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Abraar02

ThreatWatch MCP

by Abraar02

Analyze Ioc

analyze_ioc

Check a single IP, domain, URL, or file hash across all available threat intelligence sources to identify malicious activity and assess risk.

Instructions

Analyse a single Indicator of Compromise (IOC) across all available threat intelligence sources.

Supports: IPv4/IPv6 addresses, domain names, URLs, MD5/SHA1/SHA256 hashes.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
iocYesThe indicator to analyse (IP, domain, URL, or file hash).
include_rawNoIf True, append raw JSON responses from each source.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses that analysis spans 'all available threat intelligence sources' (implying multiple external lookups), but says nothing about permissions, rate limits, latency, network egress, or how unknown/malformed indicators are handled.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short, front-loaded sentences: purpose first, then supported formats. Every line earns its place with no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return-value explanation is not required. However, with zero annotations on a tool that fans out to external intelligence sources, the description omits operational context (external calls, failure/unknown-indicator behavior) that an agent would benefit from.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both the 'ioc' and 'include_raw' parameters are already documented in the schema, including the supported formats. The description's list of supported IOC types duplicates rather than extends that, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (analyse), resource (Indicator of Compromise), and scope ('a single ... IOC across all available threat intelligence sources'), and the word 'single' implicitly contrasts with the bulk_analyze sibling. It stops short of naming that alternative explicitly, so it is clear but not sibling-differentiating at the highest level.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use guidance is offered: nothing tells the agent when to prefer this over bulk_analyze or detect_iocs_in_text, and no prerequisites or exclusions are stated. Usage is only inferable from the word 'single'.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.