GAIP Trust & Assurance Agent

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish read-only, closed-world, non-destructive behavior. The description adds that it does not produce a universal trust score, which is a useful behavioral boundary, but it omits what the tool returns, whether external calls are made, or any auth/rate-limit context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The definition is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler. It is concise, though the brevity contributes to the overall underspecification rather than being a structural flaw.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter tool with a nested object and no output schema, the description is far too sparse. It does not explain required fields, the meaning of data_classification, how observations are used, or what the tool returns, leaving the agent without enough context to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 8 parameters, including a nested continuity_handle object and an enum. The description mentions 'counterparty' and 'task-specific' observations only in passing and provides no meaning for the remaining parameters such as data_classification, episode_id, synthetic, continuity_handle, or independent_operator_id.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description identifies an inspection action on 'counterparty observations' and clarifies it is task-specific rather than a universal trust score. However, 'inspect' is vague about what the tool actually does or returns, and it does not distinguish itself from the sibling verify_gaip_receipt.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance is provided, and no alternative tools are named. The only usage cue is the implicit contrast with producing a universal trust score, which is insufficient to route an agent reliably.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so safety is covered. The description reinforces that no adoption credit is created and specifies the verification steps, but says nothing about what happens when verification fails or what the verification result looks like.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence with the core action front-loaded and zero filler. Nothing is wasted, though the jargon (GAIP, adoption credit) leans on assumed domain knowledge.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With six parameters at 0% schema coverage, nested objects, and no output schema, the description should explain the optional parameters and what a verification result conveys. It covers only the required lookup key, leaving an agent without enough to invoke the tool correctly in non-default cases.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across six parameters, including a nested continuity_handle object and an enum on data_classification. The description only accounts for the receipt identifier ('by ID'); synthetic, episode_id, continuity_handle, data_classification, and independent_operator_id are left entirely unexplained.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names specific verbs (look up, verify) and a specific resource (GAIP receipt) plus the verification mechanics (hash chain, Merkle inclusion proof). It does not explicitly differentiate from the sibling inspect_counterparty_evidence, though the 'without creating adoption credit' clause carves out its own scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'without creating adoption credit' implies when this tool is appropriate — the non-mutating verification path — but never names an alternative tool or states prerequisites. Usage is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.