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check

Probe a live paid API endpoint or discovered candidates, apply your price, network, and readiness rules, and get a signed offer quote with seller terms before paying.

Instructions

Runs the paid pre-flight check on a live paid API endpoint: probes one exact HTTPS url, or the candidates discovered for a need, applies the buyer's price, network and readiness rules, and returns the selected offer with signed evidence of what the seller quoted (price, recipient, asset, network, expiry) before the agent pays the seller. Does not buy the seller's service, hold keys or pay anything for the agent; the agent keeps its wallet and pays the seller separately.

Use preview to discover candidates without paying, validate for a free readiness check of one listed URL, and check when a fresh live observation or a signed receipt is needed before a seller payment. Never call check to pay a seller. After billing.settlement_state=unknown, stop and reconcile; never create another authorization. route is the former name of this tool and is still accepted.

Cost and outcomes: the first unsigned call answers HTTP 402 with the $0.003 USDC checking-fee terms (Base, Solana or Algorand), which an x402-capable HTTP client pays. The fee settles only when a qualifying live offer is found; a completed miss (HTTP 200, live=false, typed miss_reason) is free; a settled fee is not reversed if the offer later changes. HTTP 503 with binding_error=route_binding_unavailable means the seller answered but no probed candidate could be bound to a signed receipt: a completed unpaid answer, not an outage (the reference wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true).

Parameter interactions: need or url is required; with both, url is probed directly and no discovery runs. policy is plain English compiled into the structured fields; an explicit structured field wins over the compiled value, and phrases that do not compile are echoed in unresolved_constraints, never guessed. networks is a hard allowlist judged on the current 402; prefer_network only orders results and never filters. Three independent price bounds: max_price_usd (seller price in USD), max_amount_atomic (atomic units of the seller's asset) and max_total_cost_usd (seller price plus known fees); every bound fails closed when its value is unknown. require_route_binding=true implies require_transparency and may select the next bindable candidate. Defaults: objective best, search_depth standard (up to 7 probes; thorough up to 15; hard ceiling 20), accept_payTo_change false, require_route_binding false. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlNoOptional https URL to probe instead of discovery. need or url (or both) is required.
needNoWhat the caller wants routed (plain English).
policyNoNatural-language constraints compiled into structured values. Unresolved phrases are returned, never guessed.
networksNoHard policy lock. Restricts discovery and selection to this set. A HTTP 200 winner must have selected_payment.network in this set from the CURRENT observed 402, never a catalog claim. Unlike prefer_network, this is not a ranking preference.
objectiveNoBest-of-N among currently probed eligible candidates, not every discovered endpoint. cheapest, fastest, and most_reliable rank that probed survivor set. fastest is this-request probe RTT, not settlement latency. fastest_settlement is a separate settlement/finality objective. lowest_total_cost fails closed when a fee is unknown.
search_depthNostandard: first 3 then expand 2-4 (typical cap 7). thorough may expand further. Hard server ceiling is 20.
max_price_usdNoDrop live hits whose known normalized USD exceeds this bound. Unknown USD fails closed.
max_latency_msNoCompatibility alias for max_probe_latency_ms (this request's probe RTT). Unknown latency fails closed.
prefer_networkNoWeak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche, tempo, sei, celo, robinhood (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand.
min_observationsNoRequire history n_7d at least this large. Unknown or smaller fails closed.
max_amount_atomicNoDrop live hits whose known atomic amount exceeds this bound. Unknown or cross-asset amount fails closed.
require_invocableNoIf true, drop live hits without an input schema. An explicit empty-object schema (type object, no properties or required fields) advertises no required inputs and counts as present. A bazaar HTTP GET with empty queryParams and no required body is the same signal. It does not guarantee the seller call succeeds. Absent or refused schema is not invocable.
max_total_cost_usdNoMerchant price plus known fees. Unknown fee fails closed.
accept_payTo_changeNoIf true, allow selecting a destination whose payTo just changed for the first time. Default false: the first unexpected payTo change is not selectable; a second later independent observation of the same destination can establish it.
max_probe_latency_msNoDrop live hits whose known probe RTT exceeds this bound. Not historical service/p50 latency.
min_observed_successNoRequire observed success_7d when n_7d >= 3. Unknown fails closed.
min_reputation_scoreNoRequire V1 reputation_score. Unknown fails closed. Never guessed from vague NL.
require_transparencyNoIf true, a settled /route winner fails when a signed checkpoint receipt cannot be produced. This requires delivery of verifiable evidence on HTTP 200, not server-side recovery. To verify the routing decision later, securely retain the complete paid /route response, especially pq_trust.transparency.receipt and pq_trust.transparency.reveal. Private replay outcomes support bounded recovery of the original response; they are not long-term evidence storage. Keep your own copy. Modified evidence fails verification against the public log. Default false (SEC-ROUTER-004 / A-14): a settled winner does not require a durable signed leaf. A free typed miss creates no route-decision leaf. Routing continues if append, signing, or anchoring is down after settlement (logged_uncheckpointed or unavailable). logged_uncheckpointed is never success when this flag is true. require_route_binding=true also requires transparency, even if this flag is false. A required receipt failure after settlement still reports billing.settled=true; unavailable does not prove no append occurred.
require_route_bindingNoOpt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true; that is policy working, not a crash. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding
max_service_latency_msNoDrop live hits whose historical p50 latency exceeds this bound. Unknown p50 fails closed.
max_candidates_to_probeNoRequested probe cap, hard-capped at 20.
max_settlement_latency_msNoSettlement/finality bound. Not probe RTT. Unknown fails closed.
min_reputation_confidenceNoRequire reputation_confidence. n_7d < 10 is low confidence.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlNo
liveNo
riskNoOmitted or empty when none. ["payTo_changed"] whenever payTo_changed is true.
payToNoRecipient of the selected offer as observed in the live challenge.
triedNo
targetNo
billingYes402Signal checking-fee outcome. Seller payment is separate.
changesNo
claimedNoSeller need/label/description values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts.
payableNo
comparedNoSlim probe rows. selectable, payTo_pending, payTo_changed, risk and excluded_reason show why a live row was not eligible. excluded_reason binding_unavailable marks a skipped binding failure.
observedNoWhat 402Signal itself observed in the seller's live 402 challenge at verified_at (402signal_observed rows, trusted classes only). This side, not the catalog claim, is what a buyer pays.
pq_trustNoTo verify the routing decision later, securely retain the complete paid /route response, especially pq_trust.transparency.receipt and pq_trust.transparency.reveal. Private replay outcomes support bounded recovery of the original response; they are not long-term evidence storage. Keep your own copy. Modified evidence fails verification against the public log.
invocableNo
objectiveNo
readinessNo
latency_msNo
reputationNoTransparent components first (observed, usage, tenure, stability, source_count), then V2 reputation_score, reputation_confidence, and scoring_model_id/hash. Score is never returned without components. No public 0-100 catalog badge. Unique payer addresses are never listed.
miss_reasonNo
payTo_age_sNoSeconds since the last observed recipient change for this URL, when one is recorded.
stop_reasonNo
verified_atNoWhen the observed live challenge was taken.
probed_countNo
binding_errorNoHTTP 503 when require_route_binding is true and no remaining already-probed selectable candidate could bind. Policy working, not a crash; wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true.
payTo_changedNoTrue when the observed payTo (the live challenge at verified_at) differs from the catalog claim (claimed.payTo at claimed_at) or from the last trusted destination 402Signal itself observed for this URL. Compare claimed.payTo with observed.payTo; the observed side is the one a buyer would pay.
payTo_pendingNoFirst unexpected rotation of the observed payTo against 402Signal's own previous trusted observation of this URL, judged on that history alone (an updated catalog claim does not clear it). Not selectable unless accept_payTo_change is true; a second independent observation of the same destination establishes it.
probe_ceilingNo
schema_sourceNo
observed_age_sNoSeconds since observed.observed_at.
unprobed_countNo
decision_bindingNoOpt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true; that is policy working, not a crash. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding
discovered_countNo
selected_paymentNo
candidates_probedNo
discovery_matchesNo
unmet_constraintsNo
challenge_observedNo
applied_constraintsNo
claimed_payTo_matchNoWhether observed.payTo equals claimed.payTo, compared per rail (case-insensitive on EVM). False on a mismatch; null when either side is unknown. Independent of payTo_pending, which judges against 402Signal's own observation history.
evaluation_completeNo
candidates_consideredNo
candidates_discoveredNo
probe_budget_exhaustedNo
unresolved_constraintsNo
interpreted_constraintsNo
candidate_evaluation_completeNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed20 schema fields changedv0.1.5
    • changedInput schema / properties / networks / items / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "base",
      -  "solana",
      -  "algorand",
      -  "polygon",
      -  "arbitrum",
      -  "monad",
      -  "worldchain",
      -  "xlayer",
      -  "bnb",
      -  "hyperevm",
      -  "ethereum",
      -  "optimism",
      -  "avalanche",
      -  "tempo"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "base",
      +  "solana",
      +  "algorand",
      +  "polygon",
      +  "arbitrum",
      +  "monad",
      +  "worldchain",
      +  "xlayer",
      +  "bnb",
      +  "hyperevm",
      +  "ethereum",
      +  "optimism",
      +  "avalanche",
      +  "tempo",
      +  "sei",
      +  "celo",
      +  "robinhood"
      +]
    • changedInput schema / properties / prefer_network / description
      Previous value: -"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand."New value: +"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche, tempo, sei, celo, robinhood (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand."
    • changedInput schema / properties / prefer_network / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "base",
      -  "solana",
      -  "algorand",
      -  "polygon",
      -  "arbitrum",
      -  "monad",
      -  "worldchain",
      -  "xlayer",
      -  "bnb",
      -  "hyperevm",
      -  "ethereum",
      -  "optimism",
      -  "avalanche",
      -  "tempo"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "base",
      +  "solana",
      +  "algorand",
      +  "polygon",
      +  "arbitrum",
      +  "monad",
      +  "worldchain",
      +  "xlayer",
      +  "bnb",
      +  "hyperevm",
      +  "ethereum",
      +  "optimism",
      +  "avalanche",
      +  "tempo",
      +  "sei",
      +  "celo",
      +  "robinhood"
      +]
    • addedOutput schema / properties / claimed / properties / amount / description
      Added value: +"The price the catalog listing claimed, as of claimed_at."
    • addedOutput schema / properties / claimed / properties / claimed_at
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "When the discovery feed last presented these claimed values for this URL.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "string",
      +    "integer",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / claimed / properties / facilitator
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": [
      +    "string",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / claimed / properties / payTo / description
      Added value: +"The recipient the catalog listing claimed, as of claimed_at. Compare with observed.payTo."
    • addedOutput schema / properties / claimed_payTo_match
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Whether observed.payTo equals claimed.payTo, compared per rail (case-insensitive on EVM). False on a mismatch; null when either side is unknown. Independent of payTo_pending, which judges against 402Signal's own observation history.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "boolean",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / properties / miss_reason / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "no_candidates",
      -  "no_402_envelope",
      -  "no_payto",
      -  "reachable_200",
      -  "probe_timeout",
      -  "quote_expired",
      -  "invalid_need",
      -  "upstream_5xx",
      -  "ssrf",
      -  "unlisted",
      -  "no_input_schema",
      -  "constraints_unmet",
      -  "probe_budget_exhausted",
      -  "probe_limit_reached",
      -  "unsafe_to_probe",
      -  "settlement_unknown",
      -  "authorization_used",
      -  "probe_capacity",
      -  "window_spent",
      -  "fingerprint_miss",
      -  "scheme_mismatch",
      -  "network_mismatch",
      -  "invalid_session_shape",
      -  null
      -]New value: +[
      +  "no_candidates",
      +  "no_402_envelope",
      +  "no_payto",
      +  "reachable_200",
      +  "probe_timeout",
      +  "quote_expired",
      +  "invalid_need",
      +  "upstream_5xx",
      +  "ssrf",
      +  "unlisted",
      +  "no_input_schema",
      +  "constraints_unmet",
      +  "binding_unavailable",
      +  "probe_budget_exhausted",
      +  "probe_limit_reached",
      +  "unsafe_to_probe",
      +  "settlement_unknown",
      +  "authorization_used",
      +  "probe_capacity",
      +  "window_spent",
      +  "fingerprint_miss",
      +  "scheme_mismatch",
      +  "network_mismatch",
      +  "invalid_session_shape",
      +  null
      +]
    • addedOutput schema / properties / observed
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "What 402Signal itself observed in the seller's live 402 challenge at verified_at (402signal_observed rows, trusted classes only). This side, not the catalog claim, is what a buyer pays.",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "amount": {
      +      "description": "Price in the observed challenge at verified_at.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "http_status": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "invocable": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "boolean",
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "latency_ms": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "observed_at": {
      +      "description": "When that observation was made.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "payTo": {
      +      "description": "Recipient in the observed challenge at verified_at.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "payable": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "boolean",
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "schema_present": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "boolean",
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / observed_age_s
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Seconds since observed.observed_at.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "integer",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / payTo
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Recipient of the selected offer as observed in the live challenge.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "string",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / payTo_age_s
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Seconds since the last observed recipient change for this URL, when one is recorded.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "integer",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / payTo_changed
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "True when the observed payTo (the live challenge at verified_at) differs from the catalog claim (claimed.payTo at claimed_at) or from the last trusted destination 402Signal itself observed for this URL. Compare claimed.payTo with observed.payTo; the observed side is the one a buyer would pay.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / payTo_pending
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "First unexpected rotation of the observed payTo against 402Signal's own previous trusted observation of this URL, judged on that history alone (an updated catalog claim does not clear it). Not selectable unless accept_payTo_change is true; a second independent observation of the same destination establishes it.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / readiness
      Added value: +{
      +  "enum": [
      +    "discovered",
      +    "payable",
      +    "invocable",
      +    "recently_verified"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / reputation / description
      Added value: +"Transparent components first (observed, usage, tenure, stability, source_count), then V2 reputation_score, reputation_confidence, and scoring_model_id/hash. Score is never returned without components. No public 0-100 catalog badge. Unique payer addresses are never listed."
    • addedOutput schema / properties / reputation / properties
      Added value: +{
      +  "stability": {
      +    "description": "Observed changes to this URL's terms (402signal_observed, not catalog claims): a change is a live challenge whose recipient, price, schema or rail differed from the previous trusted observation of the same URL.",
      +    "properties": {
      +      "payTo_changes": {
      +        "properties": {
      +          "changed_at": {
      +            "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "string",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          },
      +          "count": {
      +            "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "integer",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "price_changes": {
      +        "properties": {
      +          "changed_at": {
      +            "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "string",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          },
      +          "count": {
      +            "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "integer",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "rail_changes": {
      +        "properties": {
      +          "changed_at": {
      +            "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "string",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          },
      +          "count": {
      +            "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "integer",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "schema_changes": {
      +        "properties": {
      +          "changed_at": {
      +            "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "string",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          },
      +          "count": {
      +            "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.",
      +            "type": [
      +              "integer",
      +              "null"
      +            ]
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "type": "object"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "type": "object"
      +  }
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / risk
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Omitted or empty when none. [\"payTo_changed\"] whenever payTo_changed is true.",
      +  "items": {
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / verified_at
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "When the observed live challenge was taken.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "string",
      +    "null"
      +  ]
      +}
  2. Addedv0.1.4

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations cover only the safety profile (readOnly=false, destructive=false, openWorld=true, idempotent=false); the description adds the economics and failure semantics an agent cannot infer: the HTTP 402 / $0.003 USDC fee flow, fee settles only on a qualifying live offer, a completed miss is free, settled fees are not reversed, and 503 binding_error=route_binding_unavailable is a completed unpaid answer rather than an outage. This is exactly the extra context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose, then usage, then cost/outcomes, then parameter interactions — a sensible order for a tool of this complexity, and the length is defensible for a 23-parameter money-spending call. There is some redundancy (route-binding receipt behavior is described in both the cost paragraph and the parameter notes), which costs a point.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need not be explained, and the description still covers billing states, the 402/503 protocol shapes, defaults, and evidence-retention caveats. For a high-stakes paid tool, nothing an agent needs before calling is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the dedicated 'Parameter interactions' paragraph adds genuine cross-parameter meaning the per-field schema text does not — url overrides discovery when both are supplied, explicit structured fields beat compiled policy values, networks filters versus prefer_network ranks, three independent price bounds, and require_route_binding implies require_transparency. Defaults are restated rather than newly supplied, which keeps this from being a clean 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — 'runs the paid pre-flight check on a live paid API endpoint' — and enumerates exactly what it does (probes one URL or discovered candidates, applies buyer rules, returns the selected offer with signed evidence). It also draws a bright line against siblings and against the adjacent action it is NOT ('never call check to pay a seller'), so an agent can place it immediately.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly names the alternatives and the condition selecting each: 'Use preview to discover candidates without paying, validate for a free readiness check of one listed URL, and check when a fresh live observation or a signed receipt is needed.' It also states the negative condition and the post-error rule ('After billing.settlement_state=unknown, stop and reconcile; never create another authorization').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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