Skip to main content
Glama

AgenticRail Gate - sequence enforcement and verifiable audit receipts for AI agent compliance

Server Details

Deterministic runtime enforcement of step order for AI agents: ALLOW/DENY before a step runs.

If you are the author of this connector, you can claim ownership with GitHub, an HTTP challenge, or a DNS record. Claimed connector authors can inspect health checks, view analytics, and manage their listing.
Status
Healthy
Last Tested
Transport
Streamable HTTP
URL
Repository
MSMD-RUA/agenticrail-mcp
GitHub Stars
0
Server Listing
agenticrail-mcp
Tool DescriptionsA

Average 4.8/5 across 2 of 2 tools scored.

Server CoherenceA
Disambiguation5/5

The two tools have a clean temporal split: evaluate_step decides whether a step may run before execution, while verify_receipt validates the sealed audit trail afterward. There is no overlap in purpose or ambiguous boundary.

Naming Consistency5/5

Both tool names follow the same verb_noun pattern using imperative verbs (evaluate, verify) and concrete objects (step, receipt). The naming is short, parallel, and predictable.

Tool Count4/5

At two tools, the surface is slightly below the typical 3–15 tool range, but the server's purpose is deliberately narrow: gate a step and verify the resulting proofs. Each tool earns its place and there is no redundancy.

Completeness5/5

The domain lifecycle is fully covered: every agent action goes through evaluate_step for an ALLOW/DENY/HALT decision, and verify_receipt closes the loop by checking the chained receipts. There is no obvious missing operation that would leave an enforced run unresolved.

Available Tools

2 tools
evaluate_stepAInspect

Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs. The gate is deterministic (same state+request → same verdict) and enforces step order, replay protection (nonce), timestamp freshness, and sealing. A denied step must not be executed. Every decision is sealed into an Ed25519-signed, hash-chained receipt. Returns the decision (ALLOW/DENY/HALT), any reason codes, and receipt metadata. Use the demo key by sending no Authorization header, or send Authorization: Bearer . NOTE: an anonymous call has its sequence_id rewritten to 'demo-mcp-'. This is intended, not a leak: it scopes the run to the public demo lane and is how anonymous MCP traffic is identified. Always reuse the sequence_id RETURNED in the response for later steps and for verify_receipt -- the id you sent will not resolve.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stepYesThe step being attempted, e.g. 'intake' or 'review_and_sign'. Must appear in step_order (for custom sequences) and must equal `function`.
nonceNoOptional unique-per-step UUID for replay protection. Generated automatically if omitted.
actionNoOptional human-readable label for the action.
inputsNoOptional free-form inputs recorded with the decision.
functionNoDefaults to `step`. The rule step === function always holds.
step_orderNoThe full ordered list of step names for a CUSTOM sequence. Send it on every call, IDENTICAL each time. Omit only if using AgenticRail's built-in MSMD spine. It is LOCKED on the sequence's first call: a different list later is DENIED with STEP_ORDER_MISMATCH, and that denial returns locked_step_order - the list this sequence is held to. Do NOT try to clear the lock by omitting this field; that selects the MSMD spine and your steps will come back UNKNOWN_STEP. To change the plan, start a new sequence_id. One step is a valid sequence. An UNKNOWN_STEP denial returns expected_step_order (the list your step had to be in) and step_order_source ('caller' or 'msmd_spine'); msmd_spine means you sent no step_order at all and got the built-in spine.
action_typeYesThe action class for this step. These eight are the whole vocabulary, but EACH STEP ACCEPTS ONLY A SUBSET - e.g. intake takes VALIDATE_INPUT, CHECK_STATE or CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP and nothing else. A wrong one is DENIED with ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED before your step runs, and that denial now returns allowed_action_types listing exactly what the step would have accepted - read it and retry rather than guessing. These are enforcement classes, NOT what your step does: a step that searches, drafts, queries or analyses is still CHECK_STATE if it reads state, or RECORD_RESULT if it writes an outcome.
sequence_idYesStable identifier for this run of the sequence. Reuse it across every step of the same sequence. An anonymous call is rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>' and an authenticated demo call to 'demo-<your id>'; take the id back from the response and use that one from then on. Give every RUN a fresh id - a run, not an attempt: sealing is permanent, and on the shared demo lane a fixed id is shared with everyone else. A DENIED step does not spoil a sequence and does not run anything, so a denial is not a reason to start a new one: fix the call instead.
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, and it is exceptionally thorough. It reveals determinism, step-order enforcement, replay protection via nonce, timestamp freshness, Ed25519-signed hash-chained receipts, and the anonymous demo-lane sequence_id rewriting with an explicit note that this is intended. It also discloses denial response fields like locked_step_order, expected_step_order, step_order_source, and allowed_action_types, plus the permanence of sealing on the shared demo lane.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long, but the length is justified by the tool's complexity and the absence of annotations and output schema. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and then organized into security guarantees, authentication, demo-lane behavior, and sequence_id reuse. Each paragraph earns its place, though a slightly tighter edit could reduce redundancy around the step_order and sequence_id notes.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool has no output schema and no annotations, yet the description covers return values (ALLOW/DENY/HALT, reason codes, receipt metadata), common denial payloads, authentication options, the sequence_id reuse rule, and demo-lane caveats. An agent has enough context to call the tool correctly, interpret denials, and recover from mistakes without guessing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds substantial behavioral meaning beyond the schema. For step_order it explains the locking mechanism, the MSMD spine fallback, and the consequences of omitting the field; for action_type it clarifies that each step accepts a subset and that these are enforcement classes, not descriptions of the step's actual work. It also explains sequence_id rewriting and the rule that step must equal function, none of which the schema alone conveys.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs.' It clearly distinguishes the tool from its sibling verify_receipt by focusing on pre-execution gate decisions and by pointing to verify_receipt as the consumer of the returned sequence_id, which implies a separate post-hoc verification role.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit when-to-use context: invoke it before each step runs, and 'a denied step must not be executed.' It also provides important operational guidance such as 'a denial is not a reason to start a new one: fix the call instead' and instructs to reuse the returned sequence_id for later steps and verify_receipt. It does not explicitly state when to prefer verify_receipt over this tool, but the boundary is strongly implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

verify_receiptAInspect

CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer . Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / …) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and independent-archive checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys — no need to trust AgenticRail.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sequence_idYesThe sequence to verify. Use a 'demo-' sequence for keyless verification.
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses that this is a fetch/report operation, names the returned verification_status values, lists the per-receipt checks, and explains the offline verification context—far beyond a minimal description.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with when-to-call, then moves to return values and trust context. It is longer than strictly necessary—the line about evidence nobody has checked is motivational—but each part adds substantive guidance for correct usage.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple one-parameter tool with no output schema, the description fully compensates: it explains the input source, the auth requirement, the result fields, the status ranges, and why the evidence is independently useful. An agent has enough information to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, and the description adds meaning by saying the sequence_id is the one RETURNED by evaluate_step and explaining demo- versus keyed sequences. The schema already covers sequence_id, but the origin and keyless demo- semantics update the agent; slightly more detail would push to 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence' and checks whether the receipt chain is intact. It is clearly distinct from evaluate_step, which produces the sequence_id, so an agent can select the right tool.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit when-to-use guidance is front-loaded: call after a sequence seals and after any DENY, using the sequence_id returned by evaluate_step. It also gives the demo-keyless vs. Bearer-auth distinction for choosing how to invoke it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Frequently Asked Questions

Discussions

No comments yet. Be the first to start the discussion!

Related MCP Servers

  • A
    license
    A
    quality
    A
    maintenance
    Enables AI agents to execute multi-step Standard Operating Procedures step by step, with enforcement of completion at each step, making LLM behavior predictable and auditable.
    5
    3
    Apache 2.0
  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    B
    maintenance
    Deterministic policy enforcement for AI agent tool calls. It evaluates every tool call against user-defined rules before execution, with no LLM in the authorization path.
    3
    MIT
  • A
    license
    A
    quality
    A
    maintenance
    Proof-of-behavior enforcement for AI agents. Declare behavioral constraints, enforce at runtime, produce SHA-256 hash-chained audit trails. Supports covenants (permit/forbid/require), real-time verification, and cross-agent trust handshakes.
    4
    39
    MIT

View all MCP Servers

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.