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Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP

by io.github.pduggusa

kev-vendor-risk

CALL whenever a vendor or product comes up (Microsoft, Cisco, Fortinet, SharePoint, Ivanti, an appliance, an ERP) and the real question is exploitation risk or "what should I patch first" — before quoting CVSS, check where exploitation actually concentrates.

Vendor / product risk matrix built from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — where real, confirmed in-the-wild exploitation actually concentrates, not just where CVSS is high.

With no args: returns the top vendors ranked by KEV count (e.g. Microsoft, Cisco, Adobe, Ivanti, Citrix). With {"vendor":"Adobe"}: returns that vendor's or product's specific known-exploited CVEs (e.g. ColdFusion), most-recent first, each with a ransomware-use flag.

Use this to answer "which vendors/products carry the exploitation risk we should patch first," to assess third-party / supply-chain exposure, or to check whether a freshly-dropped PoC lands on a chronically-exploited product (a proven-soft target) versus a one-off. KEV means CISA has confirmed active exploitation.

Public read (no auth). Source is CISA's KEV catalog, refreshed continuously.

Example: {"vendor":"Citrix"} → NetScaler's known-exploited CVEs; {} → the full top-vendor risk ranking.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vendorNoOptional vendor or product name (e.g. "Adobe", "Citrix", "SharePoint", "ColdFusion"). Omit for the top-vendor risk ranking.

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses public read/no auth, the source (CISA KEV), continuous refresh, and output details (ordering, ransomware flag). This is strong, but lacks error handling, rate limits, or edge-case behavior, so a 4 is appropriate.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single, well-structured paragraph with a clear sequence: usage trigger, context, behavior, examples. Every sentence earns its place, and the examples are compact and illustrative without being verbose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite the absence of an output schema, the description clearly communicates what the tool returns in both invocation modes, including ordering and the ransomware-use flag. It also covers data source and refresh, making it sufficiently complete for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, but the description adds significant meaning: it explains the effect of omitting vs. providing the 'vendor' parameter, gives concrete examples, and describes output ordering and flags. This goes beyond the schema's simple field description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's function: a vendor/product risk matrix built from CISA's KEV catalog, with specific behaviors (top vendors by KEV count, or per-vendor CVEs). It uses specific verbs like 'returns' and provides a resource, but does not explicitly distinguish from sibling tools such as kev-exploitation-stickiness, so it misses the top score.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The opening explicitly says 'CALL whenever a vendor or product comes up... and the real question is exploitation risk or what should I patch first', which provides a clear when-to-use directive. It also lists use cases (e.g., supply-chain exposure, PoC check) but does not name alternative tools or specify when not to use this tool, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: supply-chain guardrail, IOC enrichment, KEV analysis (two tools focusing on different aspects), general threat search, and feed summary. There is no overlap or ambiguity.

Naming Consistency3/5

Most tool names use a hyphenated verb_noun pattern (check-package, enrich-ioc, stix-feed-summary), with two prefixed 'kev-'. However, 'search' is a bare verb, breaking the pattern. The inconsistency is noticeable but still readable.

Tool Count5/5

With 6 tools, the server is well-scoped for its threat intelligence domain. Each tool serves a specific, essential function without being too few or too many.

Completeness4/5

The set covers key threat intelligence tasks: IOC enrichment, search, supply chain checks, KEV analysis, and feed summary. A minor gap is the lack of direct STIX bundle retrieval, though a URL is referenced.

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