MUJ428 Trust Layer — Bind Approved Intent to Verified Effect
Server Details
Payment-rail-independent intent-to-effect integrity for consequential agent actions.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
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Tool Definition Quality
Average 3.9/5 across 2 of 2 tools scored.
The two tools serve clearly distinct roles: one provides requirements/information, the other performs the decision/verification action. No overlap exists, so an agent should never confuse which tool to call for a given step.
Both tool names use a verb-led snake_case pattern ('get_evidence_signal_requirements', 'trust_action'), but 'trust_action' is less standard as a verb phrase. The two names are generally consistent and predictable.
With only two tools, the surface feels thin even for a specialized trust layer. The count is acceptable for a narrowly scoped server, but it hovers at the borderline where more operational tools would likely be needed.
The server promises to bind intent to verified effect, yet there is no obvious tool for submitting evidence, recording completed actions, or retrieving past trust receipts. The current surface covers upfront requirements and one-shot decisions, but leaves the verification loop incomplete.
Available Tools
2 toolsget_evidence_signal_requirementsEvidence Signal RequirementsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Returns MUJ428 evidence-check payment, network, endpoint, and assurance-pricing requirements before an autonomous payment.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, fully covering the safety profile. The description adds the contextual cue 'before an autonomous payment' but does not disclose any additional behavioral traits such as external dependencies, data sources, or return format nuances.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence, immediately front-loaded with the action verb 'Returns', and contains no filler or repetition. Every phrase adds meaningful information about the resource and context.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (no parameters, clear read-only intent, no output schema), the description is largely complete: it names the specific resource, the categories of requirements, and the payment context. However, it lacks a description of the return structure or format, which could be useful since no output schema exists.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters and the schema coverage is 100%, so there is no parameter ambiguity to resolve. The baseline for 0-parameter tools is 4, and the description does not need to add parameter-level detail; it instead clarifies the output categories (payment, network, endpoint, assurance-pricing), which is acceptable.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb 'Returns' and names a concrete resource: 'MUJ428 evidence-check payment, network, endpoint, and assurance-pricing requirements'. It clearly differentiates the tool's purpose as a read-only retrieval of pre-payment requirements, distinct in scope from the sibling 'trust_action'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'before an autonomous payment' clearly indicates the temporal context for using this tool. However, it does not explicitly mention when not to use it or discuss alternative tools like 'trust_action', so it stops short of full exclusion guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
trust_actionMUJ428 Trust ReflexARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
VERIFY BEFORE ACT across payments, purchases, delegation, approvals, writes, releases, commits, and other consequential actions. Returns ALLOW, VERIFY, REQUIRE_VERIFICATION, or DENY plus Trust Receipt v1.3; FREE_PREFLIGHT execution_authority=false and no funds are moved.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | AI-native action vocabulary. | |
| evidence | No | ||
| external | No | ||
| milestone | No | ||
| action_ref | No | ||
| amount_usd | No | ||
| trajectory | No | ||
| counterparty | No | ||
| irreversible | No | ||
| action_history | No | ||
| evidence_count | No | ||
| risk_threshold | No | ||
| sensitive_data | No | ||
| previous_actions | No | ||
| unknown_counterparty | No | ||
| previous_trust_receipts | No |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already say readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false; the description reinforces and enriches this by stating the tool is a free preflight with execution_authority=false and that no funds are moved. That is a meaningful behavioral guarantee beyond the annotations. The opaque phrase 'FREE_PREFLIGHT' and the version-numbered Trust Receipt add terminology that is not fully explained, so the score stays at 4.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence immediately states the charge, action scope, and return verdicts, and the second adds the key safety property in one clause. It wastes no words, though the acronym 'FREE_PREFLIGHT' and the receipt version create minor density that ramps comprehension cost.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite a complex 16-parameter schema with no output schema, the description leaves essential context undefined: what kind of evidence triggers VERIFY vs DENY, what a Trust Receipt contains, how the optional parameters (risk_threshold, evidence_count, trajectory, etc.) inform the judgment, and what an agent should do after receiving a non-ALLOW verdict. The description gives the destination path of the tool but not the inputs to travel it well.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 6% and there are 16 parameters, so the description carries nearly the entire burden of parameter meaning; it does not meet that burden. The only parameter-level guidance is implicit through 'action names like PAY OR BUY' and the 'execution_authority=false' clause. The description does not explain what evidence, trajectory, amount_usd, risk_threshold, counterparty, or the other parameters mean or what inputs are required beyond 'action'.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a clear directive ('VERIFY BEFORE ACT') and immediately lists the covered action domains: payments, purchases, delegation, approvals, writes, releases, commits, and consequential actions. It also names the four returned verdicts and a Trust Receipt, distinguishing a verification check from an execution tool. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from the sibling get_evidence_signal_requirements, so it misses the top not for sibling-distinguishing clarity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description tells an agent exactly when to invoke the tool: before payments, purchases, delegation, approvals, writes, releases, commits, and other consequential actions. This is a strong, actionable use context, even though it does not name the sibling as the alternative for cases when only evidence requirements are needed. The omission of explicit off-switches keeps it from a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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