ava
Server Details
Coding agents run multi-leg cross-chain DeFi. Legs re-derived from your sentence before signing.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over the last 24 hours
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2024-11-05
- URL
- ChatGPT
- –
- Claude
- –
TDQS
Scored across 15 tools
Most tools map cleanly to distinct stages of the workflow, and descriptions cross-reference exact call flows, which helps an agent choose correctly. The main confusion risk is between ava_approve_execute and ava_lend_execute—both are human-in-the-loop execution tools—and among the three planning tools, whose boundaries require careful reading.
All tools share the ava_ prefix and use snake_case, and most names follow a verb_object pattern like create_mandate, list_mandates, and provision_wallet. The pattern is not universal—session, portfolio, copilot_turn, and plan_standing deviate—but the naming remains readable and predictable overall.
Fifteen tools is at the high end of the ideal range, and the end-to-end DeFi workflow largely justifies the count. The three planning tools and two execution tools create some redundancy, making the set feel slightly heavier than perfectly scoped.
The core one-shot loop is well covered: session, wallet, agent, mandate, plan, preview/approve/execute, and receipt all exist. However, there is no mandate update/pause/cancel tool despite those statuses being referenced, no agent lifecycle management beyond creation, and ava_approve_execute explicitly references a missing ava_list_venues tool.
Available Tools
15 toolsava_agent_recordAInspect
Read an agent's track record before delegating capital to it. Returns mandates held, executions attempted, refusals by typed code, and receipts with their proof standing. Distinguishes CLAIMED from PROVEN: receiptsProven counts only chain-confirmed receipts; unconfirmed receipts prove nothing. AP2-aligned (each receipt's ap2.reference is the hash of the closed mandate) so an AP2-aware verifier can check it. Owner-readable always; a stranger reads only if the owner opted the record public. Zero is zero, never a placeholder.
Inputs: agentInstanceId (required), userId.
ava_approve_executeAInspect
Human-in-the-loop approve: the one call that actually settles a plan from ava_copilot_turn. It is gated by the bound mandate's status and constraints and by server-side policy limits, and it CAN REFUSE (e.g. mandate paused/cancelled, a policy violation, a stale preview hash); a refusal means no funds moved and no success receipt was written, only a refusal record. Testnet mode settles against simulated balances and returns a receipt + before/after balances, never a real chain. Mainnet mode signs with the caller's own Turnkey wallet and submits for real where a venue is live, and fails closed everywhere else, so it never claims a fill it cannot show. Call ava_list_venues for which routes are live rather than assuming; that tool reads the same registry this one enforces, so it cannot drift from what will actually execute. NEVER call without explicit user confirmation of the previewed quote.
Inputs: portal (required), userId (required), executionId (required), mode, +1 more.
ava_copilot_turnAInspect
Natural-language copilot turn: message → intent → plan → testnet quote. Example: Swap 10 USDC to SUI on sui with 50 bps slip. Returns actions with approve_execute + executionId. Optional agentId/agentCredential for KYA gate (fail closed on reject). Does NOT fill until ava_approve_execute.
Inputs: message (required), mode, portal, userId, +2 more.
ava_create_agentAInspect
Register an agent instance under userId, before it has a wallet or a mandate. Mode A (multi-agent): agentId=byo-external + label (e.g. claude-workspace, cursor-arb) for a coding agent that already exists elsewhere. Mode B (hosted): agentId=defi-lend|defi-swap|defi-perp|portfolio hires an Ava-run agent. One userId may own many agent instances; this call alone never touches funds.
Inputs: portal (required), userId (required), agentId (required), label.
ava_create_mandateAInspect
Create a capital mandate: the objective, capital and constraints an agent is allowed to act under, optionally scoped to an agentInstanceId. Example: "Earn on 500 USDC on Base, max 5% drawdown". Or pass structured capital {asset,amount,chain}. Creating a mandate moves no money by itself and is not yet signed by an external wallet: it is Ava's own record of what was asked for, not a user-authorised instruction a stranger can rely on. Every later ava_approve_execute run under this mandate is gated on its status (active/paused/cancelled) and constraints, and can refuse.
Inputs: portal (required), name, userId, capital, +5 more.
ava_eval_mandateAInspect
Read-only: check a mandate's exit conditions against a market snapshot and record the result. Omit snapshot to pull a live CoinGecko price for the condition asset. Never executes and never moves money; ava_approve_execute is the only tool that does.
Inputs: mandateId (required), snapshot.
ava_get_receiptAInspect
Retrieve the receipt for a prior ava_approve_execute by executionId, the loop's final step. Returns the stored receipt plus its honest proof.standing: none (nothing submitted), unconfirmed (an identifier exists but nothing independent confirmed it), chain-confirmed (the declared chain returned the transaction and it matches what the receipt claims), or chain-contradicted (the chain disagrees with the receipt). A verified receiptHash does not by itself mean chain-confirmed; read proof.standing, not just verified. Owner-scoped: only the userId the receipt was produced for can read it by executionId; also returns a receiptHash-addressed verify URL a stranger can check with no credential.
Inputs: executionId (required), userId.
ava_lend_executeAInspect
Execute a REAL lend against one of your mandates. Routes Ava has already settled a mainnet transaction on: Morpho Blue on Base, and Aave v3 on Monad, BNB Chain and Avalanche. Aave v3 on Arbitrum One is wired through the identical pipeline and address-verified, but nothing has ever settled there, so do not describe it as proven. Aave v3 on Optimism and Base, and Compound v3 on Base and Arbitrum, are wired and address-verified but operator-disabled until each settles a real transaction, so calls on those routes refuse at the capability gate. This is the only MCP tool that moves live capital. Two-phase by design: call it once WITHOUT previewHash to receive the exact artifact a human must approve plus its hash, show that to the human, then call again WITH that previewHash. Your call is never treated as the human's confirmation, because you are not the person whose money moves. Only a settlement verified against the venue's own on-chain event returns a txHash; anything else has no txHash field at all, so a draft can never be narrated as a fill.
Inputs: userId (required), mandateId (required), op, venue, +4 more.
ava_list_mandatesCInspect
List capital mandates for a userId (optional filter by agentInstanceId).
Inputs: userId (required), portal, status, agentInstanceId.
ava_plan_standingAInspect
Turn a request for REPEATED autonomous action into an envelope of bounds the user signs once. Use this instead of ava_plan_workflow when the request describes a cadence: "every hour, rotate my USDC into the best yield on Base using Aave and Morpho, never move more than 200 per rotation, never exceed 1000 total, stop after 30 days". Asking a human to approve each rotation would defeat the point, so the user authorizes LIMITS rather than a plan: allowed operations, venues, chains, per-move and cumulative caps, a minimum gain that stops the agent churning capital for fees, an expiry, and revocation. Every bound must come from the user: anything missing is returned in missing and the envelope is NOT signable until supplied. minGainBps is required from you because users say "the best yield" rather than a basis-point floor, and Ava must not choose how much of their money goes to gas. Returns the envelope unsigned; nothing is authorized until the user signs it.
Inputs: userId (required), message (required), minGainBps.
ava_plan_workflowAInspect
Turn ONE natural-language DeFi request into the dependent actions it actually contains, across one chain or several. Example: "Supply 300 USDC to Morpho on Base, bridge no more than 200 to Avalanche, then supply what arrives to Aave" returns three legs with the third depending on the second and taking its amount from what the bridge actually delivered, not a plan-time guess. Same-chain works identically: "swap 100 USDC to WETH on Base then supply the WETH to Aave" records the swap OUTPUT token so the second leg is denominated in WETH. Plans nothing it cannot execute: a clause naming an unsupported operation, an unnamed venue, a zero or negative amount, or one amount split across venues comes back in unsupported with a reason rather than being guessed at. Signs nothing and moves nothing. Every leg reports executable so you can see what Ava could actually run today.
Inputs: userId (required), message (required).
ava_portfolioAInspect
Simulated testnet portfolio for a userId (same data as GET /v1/portfolio): seeded balances, fills, optional portal. Requires userId. Does not invent live chain balances.
Inputs: userId (required), portal.
ava_preview_txAInspect
Pre-sign preview: build the exact venue artifact (CoW EIP-712 order or unsigned Solana transaction) for a pending plan against the provisioned Turnkey wallet, simulate it where supported, and return it UNSIGNED. Nothing is signed or submitted. Show the artifact to the human, then pass the returned previewHash to ava_approve_execute so the signature covers exactly what was reviewed.
Inputs: portal (required), userId (required), executionId (required).
ava_provision_walletAInspect
Provision a Turnkey-custodied wallet address for this userId, scoped to one chain family (evm | solana | sui). Requires ava_session first. Returns the address for funding and later signing; it does not fund the wallet and does not move any money. If Turnkey is not configured server-side, the wallet comes back with status pending_provision rather than a fabricated active address, and cannot sign or hold funds until it is active.
Inputs: family (required), userId (required).
ava_sessionAInspect
Create or resume a human/org identity (userId), the first call in the loop. One human can own many agent instances (Claude + Cursor + OpenClaw + Ava-hosted). Moves no money and provisions no wallet by itself; call once and reuse the returned userId on every other tool.
Inputs: userId, displayName.
Tool Schema Changelog
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