Risk assessment matrix (likelihood × impact). ISO 31000/27005 methodology. Provide risks for assessment or get template.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| risks | No | JSON array [{name, likelihood(1-5), impact(1-5)}] |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses two usage modes (provide risks for assessment or get template) and mentions the methodology, which is helpful. However, with no annotations, it does not describe the output format, expected behavior on invalid input, or any side effects, leaving gaps in behavioral transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise—three short clauses that immediately convey the tool's identity, methodology, and usage options. Every word earns its place, and the structure front-loads the core purpose.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with only one optional parameter and no output schema, the description covers the basic functionality adequately. However, it omits what the assessment output looks like (e.g., a computed rating, a matrix visualization), which leaves some ambiguity for the agent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already fully describes the single 'risks' parameter format. The description adds meaningful conditional behavior: if risks are provided, assessment happens; if omitted, a template is returned. This goes beyond the schema's static parameter description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies a risk assessment matrix combining likelihood and impact, and mentions the ISO 31000/27005 methodology. It distinguishes itself from sibling risk tools by being a generic matrix tool, though the verb 'provide' is less specific than a single action verb.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The ISO methodology implies use for standard risk assessments, but there is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool over alternatives like cve_risk_score or iso27001_gap, nor any exclusions or prerequisites.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool focuses on a distinct security domain: attack surface, CVE scoring, compliance frameworks (DORA, ISO, NIS2), incident response, phishing, risk matrix, metrics, and threat landscape. There is no functional overlap that would confuse an agent.
All tool names follow a consistent lowercase snake_case convention and are descriptive noun phrases. The pattern is predictable, though it does not use a uniform verb_noun structure, which is a minor stylistic deviation.
With 12 tools, the server is well-scoped for a cybersecurity compliance and risk platform. Each tool adds meaningful functionality without redundancy, keeping the set manageable and purposeful.
The toolset covers major compliance assessments (DORA, ISO 27001, NIS2), incident response, risk analysis, and threat intelligence. Minor gaps exist, such as no dedicated business continuity or broader policy generation tool, but the core security lifecycle is well represented.