Pre-flight MCP security. Blocks compromised deps + tool drift. HMAC-signed. Dredd judges.
Pre-flight security verdict for an MCP server invocation. Judges BOTH server-level reputation AND the server's dependency graph (npm/pypi) against the DugganUSA threat-intel corpus (1.13M+ IOCs, Shai-Hulud + typosquat + LOLBin families). Returns BLOCK / ADVISORY / REVIEW / ALLOW with severity, evidence, dep-graph summary, and HMAC-signed response. REVIEW means we hold NO RECORD of this server -- not that it is safe. Treat REVIEW as do-not-proceed-blindly: a brand-new attacker-published server looks exactly like this. ALLOW is only returned when we actually resolved the server and scanned its dependency graph; check known_to_us and dep_graph.scanned to confirm. Use this BEFORE invoking any other MCP server tool, especially ones installed from outside the official MCP Registry.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tool | No | Optional name of the specific tool being invoked | |
| server | Yes | MCP server name (e.g. io.github.foo/bar) or substring | |
| version | No | Optional version of the MCP server (semver) |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It explains that REVIEW does not mean safe, that ALLOW is only returned after actual resolution and scanning, and that known_to_us and dep_graph.scanned must be checked. It also mentions the HMAC-signed response, adding security context. These are beyond what annotations would typically provide and give the agent a clear behavioral model.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose, then provides critical behavioral caveats and usage guidance. Each sentence adds substantive information about verdict semantics or invocation guidance. It's longer than a minimal description, but every sentence earns its place, and the structure logically flows from purpose to outcomes to usage.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description must explain return values and semantics. It does so thoroughly: lists the four verdicts, details evidence and HMAC signing, explains the meaning of REVIEW and ALLOW, and clarifies when to trust the result. It also gives usage context. This is complete for a security-check tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already provides 100% coverage with clear descriptions for each parameter (tool, server, version). The description does not add parameter-level details, but the baseline of 3 is appropriate because the schema does the heavy lifting. It implicitly connects parameters to the overall purpose (e.g., 'server' maps to server-level reputation) but doesn't go beyond that.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function with a specific verb ('Pre-flight security verdict') and identifies the resource ('MCP server invocation'). It also outlines the output categories (BLOCK/ADVISORY/REVIEW/ALLOW), which distinguishes it from any generic security tool. Though there are no sibling tools to differentiate from, the description is not a tautology and conveys a distinct purpose.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly instructs to use this tool 'BEFORE invoking any other MCP server tool' and calls out the specific context of servers installed from outside the official registry. It also explains what REVIEW means ('do-not-proceed-blindly') and what ALLOW implies, giving clear guidance on interpreting results. This is strong usage direction.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Claiming proves that you control a remote MCP connector. It does not move, proxy, or interrupt the server.
Open the connector listing, choose Claim ownership, and sign in to Glama.
Complete one verification method:
GitHub identity — fastest for official registry listings. For a namespace such as io.github.alice/server, link the matching GitHub user or an account that owns the GitHub organization, then choose Claim with GitHub.
HTTP challenge — works when you can deploy a public file. Generate a token, publish the exact JSON Glama shows at /.well-known/glama.json on the same origin as the connector, then choose Check HTTP challenge.
DNS challenge — works when you control DNS but cannot change the server. Generate a token, create the exact TXT record Glama shows, wait for it to propagate, then choose Check DNS challenge.
After verification, Glama sends a confirmation email and gives you access to listing details, thumbnails, health checks, and analytics. Keep the HTTP file or DNS record in place: Glama periodically checks it and ownership remains verified while the token is discoverable.
The HTTP ownership file has this structure:
{
"$schema": "https://glama.ai/mcp/schemas/connector.json",
"claim": "glama_claim_..."
}Claim tokens are opaque, stable, and bound to the signed-in Glama account. They contain no email address or other personal information. If Glama can no longer discover a verified HTTP or DNS token, it starts a seven-day grace period before removing claim-based access. Restore the same token during that period to keep ownership verified. Never publish an email address, Glama session token, GitHub token, or connector credential as ownership proof.
If verification fails, confirm that you copied the current token exactly. The HTTP file must be public, return valid JSON with a successful HTTP response, and stay on the connector's origin. DNS changes may need more time to propagate. A claim cannot transfer to a different origin or hostname: if the connector target changes, Glama starts the grace period and the new target must be claimed separately after the previous claim is released.
For a connector linked to the official MCP Registry, registry updates continue to replace its name, description, and URL by default. After claiming, open Manage connector and enable Use Glama listing details as the source of truth if edits made on Glama should be preserved. Categories and thumbnails are always managed on Glama; registry linkage and technical connection settings continue to sync.
Control your server's listing on Glama, including description and metadata
Access analytics and receive server usage reports
Get monitoring and health status updates for your server
Feature your server to boost visibility and reach more users
To improve your MCP server's ranking:
Claim ownership of the server listing
Complete the server profile with an accurate description and thumbnail
Provide a test profile so Glama can connect to and evaluate the server
Keep tool definitions clear and complete to earn a high Tool Definition Quality Score (TDQS)
Route real usage through the Glama Gateway; more recorded successful server uses also improve the ranking
For users:
Full audit trail – every tool call is logged with inputs and outputs for compliance and debugging
Granular tool control – enable or disable individual tools per connector to limit what your AI agents can do
Centralized credential management – store and rotate API keys and OAuth tokens in one place
Change alerts – get notified when a connector changes its schema, adds or removes tools, or updates tool definitions, so nothing breaks silently
For server owners:
Proven adoption – public usage metrics on your listing show real-world traction and build trust with prospective users
Tool-level analytics – see which tools are being used most, helping you prioritize development and documentation
Direct user feedback – users can report issues and suggest improvements through the listing, giving you a channel you would not have otherwise
The connector status is unhealthy when Glama is unable to successfully connect to the server. This can happen for several reasons:
The server is experiencing an outage
The URL of the server is wrong
Credentials required to access the server are missing or invalid
If you are the owner of this MCP connector and would like to make modifications to the listing, including providing test credentials for accessing the server, please contact support@glama.ai.
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Static MCP manifest and tool-policy security preflight with signed input-redacted receipts
Trust checks for MCP servers: trust scores, tool-drift detection, signed diligence receipts. Free.
Scan any MCP server for tool-poisoning, security, auth & license. Trust score before install.
Security research: MCP registries verify identity, not tool behavior. See gtfo.dev.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Only one tool exists, so there is no possibility of overlap or confusion between tools. Each tool (and this is the sole tool) has a clearly defined purpose.
The single tool uses a clear verb_noun snake_case pattern ('check_mcp_server'). Consistency is trivially satisfied with only one tool.
With only one tool, the server feels thin relative to typical MCP servers, which often have multiple tools. The tool is substantial in functionality, but the count is at the borderline for being too few.
The tool fully covers the server's stated purpose of performing pre-flight security checks on MCP servers, including reputation and dependency-graph analysis. It returns a complete verdict with evidence and no obvious dead ends for the intended use case.
