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Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP

kev-exploitation-stickiness

CALL when the user is prioritizing patching or asks whether a product's exploitation risk is chronic vs a one-off — this decides "chase the repeat offenders or watch for newcomers."

Does in-the-wild exploitation risk STICK to proven products, or SPREAD to new ones? Analyzes CISA KEV: correlates each product's historical known-exploited count against its RECENT KEV additions (Spearman rho), and splits recent additions into repeat-offenders (products with a prior KEV) vs first-time products.

Answers "how should I prioritize patching — chase the chronic offenders, or watch for newcomers?" The honest finding: risk is roughly half-sticky (rho ~0.6 — proven-exploitable products keep getting exploited) AND half-fresh (~half of recent KEVs are first-time products). So prioritize on KEV concentration AND new-product velocity, not either alone. 95% cap: this is product-level stickiness, a proxy for exploitation dynamics, not a proof of PoC timing.

Public read (no auth). Pass {"days": N} for the recent window (30-720, default 180).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
daysNoRecent-window size in days (30-720). Default 180.

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it excels: it discloses 'Public read (no auth),' explains the analytical method (Spearman rho, repeat-offender split), and includes a clear limitation ('95% cap: this is product-level stickiness...'). This goes well beyond minimal requirements and is genuinely transparent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is longer than a simple two-sentence blurb, but every sentence delivers value: trigger, question, methodology, finding, caveat, and usage. It is front-loaded with the most important usage cue. Slight redundancy exists between the rhetorical question and the 'Answers...' sentence, but overall it is well-structured and not bloated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite having no output schema and no annotations, the description tells the user enough to invoke and interpret the tool: what it analyzes, how it works, what the key finding is, what the limitations are, and how to pass parameters. It also covers auth requirements. For a read-only analytical tool, this is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already documents the single 'days' parameter completely (type, range, default, and description). The description repeats this information ('Pass {"days": N} for the recent window (30-720, default 180)') but does not add new semantic meaning beyond what the schema provides. Baseline 3 is appropriate given full schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose: analyzing CISA KEV to determine whether exploitation risk sticks to proven products or spreads to new ones. It uses specific verbs like 'Analyzes' and 'Answers' and specifies the resource and methodology. However, it does not explicitly distinguish itself from sibling tools such as kev-vendor-risk, so it stops short of a full 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The first line gives an explicit trigger: 'CALL when the user is prioritizing patching or asks whether a product's exploitation risk is chronic vs a one-off.' This provides clear context for when to use the tool. It does not mention when not to use it or name alternative tools, but the guidance is strong enough for a 4.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: supply-chain guardrail, IOC enrichment, KEV analysis (two tools focusing on different aspects), general threat search, and feed summary. There is no overlap or ambiguity.

Naming Consistency3/5

Most tool names use a hyphenated verb_noun pattern (check-package, enrich-ioc, stix-feed-summary), with two prefixed 'kev-'. However, 'search' is a bare verb, breaking the pattern. The inconsistency is noticeable but still readable.

Tool Count5/5

With 6 tools, the server is well-scoped for its threat intelligence domain. Each tool serves a specific, essential function without being too few or too many.

Completeness4/5

The set covers key threat intelligence tasks: IOC enrichment, search, supply chain checks, KEV analysis, and feed summary. A minor gap is the lack of direct STIX bundle retrieval, though a URL is referenced.

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