Skip to main content
Glama
vbr-write-mcp

vbr-write-mcp

by Aquatick

Report Malware Event

report_malware_event

Creates a malware event from external EDR/XDR/SIEM data so Veeam Backup & Replication flags the affected machine's restore points.

Instructions

Create a malware event from an external source (EDR/XDR/SIEM): VBR then flags the machine's restore points.

machine is a SuspiciousActivityMachineSpec (see describe_model; identifies the machine by FQDN/IP/UUID).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "machine": "<machine>",
      "details": "<details>",
      "engine": "<engine>",
      "detection_time_utc": "<detection_time_utc>"
    },
    "name": "report_malware_event"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
engineYes
detailsYes
machineYes
severityNoSuspicious
confirm_tokenNo
detection_time_utcYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so the write/offline nature is covered. The description's useful addition is the disclosed side effect that restore points get flagged, but it says nothing about the confirm_token parameter's role in gating the call, idempotency for repeated detections, or permission requirements.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with purpose and the side effect, with the nested-object pointer in a separate short sentence. There is no filler, but the second sentence spends space on one parameter while the other five go unmentioned.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the nested `machine` spec is handled via a describe_model pointer. For a 6-parameter mutation with a confirm_token and a severity enum, however, the definition is thinner than the complexity warrants, leaving the confirmation flow and non-machine parameters unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the parameter burden, yet it explains only `machine` (as a SuspiciousActivityMachineSpec identified by FQDN/IP/UUID) and defers to describe_model. The meaning of `engine`, `details`, `detection_time_utc`, and especially `confirm_token` is left entirely undocumented.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description pairs the specific verb 'create' with the resource 'malware event' and adds scope ('from an external source (EDR/XDR/SIEM)') plus the downstream effect ('VBR then flags the machine's restore points'). That clearly separates it from set_backup_file_malware_state and manage_malware_exclusions, though it never names those siblings explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the phrase 'from an external source (EDR/XDR/SIEM)', which tells the agent this is the ingestion path for third-party detections rather than for editing exclusions or file states. There is no explicit when-not guidance, no prerequisites, and no mention of what to do when an event already exists for the machine.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.