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Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP

check-package

Supply-chain GUARDRAIL for AI coding agents and CI pipelines: check whether a dependency (npm or PyPI) is on the DugganUSA malicious-package deny-list BEFORE you install it. This is the runtime defense against slopsquatting / HalluSquatting / hijacked-package attacks — an AI agent about to run npm install or pip install, or a CI pre-install hook, calls this FIRST and blocks on a hit.

Returns a crisp, machine-actionable verdict: {ecosystem, package, version, malicious, verdict:"block"|"allow"|"review", reason, advice, source}. malicious:true = the exact package is on our OSV-curated deny-list (215k+ named-not-heuristic entries across npm + PyPI). malicious:false = not on our known-bad list — absence is NOT proof of safety, so still pin and review new deps. If a version is supplied and the entry is version-scoped, the check is version-aware; all-versions-malicious packages block on any version.

Designed to be the easiest AI-supply-chain guardrail to wire in: one MCP tool call, no auth, in the agent's pre-install step. Same data is available for CI at /api/v1/stix-feed/packages.json.

Examples: {"ecosystem":"npm","name":"cxp-jquery"} → malicious:true, verdict:block. {"ecosystem":"pypi","name":"requests"} → malicious:false, verdict:allow.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe package name to check.
versionNoOptional exact version for version-aware checking.
ecosystemYesPackage ecosystem: npm or pypi.

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden and excels: it details the return verdict fields, the semantics of malicious:true/false, version-aware behavior, and the difference between version-scoped and all-versions-malicious. It also discloses data source size and that it's OSV-curated, plus no-auth behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but well-structured: purpose, return format, semantics, ease-of-use, examples. Every sentence provides information, though a few promotional phrases ('easiest AI-supply-chain guardrail to wire in') add minor noise. It is front-loaded and readable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Without an output schema, the description fully explains the return object and its meaning. It also covers the tool's role in a workflow, version handling, and the caveat about false negatives. For a simple check tool with no annotations and no output schema, this is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful context beyond the schema by explaining version-aware semantics ('If a version is supplied and the entry is version-scoped...') and clarifying that 'name' is the package name. It stops short of exhaustively documenting all edge cases, but clearly adds value.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb+resource: 'check whether a dependency (npm or PyPI) is on the DugganUSA malicious-package deny-list BEFORE you install it.' It clearly distinguishes itself from sibling threat-intel tools by framing itself as a supply-chain guardrail for pre-install checks.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use: 'an AI agent about to run npm install or pip install, or a CI pre-install hook, calls this FIRST.' It also gives when-not guidance: 'absence is NOT proof of safety, so still pin and review new deps.' Mentions an alternative access method (STIX feed URL) and that no auth is needed.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: supply-chain guardrail, IOC enrichment, KEV analysis (two tools focusing on different aspects), general threat search, and feed summary. There is no overlap or ambiguity.

Naming Consistency3/5

Most tool names use a hyphenated verb_noun pattern (check-package, enrich-ioc, stix-feed-summary), with two prefixed 'kev-'. However, 'search' is a bare verb, breaking the pattern. The inconsistency is noticeable but still readable.

Tool Count5/5

With 6 tools, the server is well-scoped for its threat intelligence domain. Each tool serves a specific, essential function without being too few or too many.

Completeness4/5

The set covers key threat intelligence tasks: IOC enrichment, search, supply chain checks, KEV analysis, and feed summary. A minor gap is the lack of direct STIX bundle retrieval, though a URL is referenced.

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