and shows you the diff.
It is consulted only where there is no read already, so it can never displace a working pre-read with a differently shaped one — which would make the post-state and the snapshot incomparable and every later comparison meaningless.
When the server changes underneath you
A policy is a claim about what a tool does, and a tool's name is a weak place to
anchor that claim. A server upgrade can keep write_file and add an argument to
it. The policy still says reversible, the snapshot still reads a field that has
moved, and the before-image captured no longer matches the write. Nothing fails.
The undo is produced on request, confidently, and is wrong — which is worse than
having no undo, because somebody acted on it.
So you can pin the shape a tool had when you wrote its policy:
synartesis pinIt prints a block. Paste it into the manifest:
pins:
fs:
write_file: "sha256:ce17c85e8a5883552a11555f9b893de497fadab965a5c7935c0cb8f3c55b91d6"
edit_file: "sha256:88459ef670b139a12a3e0335ae0a4584dd892f60f45f565b545e1004d7565dd5"From then on, a tool whose shape has moved stops the proxy at startup and names
both fingerprints, instead of quietly serving the old policy. Re-run pin when
you have looked at what changed and decided the policy still holds.
It prints rather than writes on purpose: pinning is you vouching for what a tool does today, and a command that silently rewrote your policy would let that happen without anyone reading it.
Pinning is per server and all-or-nothing. A server with no pins is not checked, so every manifest written before this existed keeps working. A server with any pins is checked in full — a half-pinned server is the worst of both, because it reads as protected and is not. Tools that no policy matches need no pin: they are already fail-closed as irreversible and gated, so there is no classification for a schema change to corrupt.
Commands
synartesis desktop opens the window, and says where to
get it if it is not installed.
Command | Does |
| The screen. Everything below can be done from it |
| Cover the clients on this machine, put them back, say what is covered |
| Introspect a server and draft a manifest |
| Load a manifest and verify it against the servers it names |
| Print the |
| Every recorded session |
| One session's timeline, with the undo for each step |
| The same, plus what has changed in the world since |
| Every argument, snapshot and inverse, nothing elided |
| What is waiting, and answering it |
| Reverse a session, newest action first |
| Plan it and change nothing |
| Rebuild each undo from the current manifest |
| Print what it would write over; |
| Live activity, with approvals answerable in place |
| Delete sessions older than 30 days and reclaim the space |
| End a session a killed proxy left open |
In the screen: enter opens, u undoes, p previews, l checks the world
now, f expands, c shows every AI on the machine, g shows what is held.
--manifest and --journal are found rather than typed, from the current
directory upwards the way a version control tool finds its root, then from
~/.synartesis. SYNARTESIS_HOME moves that. --json works on list, show
and gates. Exit codes: 0 succeeded, 1 halted or refused, 2 bad usage.
Full walkthrough, writing a manifest, and serving over HTTP for clients that cannot start a process: see the user guide.
What it does not do
It cannot un-send what has been seen. An email that has been read, a posted message, a file deleted with no backup. This is why the gate exists.
Compensable actions can only be checked for drift if their policy declares a
verifyread. They have no pre-read — the thing they made did not exist before the call — so without one, undo compensates them and marks them[unverified]. With one, the resource is read back after the write and undo halts rather than compensating over somebody else's edit.Undo halts on uncertainty, and steps over the merely permanent. Drift, an unknown outcome, or a failed reversing call stop it. An action that simply cannot be undone is reported and left in place while everything else is reverted. Either way the session is marked
partial.An error is not proof that nothing happened. A timeout or a tool-level error after a write leaves the outcome unknown, not failed, and undo will not step past it. Where a pre-read exists it is consulted to settle the question instead of guessing.
An undo is only as good as the policy that recorded it. Inverses are resolved when the call happens, so a mistake in a manifest is baked into every run made under it.
undo --replanrebuilds them from a corrected one.
The bundled filesystem policy is tested against the real server: exact byte-for-byte restoration, drift refusal, and absence told apart from a read that failed. The memory, git and github policies are checked only for tool existence — their recovery guarantees are not yet proven.
Trust
A manifest names commands and Synartesis runs them. Treat one you did not write the way you would treat a shell script from the same source: read it first.
The journal is a copy of your data, not a log. Putting a file back means
having kept what was in it, so the contents of every resource before it was
written are in there in plain text — including any key that was sitting in a
file your agent touched. That is not a leak to be closed; it is the thing that
makes undo work. It is created 0600 in a 0700 directory, and nothing is
encrypted: full-disk encryption answers a stolen laptop, permissions answer
another account on a machine you share.
It grows at roughly four times the bytes your agent writes and never shrinks
on its own — thirty edits of one 200 kB file came to 24 MB. synartesis prune
deletes whole sessions and VACUUMs. It will not touch one still active, or one
holding a call waiting on a person, or one whose undo halted on a conflict. A
pruned session cannot be undone afterwards, which is the whole of the trade.
Nothing prunes on a timer.
Durability. The journal runs synchronous = NORMAL. A crash of the process
or of the CLI mid-undo loses nothing; only the machine losing power can cost the
tail of the write-ahead log. SYNARTESIS_SYNC=full asks for an fsync per commit
instead — worth it where fsync is cheap, and measurably not where it is not.
Development
pnpm testpnpm typecheck && pnpm lintEvery push runs those on Linux and macOS across Node 22 and 24, plus the demo and the installer.
Licence
MIT. See LICENSE.
This server cannot be deployed
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