AgenticRail Gate - sequence enforcement and verifiable audit receipts for AI agent compliance
Server Details
Deterministic runtime enforcement of step order for AI agents: ALLOW/DENY before a step runs.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over 55 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP ยท MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- Repository
- MSMD-RUA/agenticrail-mcp
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- agenticrail-mcp
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
evaluate_step is a pre-execution gate that returns ALLOW/DENY for a single step, while verify_receipt is a post-execution verifier for a sealed or denied sequence. Their purposes are clearly disjoint and sequential, leaving no room for misselection.
Both tools follow a consistent verb_noun snake_case pattern: evaluate_step and verify_receipt. There is no mixing of conventions or vague verbs.
Two tools is slightly under the typical 3-15 range, but for a focused compliance gate that only needs one enforcement tool and one verification tool, each earns its place. The count is minimal yet sufficient for the stated purpose.
The surface covers the core lifecycle: evaluate_step implicitly creates and enforces a sequence, and verify_receipt provides tamper-evident verification. Minor gaps exist (e.g., no explicit tool to list sequences or retrieve raw receipt chains), but the essential workflow is complete.
Available Tools
2 toolsevaluate_stepAInspect
Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs, so a required step cannot be skipped or run out of order. A denied step must not be executed. You walk away holding a signed, hash-chained, tamper-evident audit trail of the run that you can hand to anyone, and they can verify it offline - no callback to us and no account with us. The gate is deterministic (same state+request -> same verdict) and enforces step order, replay protection, timestamp freshness and sealing. START HERE - send this, changing only CHANGE-ME to any unique string of your own, and it will be ALLOWED: {"sequence_id":"CHANGE-ME","step":"intake","action_type":"CHECK_STATE","step_order":["intake","settle"]}. Then send the same call with step 'settle' to close and seal it. Use the demo key by sending no Authorization header, or send Authorization: Bearer . NOTE: an anonymous call has its sequence_id rewritten to 'demo-mcp-'. This is intended, not a leak: it scopes the run to the public demo lane and is how anonymous MCP traffic is identified. Always reuse the sequence_id RETURNED in the response for later steps and for verify_receipt -- the id you sent will not resolve. Typical use is gating the order of a regulated workflow the caller already runs: customer and third-party due diligence, verification of identity before a payment or business relationship, company registry, beneficial-ownership and sanctions screening, supplier and contractor onboarding. This tool performs none of those checks and holds no registry or watchlist data. It decides only whether the step you are about to run is allowed at this point in the order you declared.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| step | Yes | The step being attempted, e.g. 'intake' or 'review_and_sign'. This is a NAME, not a description. It must be spelled identically on every call, must appear in step_order (for custom sequences), and must equal `function`. The gate compares it byte for byte, so a sentence that changes with the subject can never match and is denied UNKNOWN_STEP. Put the human-readable sentence in `action` instead. | |
| nonce | No | Optional unique-per-step UUID for replay protection. Generated automatically if omitted. | |
| action | No | Optional human-readable label for the action. | |
| inputs | No | Optional free-form context for the step. NOT stored in the receipt: the receipt keeps only a SHA-256 hash of the whole request. Put anything that must be kept as evidence in `attestation` instead (published verbatim; world-readable on the anonymous demo lane). | |
| function | No | Defaults to `step`. The rule step === function always holds. | |
| step_order | No | The full ordered list of step names for a CUSTOM sequence. Send it on every call, IDENTICAL each time. Omit only if using AgenticRail's built-in MSMD spine. It is LOCKED on the sequence's first call: a different list later is DENIED with STEP_ORDER_MISMATCH, and that denial returns locked_step_order - the list this sequence is held to. Do NOT try to clear the lock by omitting this field; that selects the MSMD spine and your steps will come back UNKNOWN_STEP. To change the plan, start a new sequence_id. One step is a valid sequence. An UNKNOWN_STEP denial returns expected_step_order (the list your step had to be in) and step_order_source ('caller' or 'msmd_spine'); msmd_spine means you sent no step_order at all and got the built-in spine. | |
| action_type | Yes | The action class for this step. The whole vocabulary is exactly these eight and nothing else is accepted: CHECK_STATE, CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP, SELECT_NEXT_STEP, RECORD_RESULT, WAIT_FOR_SIGNAL, VALIDATE_INPUT, PAUSE_CYCLE, REDUCE_STIMULUS. These are ENFORCEMENT CLASSES, NOT a description of what your step does. READ, QUERY, LOOKUP, SEARCH, EXECUTE, ANALYZE and TOOL_CALL are the most common wrong guesses and every one of them is denied: a step that searches, drafts, queries or analyses is still CHECK_STATE if it reads state, or RECORD_RESULT if it writes an outcome. EACH STEP THEN ACCEPTS ONLY A SUBSET of the eight - e.g. intake takes VALIDATE_INPUT, CHECK_STATE or CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP and nothing else. A wrong one is DENIED with ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED before your step runs, and that denial returns allowed_action_types listing exactly what the step would have accepted - read it and retry rather than guessing. A denial does not spoil the sequence and runs nothing. | |
| sequence_id | Yes | Stable identifier for this run of the sequence. Reuse it across every step of the same sequence. An anonymous call is rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>' and an authenticated demo call to 'demo-<your id>'; take the id back from the response and use that one from then on. Give every RUN a fresh id - a run, not an attempt: sealing is permanent, and on the shared demo lane a fixed id is shared with everyone else. A DENIED step does not spoil a sequence and does not run anything, so a denial is not a reason to start a new one: fix the call instead. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden, and it does: it discloses determinism (same state+request -> same verdict), enforcement of step order, replay protection, timestamp freshness, sealing, the anonymous sequence_id rewrite, the step_order lock on first call, and that denials run nothing. This is far beyond what any structured field states.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The core purpose and the START HERE example are front-loaded, and most sentences carry distinct operational content. It is long, with some promotional framing ('hand to anyone', 'no account with us') that could be trimmed, but it does not bury the actionable guidance.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For an 8-parameter, no-annotation, no-output-schema tool, the description covers the gaps that matter: denial codes and retry behavior, the step_order lock, the demo-lane rewrite, sealing permanence, and the boundary that it performs none of the underlying checks. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the schema already documents each parameter in depth. The description still adds value with a concrete, ready-to-send example payload that pins down real values for sequence_id, step, action_type and step_order, plus the operational note that the returned sequence_id must be reused rather than the one sent.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence names a specific verb and resource: 'Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs,' and explicitly scopes the tool against its sibling by naming verify_receipt for receipt checking. An agent can distinguish it from verify_receipt without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives an explicit START HERE recipe with a literal payload, states how to use the demo lane vs an authenticated key, tells the caller to reuse the sequence_id returned by the server, and explains that a denial is not a reason to start a new sequence. It also names the sibling (verify_receipt) and the correct follow-up action.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_receiptAInspect
CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer . Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / ...) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and archive-witness checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys - no need to trust AgenticRail.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| sequence_id | Yes | The sequence to verify. Use a 'demo-' sequence for keyless verification. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does well: it discloses auth requirements, returned verification_status values, per-receipt checks, and the offline trust model. It stops short of stating that the operation is read-only/non-destructive or mentioning rate limits, so it is not fully complete.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The trigger is front-loaded in all caps, and the structure moves logically from when-to-call to auth to return details. It is somewhat expansive with motivational and trust framing, but those sentences still add useful context for a verification tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description must explain what comes back, and it does: verification_status plus per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and archive-witness checks. Combined with auth and trust context, it is complete enough for an agent to call and interpret the result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds integration meaning by saying the sequence_id is returned by evaluate_step and repeats the demo- keyless verification context, which helps the agent source the value correctly.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. It clearly distinguishes this from evaluate_step by positioning verification as a post-seal, post-deny check on evidence already produced.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says when to call: after a sequence seals and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id returned by evaluate_step. It also gives the conditional auth requirement for demo versus non-demo sequences, leaving little ambiguity about invocation context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / inputs / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional free-form inputs recorded with the decision."New value: +"Optional free-form context for the step. NOT stored in the receipt: the receipt keeps only a SHA-256 hash of the whole request. Put anything that must be kept as evidence in `attestation` instead (published verbatim; world-readable on the anonymous demo lane)."
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / action_type / descriptionPrevious value: -"The action class for this step. These eight are the whole vocabulary, but EACH STEP ACCEPTS ONLY A SUBSET - e.g. intake takes VALIDATE_INPUT, CHECK_STATE or CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP and nothing else. A wrong one is DENIED with ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED before your step runs, and that denial now returns allowed_action_types listing exactly what the step would have accepted - read it and retry rather than guessing. These are enforcement classes, NOT what your step does: a step that searches, drafts, queries or analyses is still CHECK_STATE if it reads state, or RECORD_RESULT if it writes an outcome."New value: +"The action class for this step. The whole vocabulary is exactly these eight and nothing else is accepted: CHECK_STATE, CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP, SELECT_NEXT_STEP, RECORD_RESULT, WAIT_FOR_SIGNAL, VALIDATE_INPUT, PAUSE_CYCLE, REDUCE_STIMULUS. These are ENFORCEMENT CLASSES, NOT a description of what your step does. READ, QUERY, LOOKUP, SEARCH, EXECUTE, ANALYZE and TOOL_CALL are the most common wrong guesses and every one of them is denied: a step that searches, drafts, queries or analyses is still CHECK_STATE if it reads state, or RECORD_RESULT if it writes an outcome. EACH STEP THEN ACCEPTS ONLY A SUBSET of the eight - e.g. intake takes VALIDATE_INPUT, CHECK_STATE or CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP and nothing else. A wrong one is DENIED with ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED before your step runs, and that denial returns allowed_action_types listing exactly what the step would have accepted - read it and retry rather than guessing. A denial does not spoil the sequence and runs nothing."
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / step / descriptionPrevious value: -"The step being attempted, e.g. 'intake' or 'review_and_sign'. Must appear in step_order (for custom sequences) and must equal `function`."New value: +"The step being attempted, e.g. 'intake' or 'review_and_sign'. This is a NAME, not a description. It must be spelled identically on every call, must appear in step_order (for custom sequences), and must equal `function`. The gate compares it byte for byte, so a sentence that changes with the subject can never match and is denied UNKNOWN_STEP. Put the human-readable sentence in `action` instead."
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / sequence_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Stable identifier for this run of the sequence. Reuse it across every step of the same sequence. An anonymous call is rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>' and an authenticated demo call to 'demo-<your id>'; take the id back from the response and use that one from then on. Give every run a fresh id: sealing is permanent, and on the shared demo lane a fixed id is shared with everyone else."New value: +"Stable identifier for this run of the sequence. Reuse it across every step of the same sequence. An anonymous call is rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>' and an authenticated demo call to 'demo-<your id>'; take the id back from the response and use that one from then on. Give every RUN a fresh id - a run, not an attempt: sealing is permanent, and on the shared demo lane a fixed id is shared with everyone else. A DENIED step does not spoil a sequence and does not run anything, so a denial is not a reason to start a new one: fix the call instead."
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / step_order / descriptionPrevious value: -"The full ordered list of step names for a CUSTOM sequence. Send it on every call, IDENTICAL each time. Omit only if using AgenticRail's built-in MSMD spine. It is LOCKED on the sequence's first call: a different list later is DENIED with STEP_ORDER_MISMATCH, and that denial returns locked_step_order - the list this sequence is held to. Do NOT try to clear the lock by omitting this field; that selects the MSMD spine and your steps will come back UNKNOWN_STEP. To change the plan, start a new sequence_id."New value: +"The full ordered list of step names for a CUSTOM sequence. Send it on every call, IDENTICAL each time. Omit only if using AgenticRail's built-in MSMD spine. It is LOCKED on the sequence's first call: a different list later is DENIED with STEP_ORDER_MISMATCH, and that denial returns locked_step_order - the list this sequence is held to. Do NOT try to clear the lock by omitting this field; that selects the MSMD spine and your steps will come back UNKNOWN_STEP. To change the plan, start a new sequence_id. One step is a valid sequence. An UNKNOWN_STEP denial returns expected_step_order (the list your step had to be in) and step_order_source ('caller' or 'msmd_spine'); msmd_spine means you sent no step_order at all and got the built-in spine."
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / step_order / descriptionPrevious value: -"The full ordered list of step names for a CUSTOM sequence. Send it on every call. Omit only if using AgenticRail's built-in MSMD spine."New value: +"The full ordered list of step names for a CUSTOM sequence. Send it on every call, IDENTICAL each time. Omit only if using AgenticRail's built-in MSMD spine. It is LOCKED on the sequence's first call: a different list later is DENIED with STEP_ORDER_MISMATCH, and that denial returns locked_step_order - the list this sequence is held to. Do NOT try to clear the lock by omitting this field; that selects the MSMD spine and your steps will come back UNKNOWN_STEP. To change the plan, start a new sequence_id."
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / action_type / descriptionPrevious value: -"The action class for this step, e.g. CHECK_STATE, SELECT_NEXT_STEP, RECORD_RESULT, PAUSE_CYCLE. Must be permitted for the step."New value: +"The action class for this step. These eight are the whole vocabulary, but EACH STEP ACCEPTS ONLY A SUBSET - e.g. intake takes VALIDATE_INPUT, CHECK_STATE or CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP and nothing else. A wrong one is DENIED with ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED before your step runs, and that denial now returns allowed_action_types listing exactly what the step would have accepted - read it and retry rather than guessing. These are enforcement classes, NOT what your step does: a step that searches, drafts, queries or analyses is still CHECK_STATE if it reads state, or RECORD_RESULT if it writes an outcome." - added
Input schema / properties / action_type / enumAdded value: +[ + "CHECK_STATE", + "CLARIFY_NEXT_STEP", + "SELECT_NEXT_STEP", + "RECORD_RESULT", + "WAIT_FOR_SIGNAL", + "VALIDATE_INPUT", + "PAUSE_CYCLE", + "REDUCE_STIMULUS" +]
1 tool update
- Changed
evaluate_step1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / sequence_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Stable identifier for this run of the sequence. Reuse it across every step of the same sequence. Demo callers get a 'demo-' prefix."New value: +"Stable identifier for this run of the sequence. Reuse it across every step of the same sequence. An anonymous call is rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>' and an authenticated demo call to 'demo-<your id>'; take the id back from the response and use that one from then on. Give every run a fresh id: sealing is permanent, and on the shared demo lane a fixed id is shared with everyone else."
2 tool updates
- First observed
evaluate_step - First observed
verify_receipt
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