FLOP Independent MCP V2
Server Details
Bounded readonly SHA256 verification with the official MCP SDK. No code execution or model calls.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 98.7% over 18 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
With only a single tool, there is no possibility of misselection or overlapping purpose. The lone tool hash_verify has a clear, unambiguous function.
The single name hash_verify follows a clean verb_noun pattern in snake_case. There are no other tools to create inconsistency.
A single tool is too thin for a server positioned as a general-purpose MCP V2 endpoint. Even for a narrow hashing purpose, one operation leaves almost no surface to work with.
Only verification of a SHA256 is provided; there is no ability to compute a hash, support other algorithms, or handle related crypto tasks. Agents hit a dead end for anything beyond checking an existing digest.
Available Tools
1 toolhash_verifyBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Compare the SHA256 of bounded UTF-8 data with an exact lowercase hash.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | Yes | ||
| expected_sha256 | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| sha256 | Yes | |
| matches | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, and closed-world, so safety is covered. The description adds real behavioral detail beyond that: input must be UTF-8 and the comparison requires an exact lowercase hash (implying case-sensitive matching). However, 'bounded' is left unexplained, so a key constraint remains opaque.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single efficient sentence with the core action and the key constraint (lowercase exact match) front-loaded. Nothing is redundant, though the compressed phrasing leaves 'bounded' dangling.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the boolean result need not be explained, and annotations cover the safety profile. The remaining gap is the undefined data-size bound, which an agent needs in order to avoid spurious failures on large inputs.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry parameter meaning, and it does partially: 'data' is characterized as bounded UTF-8, and 'expected_sha256' as an exact lowercase hash. It never specifies the size bound or the format/length expectations for the hash string, so the compensation is incomplete.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb (compare) and a specific resource (SHA256 of UTF-8 data against an expected hash), so the operation is unambiguous. There are no sibling tools to differentiate from, but the qualifier 'bounded' is never defined, leaving the scope imprecise.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or alternative context is given. The agent cannot tell whether this is a pre-flight check, a validation step, or a comparison primitive from the description alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- First observed
hash_verify
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