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Antonytm

mcp-sitecore-server

by Antonytm

security-import-account

Destructive

Imports a Sitecore user or role from the CM filesystem, overwriting current state with the serialized .user or .role file. Export the account first; on SitecoreAI use Sitecore CLI serialization.

Instructions

Imports (deserializes) a Sitecore user or role from the CM's filesystem, overwriting the account's current state with the serialized one. The .user / .role file must exist — export it first with security-export-account. On SitecoreAI prefer Sitecore CLI serialization.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathNoExact server-side .user / .role file to deserialize. Not with root.
rootNoServer-side directory to deserialize from. Defaults to Sitecore's serialization folder. Not with path.
identityYesThe account to import, e.g. 'sitecore\admin' or 'sitecore\Author'.
accountTypeYesWhether the identity names a user or a role.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.0.5

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuine value beyond that by spelling out what is destroyed ('overwriting the account's current state with the serialized one') and the filesystem dependency. It does not describe reversibility or return behavior, but the key destructive consequence is explicit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the operation and its destructive consequence, followed by prerequisite and platform caveat. No wasted text.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description supplies the prerequisite, the destructive semantics, and a platform-specific alternative, and annotations cover the safety profile. It is essentially complete, with only minor omissions (reversibility, error conditions) left unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema already documents the path/root mutual exclusion and the identity/accountType semantics. The description adds only the incidental '.user / .role file' framing, so baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Imports (deserializes) a Sitecore user or role') plus scope ('from the CM's filesystem'), which cleanly distinguishes it from siblings like security-export-account, security-new-user, and security-set-user. An agent can identify the operation without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit prerequisite and routing: the .user/.role file must already exist and should be created with security-export-account first, plus a platform-specific alternative (Sitecore CLI on SitecoreAI). It stops short of stating when not to use this tool versus other account-mutation tools, so it is clear context without full exclusion guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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