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io.github.AIops-tools/symantec-edr-aiops

io.github.AIops-tools/symantec-edr-aiops

by AIops-tools

edr_deny_list

Read-only

Lists deny policies with pagination for read-only policy audits and endpoint incident investigations.

Instructions

[READ] List deny policies.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "edr_deny_list"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNo
next_cursorNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

C2.4/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint=true already declares this is a safe read, and the "[READ]" prefix merely restates that annotation rather than adding context. Nothing is said about pagination behavior, result ordering, maximum page size, or what an empty list means, all of which an agent needs for a paged listing tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The single line is front-loaded and free of waste, but its brevity comes from under-specification rather than economy. There is no structural separation between what the tool does and how to page through results.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, no-required-argument listing tool the description is minimally viable, since the schema exposes both inputs and the annotation covers safety. It stops short of completeness because pagination mechanics and the nature of a returned deny policy are never addressed and no output schema exists to fill the gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so neither limit (default 50) nor next_cursor is documented anywhere. The description does not explain that limit caps page size or that next_cursor is the continuation token returned by a prior call, leaving the agent to infer pagination semantics from parameter names alone.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose3/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description pairs a generic verb ("List") with a specific resource ("deny policies"), so an agent can infer it enumerates EDR deny policies. However, it does nothing to distinguish this from the obvious sibling edr_allow_list, and "policies" is left unqualified (blocking policies? file/network?). Purpose is recognizable but not sharp.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no exclusions, and no named alternative. An agent must guess whether this should be called alongside or instead of edr_allow_list, or whether it returns enforced rules versus policy definitions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.