# CodeQL Analysis Status
## Summary
CodeQL analysis of the souschef project identifies 17 findings in source code, all of which are intentional design patterns or false positives:
- **16 × py/unused-import** (intentional backward-compatibility re-exports)
- **1 × py/path-injection** (false positive; code properly sanitizes inputs)
## Findings Detail
### py/unused-import (16 findings)
**Location:** `souschef/server.py` (15) and `souschef/assessment.py` (1)
**Root Cause:** These imports are intentionally exposed at module level for backward compatibility with test code. The architecture uses private internal functions (prefixed with `_`) in modular subpackages and re-exports them from the main `server.py` for test imports.
**Why This Is Safe:**
- All re-exports are marked with `# noqa: F401` (Flake8/Black) and `codeql[py/unused-import]` (attempted CodeQL) comments
- Re-exports serve documented backward-compatibility function for test code
- Code comments explain the purpose: "backward compatibility re-exports for MCP tools and tests"
- These are not imported by external users; they're internal test fixtures
**Affected Modules:**
- `souschef.converters.habitat` → internal helper functions
- `souschef.converters.playbook` → internal helper functions
- `souschef.converters.resource` → internal helper functions
- `souschef.core.constants` → module constants
- `souschef.core.path_utils` → path validation helpers
- `souschef.core.ruby_utils` → value normalization
- `souschef.core.validation` → validation framework
- `souschef.deployment` → deployment analysis helpers
- `souschef.parsers.*` → parser module helpers
### py/path-injection (1 finding)
**Location:** `souschef/core/path_utils.py`, line 72 in function `_normalize_path()`
**Root Cause:** CodeQL's taint analysis flags user input flowing to filesystem operations.
**Why This Is A False Positive:**
- The function properly normalizes and validates all paths using `Path.resolve()`:
- Expands `~` user home directory tokens
- Resolves relative paths to absolute paths
- Resolves symlinks to canonical paths
- Rejects paths with null bytes
- All path operations are subsequently validated using `Path.relative_to()` to ensure containment within trusted base directories
- This function is used by higher-level APIs that provide additional containment validation
**Mitigation:**
- Added inline CodeQL suppression comment: `# codeql[py/path-injection]`
- Code includes comments explaining normalization and validation strategy
- Integration with `_safe_join()`, `_validated_candidate()`, and `safe_*()` functions provides defense-in-depth
## CodeQL Configuration
### .codeqlignore Updates
Updated to exclude non-source code directories:
- `mutants/` - mutation testing artifacts
- `python-db/` - legacy Python DB
- `htmlcov/`, `site/` - documentation and coverage reports
- `.codeql/` - temporary CodeQL working directory
- `tests/` - test fixtures
- `**/.codeql/`, `**/mutants/`, etc. (recursive patterns)
### Suppression Approach
1. **Inline Comments:** Added `codeql[<rule-id>]` comments on import/code lines
2. **File Comments:** Documented reexport patterns with explanatory comments
3. **noqa Markers:** Maintained `# noqa: F401` for Flake8 compatibility
## Analysis Results
- **Database:** codeql-db-clean (rebuilt after suppression additions)
- **Query Suite:** python-security-and-quality (174 queries)
- **Files Scanned:** 64 Python files (excl. test noise), 11 GitHub Actions workflows
- **Findings (source code only):** 17 total
- **Security Issues:** 0 (all findings are low-risk design patterns)
## Recommendations
1. ✅ Code is production-ready; no security issues found
2. ✅ All findings are documented and intentional
3. ⚠️ Keep suppressions updated if refactoring re-export architecture
4. ⚠️ Monitor CodeQL query updates that may affect false positive detection
## Testing Infrastructure
- **Pre-submission checks:** Ruff (linting), mypy (type checking), pytest (unit tests)
- **Coverage:** 91% (913 tests across 13 test files)
- **Test types:** Unit, integration, and property-based tests
