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Glama

set_model_allowlist

Destructive

Replace the permitted Ollama model allowlist in AI Guardian using glob patterns; specify allowed model names or leave empty to allow all models.

Instructions

[WRITE][risk=medium] Replace the model allowlist (glob patterns; empty = allow-all).

Args: models: Shell-glob patterns of permitted model names (e.g. ["llama3.", "qwen"]).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modelsYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.6.0

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=true, but the description adds real value: the [WRITE][risk=medium] tag and the fact that this is a full replacement whose empty value means allow-all (a dangerous default worth surfacing). The one gap is that the annotation idempotentHint=false sits oddly with 'Replace' semantics, and no side effects (audit entries, immediate enforcement) are disclosed to explain it.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Extremely economical: a leading write/risk marker, one sentence of semantics, and one argument line with syntax plus example. Nothing is redundant and the risk/write signal is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, no-output-schema mutation whose annotations already carry the destructive profile, the description supplies the argument format and the critical empty-value behavior. It omits revert guidance despite an undo_apply sibling existing, and does not describe enforcement timing, minor gaps for a medium-risk write.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the single 'models' parameter is undocumented in the schema, so the description carries the load. It does so well: it specifies shell-glob syntax, gives concrete examples like ["llama3.*", "qwen*"], and defines the empty-list edge case as allow-all. It does not say how malformed patterns are handled, which keeps it from a 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb+resource: 'Replace the model allowlist', which immediately distinguishes it from set_model_denylist and other model-management siblings. 'Replace' also clarifies it is a full overwrite rather than an append. It stops short of naming the sibling it is not, so it is clear but not maximally differentiated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance: nothing says when an allowlist is preferable to set_model_denylist, what precedence applies if both are set, or whether the change takes effect on already-running models. The 'empty = allow-all' note is a semantic default, not usage routing. The agent must infer the operating context from the tool name alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.