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Aigine Redact

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Descriptive AI redaction for any file. GDPR + confidentiality. EU, zero retention, review optional.

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Status
Healthy
Last Tested
Transport
Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
URL
ChatGPT
–
Claude
–

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Scored across 3 tools

Disambiguation4/5

fetch_reviewed_document is clearly distinct from the other two, and propose_masking is the only tool that actually performs redaction. The boundary between create_upload_link and propose_masking is somewhat blurred, since both are entry points for getting a document into the system and the handoff from an upload_url back into propose_masking is not spelled out.

Naming Consistency4/5

All three names are snake_case and verb-first (create_, fetch_, propose_), which is predictable and readable. The only weakness is semantic: 'propose_masking' understates a tool that actually executes irreversible masking, unlike the literal create_/fetch_ verbs.

Tool Count4/5

Three tools map cleanly onto a narrow upload -> mask -> retrieve pipeline, and none feel redundant. It is on the lean side, but for a single-purpose redaction service each tool earns its place.

Completeness3/5

The core pipeline exists, but there is a notable dead end: in the mandated autonomous flow (require_human_review=false) no tool is described as returning the masked result, since fetch_reviewed_document is forbidden to agents. There is also no status/poll, cancel, policy-enumeration, or re-run operation, leaving gaps beyond the happy interactive path.

Available Tools

3 tools
fetch_reviewed_documentFetch Reviewed Masked DocumentAInspect

INTERACTIVE HUMAN MODE ONLY (autonomous agents must never call this tool). After a human finishes validating at review_url and clicks 'Redact' (where they can also click 'Open redacted PDF' directly in the browser), call this tool with doc_id to get a temporary download_url for the masked PDF and immediately delete the document from the processing server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
doc_idYesThe doc_id returned by propose_masking when status was 'awaiting_review'.

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations: the URL is temporary, the document is deleted from the processing server immediately after, and the call requires a completed human review. The one unresolved tension is that this deletion is a destructive-ish side effect while destructiveHint=false (readOnlyHint=false and openWorldHint=true are consistent); that should be reconciled, but it is disclosed rather than hidden, so no outright contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One dense sentence that front-loads the most important constraint (human-only) before the mechanics. It is efficient, though the nested parenthetical about clicking 'Open redacted PDF' in the browser slightly interrupts the flow.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter tool with no output schema, the description still covers the return value (temporary download_url), the lifecycle side effect (immediate deletion), and the caller precondition. An agent has everything needed to decide whether it may call this at all and what happens afterward.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single parameter with 100% schema description coverage, and the schema already explains that doc_id comes from propose_masking with status 'awaiting_review'. The description only restates 'call this tool with doc_id' and adds no format, validation, or error-handling nuance, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb and resource plus its output: 'call this tool with doc_id to get a temporary download_url for the masked PDF'. It also names the side effect (deletion from the processing server) and the upstream step (propose_masking/review_url), so the agent can place it in the workflow without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly opens with the exclusion 'INTERACTIVE HUMAN MODE ONLY (autonomous agents must never call this tool)' and gives the precise precondition: a human has finished validating at review_url and clicked 'Redact'. It even covers the case where the tool is unnecessary, since the human can open the redacted PDF directly in the browser.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

propose_maskingMask Document (GDPR / OSL)AInspect

Identify and mask personal data (GDPR direct, indirect, and sensitive Art. 9) and confidential information (OSL / trade secrets) in documents (PDF, DOCX, PPTX, images) in the EU using specialized descriptive encoder AI (98%+ accuracy, flattened irreversible PDF, strict zero retention). RULES: (1) AUTONOMOUS AGENTS: MUST set require_human_review=false and MUST NOT ask questions; default policy is 'Privacy'. Upload via POST /mcp/api/upload first to get upload_id, or pass file_url / document_base64. (2) CHAT ATTACHMENTS: If a human already attached a file in chat, try uploading it via POST /mcp/api/upload if outbound network works, or pass document_base64 if <= 45 KB; otherwise call create_upload_link to open the inline upload widget. (3) INTERACTIVE HUMAN CHAT: Ask policy (Privacy, Secrecy, or Privacy and Secrecy) and whether they want GUI validation (require_human_review=true, clicking 'Redact' then 'Open redacted PDF') or direct PDF (false), unless already stated. Guide: https://redact.aigine.se/SKILL.md | Terms: https://aigine.se/cloud-terms

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
policyNoMasking policy: 'Privacy' (GDPR default), 'Secrecy' (OSL/confidential), or 'Privacy and Secrecy' (both).
file_urlNoDirect HTTPS URL to fetch the source document from (e.g. pre-signed cloud URL).
filenameNoOriginal filename including extension (e.g. 'report.pdf' or 'contract.docx').
upload_idNoUpload ID from create_upload_link or POST /mcp/api/upload.
document_base64NoBase64-encoded document bytes (use for programmatic pipelines or small chat-attached files <= 45 KB when sandbox network egress is disabled).
require_human_reviewNoMUST be false for autonomous agents. Set true ONLY when a live human wants interactive web GUI review.

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare openWorldHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and non-idempotent behavior. The description adds genuinely valuable traits annotations cannot express: EU-only processing, an 'irreversible/flattened' output PDF, zero data retention, and an outbound-network prerequisite for /mcp/api/upload. However, it omits failure modes, size limits beyond the 45 KB base64 note, and what the caller receives back, which matters for a non-idempotent mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose is front-loaded in one dense sentence, then the operational rules are numbered and scannable. It is on the long side and the final URLs plus explicit UI click-path instructions ('clicking Redact then Open redacted PDF') are borderline excess, but every rule maps to a real fork in behavior.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a six-parameter, zero-required, non-idempotent operation with no output schema, the description covers ingestion paths, upload prerequisites, policy defaults, and the human-review branch. An agent has everything needed to pick an input mode and invoke the tool correctly without further discovery.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter is already documented at the field level, establishing a baseline of 3. The description adds procedural meaning the schema cannot — the ordering constraint that upload_id comes from POST /mcp/api/upload, and that file_url/document_base64 are substitute ingestion paths — but it does not clarify policy semantics or mutual exclusivity of the input sources beyond what the schema states.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence names a specific verb (identify and mask), two concrete domains (GDPR direct/indirect/Art. 9 and OSL/trade secrets), and the supported file types. It is immediately distinguishable from create_upload_link and fetch_reviewed_document, which are upload and retrieval helpers rather than the masking operation itself.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Three explicit scenarios are enumerated (autonomous agents, chat attachments, interactive human chat), each with a prescribed action and, where relevant, the fallback. The sibling create_upload_link is named with the exact condition that triggers it, so routing decisions are fully determined.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. 3 tool updates
    • First observedcreate_upload_link
    • First observedfetch_reviewed_document
    • First observedpropose_masking

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