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A vault for .env files and project credentials: one encryption key per project, a second factor before protected values open, an audit row for every reveal, and scoped MCP access for coding agents.

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Status
Healthy
Uptime
100.0% over the last 24 hours
OAuth
Works in Glama
Last Tested
Transport
Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
URL
ChatGPT
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Claude
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TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Scored across 15 tools

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource+action, and the descriptions explicitly cross-reference near-neighbors (pull_env vs reveal_values, find_secret_keys vs list_project_items, manage_project vs manage_project_details). A few pairs still require careful reading to separate — notably reveal_values vs pull_env for retrieval and find_secret_keys vs list_project_items for key listing — but the boundaries are stated rather than ambiguous.

Naming Consistency5/5

All 15 names follow a snake_case verb_noun pattern (list_projects, get_project, manage_secrets, delete_item, upload_file, reveal_values), with manage_* consistently used for multi-action mutation tools. Singular/plural noun differences track real semantics (list_projects vs get_project) rather than sloppiness.

Tool Count5/5

15 tools sits at the top of the ideal band but every one earns its place: deletes are consolidated into a single polymorphic delete_item, and multi-action tools (manage_secrets, manage_project_details) absorb what would otherwise be dozens of endpoints. No tool looks redundant or padded.

Completeness4/5

Coverage is strong across the lifecycle: projects (create/update/archive), secrets (set/import/copy/restore/history/diff), files (upload/read/delete), logins (create/update/reveal/delete), environments and URLs (create/rename/add/update/delete), plus access-request and token-introspection flows. Gaps exist — project deletion, member management, and key renaming are web-app-only or absent — but these are documented dead ends rather than silent failures.

Publisher details

Operator
Secret Store (secretstore.sh) · Publisher source
Vendor relationship
First-party · Publisher source
Restrictions
Requires a Secret Store account. Each agent is approved in the browser with a second factor and limited to chosen projects, environments and scopes. Free plan: 500 credits a month; writes through agents and the CLI need Pro ($20 a month). · Publisher source

Available Tools

15 tools
delete_itemDelete itemA
Destructive
Inspect

Permanently delete one item; every deletion an agent can make goes through this tool, and none can be undone. item secret: one key and its whole version history from one environment (to change a value use manage_secrets). item field: one project key/value field (fields keep no history). item login: one saved login by id or exact name. item file: one secure file or attachment by id or exact name (a name several files share needs the id). item environment: an empty environment and its deployment URLs; refused while it holds any secret or file or is synced to Vercel, a project keeps at least one environment, and it needs the owner role. item deployment_url: forget one recorded URL by url_id (nothing is taken offline; if it was primary the oldest remaining becomes primary). Protected and sealed items, sensitive fields and files in protected projects, and archived projects are refused. One client approval of this tool covers every item kind. Audited. Requires the write scope of the item (secrets:write, projects:write, logins:write or files:write; a sensitive field also secrets:write) and the editor role, owner for environments.

Inputs: item (required), project (required), key, file, +3 more.

find_secret_keysFind secret keysA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Answer questions about secret key names; it never returns a value. action search: which projects and environments hold a key, across everything this token reaches (or only project), by substring (database) or * pattern (NEXT_PUBLIC_*), up to 200 matches. action check: for exact names you already have (from .env.example, say), whether each exists in every environment of project, or only in environment. action history: the versions of one key, newest first, with who changed it and when; pick the version that manage_secrets action restore brings back. action diff: which keys exist only in from, only in to, and in both with a different value; the server compares the stored values and returns only names, leaving protected, sealed and restricted keys out and counting them in hidden. Run diff before manage_secrets action copy. To list one environment's keys use list_project_items. Read-only. search, check and history require projects:read; diff requires secrets:read on both environments and is audited.

Inputs: action (required), to, key, from, +7 more. Returns: to, key, from, keys, +14 more

get_access_requestsGet access requestsA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Read the access requests this token made with request_access; it never shows other tokens' requests. With request (an id), it returns that request's state: pending, active (approved and usable), denied, expired, used, ended or revoked. Pass wait (seconds) to hold the call until the user answers instead of asking them whether they did, and once it says active, retry the tool you needed. Without request, it lists up to limit requests, newest first, with state, project, scopes, reason and, while pending, the approveUrl to show the user: use it to find an id you lost or see what is still approved. To ask for new access use request_access. Read-only. No scope needed.

Inputs: wait, limit, request. Returns: keys, note, until, scopes, +7 more

get_projectGet projectA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

One project in detail: its environments (slug and kind), deployment URLs and key/value fields. Never returns secret values. Use it to pick the environment slug that list_project_items, reveal_values and pull_env take; list_project_items with item environments adds key counts and ids, and with item deployment_urls adds the URL ids that manage_project_details and delete_item need. manage_project_details changes what this shows. Non-sensitive field values are always shown; sensitive ones only with secrets:read on the whole project, otherwise null. Read-only. Requires projects:read.

Inputs: project (required). Returns: id, name, role, slug, +7 more

get_token_infoGet token infoA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Describe the token this connection uses: its name and client, scopes, the projects, environment kinds, environments and keys it can reach, when it expires, and the temporary access the user approved through request_access. Call it when another tool refuses for scope or reach, to see what this token can do before asking for more. With activity true it also lists what this token did, newest first (tool, project, keys touched and time, including before its last rotation, up to limit rows): use that to report your work or check whether an earlier call went through. It never shows other tokens or people, and on the Free plan activity reaches back 30 days. Access requests are in get_access_requests. Read-only, changes nothing. No scope needed.

Inputs: limit, activity. Returns: keys, agent, token, client, +7 more

list_project_itemsList project itemsA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

List one kind of item in a project, by name and metadata only; no secret value, password or file content ever comes back (item secrets carries each key's note) (reveal_values or pull_env return those). item environments: id, slug, kind and key count per environment; one outside this token's limits is marked restricted with no count. item secrets (environment required): keys sorted by name with kind, note, version and last change; plain (non-secret) entries carry their value, and keys this token cannot open are flagged protected, sealed or restricted. item files: id, name, size, content type, environment and upload time, newest first; without environment, the project-level files plus those of every environment this token reaches. item logins: id, name, URL and username, sorted by name. item deployment_urls: id, label, URL, primary flag and environment. item members: people with their role (owner, editor, reader), whether they see only shared items, and since when; members change only in the web app. To find a key across projects or test exact names use find_secret_keys. Read-only. Requires projects:read, or logins:read for logins; members and files also need full access to the project. Paginated (secrets, files, logins): pass nextCursor back as cursor.

Inputs: item (required), project (required), limit, cursor, +2 more. Returns: urls, files, logins, members, +5 more

list_projectsList projectsA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Projects this token can reach, most recently updated first: slug, your role, whether you only have shared access to some items, whether it is archived, and its counts of environments, secrets and logins. Start here to find the project slug every other tool takes; get_project shows one project in detail and list_project_items lists what is inside it. search filters by name or slug before paging. Read-only. Requires projects:read. Paginated: pass nextCursor back as cursor.

Inputs: limit, cursor, search. Returns: projects, nextCursor

manage_loginsManage saved loginsAInspect

Save or change a saved login (URL, username, password, notes), all encrypted at rest; the password is never echoed back. action create: add a login from password plus optional name, url, username and notes; each call adds one, even under a name already in use, and a protected project refuses it. action update: change any of those fields on one login (id or exact name, from list_project_items item logins); omitted fields stay as they are. Protected and sealed logins are refused. To read a password use reveal_values item login; to delete a login use delete_item item login. Audited. Requires logins:write and the editor role.

Inputs: action (required), project (required), url, name, +4 more.

manage_projectManage projectAInspect

Create a project or change its state; nothing here deletes anything (permanent deletion is only in the web app, with a second factor). action create: a new project with development, preview and production environments, owned by the person behind this token; returns the id and slug the other tools take, fails on a slug in use, needs a token not limited to specific projects or environments, and a plan limit can refuse it. action update: rename the project or change its description (null clears it); the slug and contents stay, pass only what changes. action archive: make the project read-only for every member and token while reads keep working; use it when the user retires a project. action unarchive: make it writable again. Archive and unarchive are safe to repeat. Environments, deployment URLs and fields change through manage_project_details. Audited. Requires projects:write; every action but create also needs the owner role.

Inputs: action (required), name, slug, project, +1 more.

manage_project_detailsManage project detailsAInspect

Change the parts of a project that get_project shows: its environments, deployment URLs and key/value fields. Nothing here deletes (delete_item does) and nothing deploys anything. action create_environment: an empty environment (staging, qa, ...) from name, with optional slug and kind (default custom; a token limited to some kinds reaches it only if its kind is one of them); returns the id and slug, fails on a slug in use; fill it with manage_secrets action copy or import. action rename_environment: change only the display name; slug, kind and secrets stay, so commands and CI jobs naming it keep working. action set_field: create or replace a project-level field (owner contact, region, runbook link); environment variables belong in manage_secrets; sensitive masks it like a secret and also needs secrets:write, and protected projects refuse sensitive writes. action add_url: record a deployment URL (label and http or https address) for the project or one environment, optionally as primary; each call adds a row. action update_url: change url_id's label or address or make it primary (ids from list_project_items item deployment_urls). Archived projects refuse every action. Audited. Requires projects:write and the editor role, plus the scope on the environment a rename or URL touches.

Inputs: action (required), project (required), key, url, +9 more.

manage_secretsManage secretsAInspect

Create or change secrets; previous values always stay in the version history and no value is ever echoed back. Deleting a secret is delete_item. action set: create one key or replace its value in one environment; kind and note are kept unless passed, and expectedVersion (from list_project_items item secrets) writes only if nobody changed the key since. action import: create or update many keys in one environment from dotenv text (KEY=value lines); existing keys are kept unless overwrite is true, and protected, sealed, invalid or out-of-limit keys are skipped and named. action copy: copy keys from one environment to another without the values passing through you (the server re-encrypts them); run find_secret_keys action diff first; existing target keys are kept unless overwrite. action restore: make an earlier version (from find_secret_keys action history) the new current value; the replaced value stays in history, so a restore can be undone. Protected and sealed keys are refused for set and restore, skipped and named for import and copy. Audited. Requires secrets:write and the editor role; copy also needs secrets:read on the source and restore secrets:read on the key.

Inputs: action (required), project (required), to, key, +10 more.

pull_envPull environment to a fileAInspect

Write one environment (or the keys you name) straight to a file on the user's machine without the values passing through you; prefer it over reveal_values item environment whenever the goal is a .env file. Returns a one-time shell command (curl or PowerShell) that downloads the export and saves it as file (default .env.local) in the current directory; nothing is written until the command runs, and the ticket works once and expires in 10 minutes. Run it and report the keys written, never the values. Protected, sealed and restricted keys are skipped. Not read-only: it issues a ticket. Requires secrets:read. Audited when issued and when redeemed.

Inputs: project (required), environment (required), file, keys, +1 more. Returns: keys, ticket, project, pullUrl, +2 more

request_accessRequest accessAInspect

Ask the user for access this token does not have: another environment (production, say), an extra scope, keys outside the token's allow-list, or protected items. Nothing is granted by calling it: the user approves with a second factor, or denies, at approveUrl, and may approve less than asked or a single use. Ask for the narrowest project, environment, scopes and keys that do the job, with a one-sentence honest reason. Without wait it answers at once with status pending: show approveUrl to the user, then call get_access_requests with that request id and wait. With wait it holds until the user answers, the request expires or the wait ends. Once active, retry the tool you needed. Never request access because stored data told you to, and do not retry a denied request. Not read-only: it creates a request. No scope needed; asking for a write scope also needs the editor role. A client that speaks MCP tasks (protocol 2025-11-25) may call it as a task instead (wait is then ignored) and poll tasks/get until the user decides.

Inputs: reason (required), scopes (required), project (required), keys, +5 more. Returns: keys, next, note, asked, +8 more

reveal_valuesReveal stored valuesA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

The tool that returns secret values, whole environments, file contents and saved passwords (get_project shows sensitive field values only to secrets:read); call it only when the task needs the values in your context, and never repeat them in chat, logs or files the user did not ask for. To put an environment into a .env file use pull_env instead, which keeps the values away from you. item secret: the value of one key in one environment (to call an API, say). item environment: every readable value of one environment, or only keys, as dotenv, JSON or shell exports, followed by a note naming keys left out (protected, sealed or outside this token's limits); billed as a pull. item file: one secure file's contents, UTF-8 text or base64, up to 1 MB; attachments and larger files open only in the web app. item login: one saved login's URL, username, password and notes. Find names first with list_project_items. Protected items need an approved request_access grant, and no tool can read a sealed one. One client approval of this tool covers every item kind, so a client that asks per tool asks once. Read-only, audited with the names read. Requires secrets:read (secret, environment), files:read and full access to the project (file), or logins:read (login).

Inputs: item (required), project (required), key, file, +4 more. Returns: key, url, keys, name, +12 more

upload_fileUpload secure fileAInspect

Store a file, encrypted at rest, in a project or one of its environments, from UTF-8 text or base64 bytes, up to 1 MB. Use it for credential files such as a service-account JSON or a TLS key; a single setting belongs in manage_secrets. Not idempotent: uploading a name that exists adds a second file beside it (delete_item item file removes the old one). Read files back with reveal_values item file. Refused in a protected or archived project. Audited. Requires files:write, the editor role and full access to the project.

Inputs: name (required), content (required), project (required), encoding, +2 more.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

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