Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It does add context by naming the external HaveIBeenPwned source and regulatory use case, but it does not disclose rate limits, required permissions, or response behavior. The read-only nature is only implied by 'check'.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences front-load the data source and purpose, with no filler. The DORA reference adds useful context in a single phrase. Every word earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple tool with only two optional parameters and no output schema, the description is mostly sufficient. However, it does not mention what the response contains (e.g., breach names, dates) or the impact of the limit parameter, leaving some ambiguity about the return format.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with clear descriptions for both domain and limit, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description adds little beyond 'domain/company breach exposure' and does not provide additional parameter context or examples beyond what the schema already includes.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool checks domain/company breach exposure via the HaveIBeenPwned database, which is a specific verb+resource+scope. It distinguishes from siblings by focusing on breach exposure rather than CVEs, advisories, or threat actors.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The DORA Art. 18 reference implies it is used for incident assessment, but it does not explicitly state when to use this over alternatives like cve_search or kev_check. No exclusions or alternative tool names are provided, leaving usage mostly implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.