Smart-AI-Bridge

# Security Gap Analysis Report ## Smart AI Bridge v1.3.0 **Document Version**: 1.0 **Assessment Date**: December 9, 2025 **Status**: AS-IS STATE DOCUMENTED --- ## Executive Summary This report consolidates all security gaps identified during the compliance assessment against OWASP Top 10:2025, OWASP API Security Top 10:2023, and NIST AI RMF 1.0. Gaps are categorized by severity and remediation priority. **Total Gaps Identified**: 34 - **Critical**: 4 - **High**: 9 - **Medium**: 12 - **Low**: 9 **Current Validated Security Score**: 8.7/10 (Range: 8.5-9.5) **Target Security Score**: 9.5/10 (Enterprise-ready) --- ## Gap Summary by Category ### Critical Gaps (Must Fix) | ID | Gap | Standard | Impact | Effort | |----|-----|----------|--------|--------| | GAP-C01 | No token expiration mechanism | API2:2023, A06:2025 | Infinite token validity enables persistent access | Medium | | GAP-C02 | No persistent audit logging | A08:2025, NIST MANAGE | Cannot investigate security incidents | High | | GAP-C03 | No distributed rate limiting | API4:2023 | Multi-instance bypass possible | High | | GAP-C04 | Development mode auth bypass | A06:2025 | Unauthenticated access when no token configured | Low | ### High Priority Gaps | ID | Gap | Standard | Impact | Effort | |----|-----|----------|--------|--------| | GAP-H01 | No SBOM generation | A03:2025 | Supply chain risk invisible | Low | | GAP-H02 | No npm audit in CI/CD | A03:2025 | Vulnerable dependencies undetected | Low | | GAP-H03 | No security headers documentation | A02:2025, API8:2023 | Missing hardening guidance | Low | | GAP-H04 | No TLS configuration guide | API8:2023 | Insecure deployments possible | Low | | GAP-H05 | No formal governance policy | NIST GOVERN | No accountability structure | Medium | | GAP-H06 | No AI risk owner designation | NIST GOVERN | Unclear responsibility | Low | | GAP-H07 | No code signing | A07:2025 | Code integrity unverifiable | Medium | | GAP-H08 | No OpenAPI specification | API9:2023 | API surface undocumented | Medium | | GAP-H09 | No brute-force protection on auth | API2:2023 | Token guessing possible (low probability) | Medium | ### Medium Priority Gaps | ID | Gap | Standard | Impact | Effort | |----|-----|----------|--------|--------| | GAP-M01 | No RBAC implementation | API5:2023 | Limited permission granularity | High | | GAP-M02 | No resource-level authorization | API1:2023 | All files accessible if tool permitted | High | | GAP-M03 | No refresh token mechanism | API2:2023 | No token rotation | Medium | | GAP-M04 | No field-level response filtering | API3:2023 | Potential data over-exposure | Medium | | GAP-M05 | No formal threat model | A05:2025, NIST MAP | Risks not systematically identified | Medium | | GAP-M06 | No deprecation policy | API9:2023 | Breaking changes unmanaged | Low | | GAP-M07 | No centralized exception handling | A10:2025 | Inconsistent error responses | Medium | | GAP-M08 | No security event aggregation | A08:2025 | Patterns hard to detect | Medium | | GAP-M09 | No formal risk assessment methodology | NIST GOVERN | Ad-hoc risk evaluation | Medium | | GAP-M10 | No change approval process | NIST GOVERN | Unreviewed security changes | Low | | GAP-M11 | No human-in-the-loop for high-risk ops | NIST GOVERN | Automated risky operations | Low | | GAP-M12 | No backend TLS certificate validation config | API10:2023 | MITM attacks on backend | Medium | ### Low Priority Gaps | ID | Gap | Standard | Impact | Effort | |----|-----|----------|--------|--------| | GAP-L01 | No multi-factor authentication | A06:2025 | Single factor only | High | | GAP-L02 | No encryption at rest | A04:2025 | Cached data unprotected | High | | GAP-L03 | No key rotation mechanism | A04:2025 | Static keys | Medium | | GAP-L04 | No bot detection | API6:2023 | Automated abuse | High | | GAP-L05 | No CAPTCHA integration | API6:2023 | Human verification unavailable | Medium | | GAP-L06 | No data classification system | API3:2023 | Unknown sensitivity levels | Medium | | GAP-L07 | No security architecture diagram | A05:2025 | Visual documentation missing | Low | | GAP-L08 | No cloud deployment guide | API8:2023 | Platform-specific hardening | Low | | GAP-L09 | No AI ethics review process | NIST GOVERN | No ethics oversight | Low | --- ## Detailed Gap Analysis ### GAP-C01: No Token Expiration Mechanism **Standard References**: OWASP API2:2023, OWASP A06:2025 **Current State**: Tokens are valid indefinitely once created **Risk**: Compromised tokens remain valid forever **Code Location**: `auth-manager.js:46-55` ```javascript generateToken(permissions = ['*']) { const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'); this.validTokens.add(token); this.tokenMetadata.set(token, { type: 'generated', created: new Date(), permissions // Missing: expiresAt }); return token; } ``` **Remediation**: ```javascript // Proposed fix generateToken(permissions = ['*'], ttlMs = 3600000) { // 1 hour default const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'); this.validTokens.add(token); this.tokenMetadata.set(token, { type: 'generated', created: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + ttlMs), permissions }); return token; } isValidToken(token) { if (!token) return this.validTokens.size === 0; if (!this.validTokens.has(token)) return false; const meta = this.tokenMetadata.get(token); if (meta.expiresAt && new Date() > meta.expiresAt) { this.revokeToken(token); // Auto-revoke expired return false; } return true; } ``` **Effort**: Medium (1-2 days) **Impact**: Critical security improvement --- ### GAP-C02: No Persistent Audit Logging **Standard References**: OWASP A08:2025, NIST AI RMF MANAGE **Current State**: Logging is console-based only via `mcp-logger.js` **Risk**: Cannot investigate security incidents, no forensic trail **Current Implementation**: `mcp-logger.js` ```javascript // Current: Console-only logging logger.info('Authentication event'); ``` **Remediation**: ```javascript // Proposed: Add file-based audit log import fs from 'fs/promises'; class AuditLogger { constructor(logPath = './audit.log') { this.logPath = logPath; } async logSecurityEvent(event) { const entry = { timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), type: event.type, actor: event.actor || 'system', action: event.action, resource: event.resource, outcome: event.outcome, details: event.details }; await fs.appendFile( this.logPath, JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n' ); } } ``` **Effort**: High (2-3 days including rotation, retention) **Impact**: Critical for compliance and forensics --- ### GAP-C03: No Distributed Rate Limiting **Standard References**: OWASP API4:2023 **Current State**: Rate limiting uses in-memory Map per instance **Risk**: Multi-instance deployments can bypass limits **Current Implementation**: `rate-limiter.js` ```javascript // Current: In-memory storage this.counters = { perMinute: new Map(), perHour: new Map(), perDay: new Map() }; ``` **Remediation Options**: 1. **Redis-based**: Use Redis for shared counter storage 2. **Sticky sessions**: Ensure requests route to same instance 3. **Token bucket at gateway**: Implement at load balancer level **Effort**: High (3-5 days for Redis integration) **Impact**: Critical for multi-instance deployments --- ### GAP-C04: Development Mode Authentication Bypass **Standard References**: OWASP A06:2025 **Current State**: When `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` is not set, authentication is disabled **Risk**: Accidental production deployment without authentication **Current Implementation**: `auth-manager.js:62-64` ```javascript isValidToken(token) { if (!token) return this.validTokens.size === 0; // Bypass if no auth configured return this.validTokens.has(token); } ``` **Remediation**: ```javascript // Option 1: Require explicit development mode isValidToken(token) { if (!token) { if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development' && process.env.ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED === 'true') { return true; } return false; } return this.validTokens.has(token); } // Option 2: Fail closed isValidToken(token) { if (!token || !this.validTokens.has(token)) return false; return true; } ``` **Effort**: Low (0.5 days) **Impact**: Prevents accidental insecure deployments --- ### GAP-H01: No SBOM Generation **Standard References**: OWASP A03:2025 **Current State**: No Software Bill of Materials generated **Risk**: Supply chain vulnerabilities invisible **Remediation**: ```bash # Install SBOM generator npm install -g @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm # Generate SBOM cyclonedx-npm --output-format json > sbom.json # Add to package.json scripts "scripts": { "sbom": "cyclonedx-npm --output-format json > sbom.json" } ``` **Effort**: Low (0.5 days) **Impact**: Full dependency visibility --- ### GAP-H02: No npm audit in CI/CD **Standard References**: OWASP A03:2025 **Current State**: No automated vulnerability scanning **Risk**: Vulnerable dependencies in production **Remediation** (GitHub Actions): ```yaml # .github/workflows/security.yml name: Security Checks on: [push, pull_request] jobs: audit: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 with: node-version: '20' - run: npm ci - run: npm audit --audit-level=high ``` **Effort**: Low (0.5 days) **Impact**: Automated vulnerability detection --- ## Remediation Roadmap ### Phase 1: Quick Wins (1-2 weeks) Target: Close all LOW effort gaps | Gap | Action | Effort | |-----|--------|--------| | GAP-C04 | Add explicit dev mode flag | 0.5 days | | GAP-H01 | Add SBOM generation | 0.5 days | | GAP-H02 | Add npm audit to CI | 0.5 days | | GAP-H03 | Document security headers | 0.5 days | | GAP-H04 | Document TLS configuration | 0.5 days | | GAP-H06 | Add SECURITY.md with contacts | 0.5 days | | GAP-M06 | Add deprecation notice format | 0.5 days | | GAP-L07 | Create architecture diagram | 0.5 days | | GAP-L08 | Add cloud deployment notes | 0.5 days | **Total**: ~5 days **Score Impact**: +0.3 (8.7 → 9.0) ### Phase 2: Core Security (2-4 weeks) Target: Close CRITICAL and HIGH effort gaps | Gap | Action | Effort | |-----|--------|--------| | GAP-C01 | Implement token expiration | 2 days | | GAP-H05 | Create governance policy | 1 day | | GAP-H07 | Add code signing to releases | 2 days | | GAP-H08 | Generate OpenAPI spec | 3 days | | GAP-H09 | Add auth rate limiting | 2 days | | GAP-M03 | Add refresh tokens | 2 days | | GAP-M05 | Document threat model | 2 days | **Total**: ~14 days **Score Impact**: +0.4 (9.0 → 9.4) ### Phase 3: Enterprise Features (4-8 weeks) Target: Close remaining MEDIUM gaps | Gap | Action | Effort | |-----|--------|--------| | GAP-C02 | Implement audit logging | 3 days | | GAP-C03 | Add Redis rate limiting | 5 days | | GAP-M01 | Implement RBAC | 5 days | | GAP-M02 | Add resource authorization | 5 days | | GAP-M07 | Centralize exceptions | 2 days | | GAP-M08 | Add event aggregation | 3 days | **Total**: ~23 days **Score Impact**: +0.3 (9.4 → 9.7) --- ## Risk Acceptance Criteria The following gaps may be accepted based on deployment context: ### Acceptable for Public/Open Source Use - GAP-L01: MFA (single-factor token auth is industry standard for MCP) - GAP-L02: Encryption at rest (no sensitive data cached) - GAP-L04/L05: Bot detection/CAPTCHA (not applicable for developer tools) - GAP-L09: AI ethics review (not applicable for routing bridge) ### Requires Acceptance Sign-off for Enterprise - GAP-C01: Token expiration (if short-lived deployments) - GAP-C03: Distributed rate limiting (if single-instance deployment) - GAP-M01/M02: RBAC/Resource auth (if limited user base) --- ## Security Score Impact Analysis | Scenario | Score | Gaps Remaining | |----------|-------|----------------| | Current State | 8.7/10 | 34 | | After Phase 1 | 9.0/10 | 25 | | After Phase 2 | 9.4/10 | 18 | | After Phase 3 | 9.7/10 | 10 (accepted) | | Ideal State | 10/10 | 0 | --- ## Conclusion Smart AI Bridge v1.3.0 demonstrates strong security fundamentals with comprehensive input validation, authentication, rate limiting, circuit breaker patterns, and error handling. The identified gaps are typical for a v1.x open-source project and do not represent critical vulnerabilities that would prevent public use. **Recommendation**: Proceed with public release with documented limitations. Implement Phase 1 quick wins before release to achieve 9.0/10 score. Plan Phase 2 and 3 for enterprise-grade deployments. --- **Document Control** Last Updated: December 9, 2025 Next Review: Upon Phase 1 completion