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hydra_attack

Run password brute-force or dictionary attacks against remote services like SSH, FTP, and SMB to test credential strength.

Instructions

Run Hydra password brute-force/dictionary attack against a target service on the remote Kali machine. Supports SSH, FTP, HTTP, SMB, and many other protocols.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "target": "<target>",
      "service": "<service>"
    },
    "name": "hydra_attack"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`port`	No	Override the default port for the service
`target`	Yes	Target IP address or hostname. Example: "192.168.1.10"
`service`	Yes	Target service/protocol to attack
`threads`	No	Number of parallel attack threads. Default: 16
`password`	No	Single password to try. Mutually exclusive with password_list.
`username`	No	Single username to try. Mutually exclusive with username_list.
`password_list`	No	Path to password wordlist on Kali machine. Default: /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt	/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
`username_list`	No	Path to username wordlist on Kali machine. Example: "/usr/share/wordlists/usernames.txt"
`http_form_params`	No	For http-post-form: form path and parameters. Example: "/login.php:user=^USER^&pass=^PASS^:Invalid"

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv1.0.0Sep 13, 2026

TDQS

C2.9/5.0

Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden, and it does add one useful fact: the attack executes on a remote Kali machine, not locally. However, it never warns that brute-forcing is noisy, may trigger account lockouts or IDS alarms, requires explicit authorization, or can take arbitrarily long. For a high-risk offensive tool these omissions are significant.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, no filler, with the action front-loaded before the protocol coverage. Nothing needs to be cut and nothing is buried.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a nine-parameter, unannotated, no-output-schema offensive tool, the description is thin. It says nothing about what a successful run returns (recovered credentials?), the time cost, lockout risk, or any safety/authorization expectation, all of which an agent needs before invoking a password brute-forcer.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, with each of the nine parameters documented in the schema itself, so this is a baseline 3. The description's protocol list loosely corresponds to the 'service' enum but adds no syntax or usage detail beyond what the schema already states.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific tool, action, and resource: 'Run Hydra password brute-force/dictionary attack against a target service.' It also lists supported protocols, which is enough for an agent to distinguish it from siblings like nmap_scan or sqlmap_scan. It stops short of explicitly contrasting itself with any sibling by name.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives (e.g., metasploit_exec, which also has credential attack modules) and no stated prerequisites such as authorization, scope, or network reachability of the target. The agent is left to infer context entirely from the tool's name.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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