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The trust harness for AI agents. Set what an agent can do before it acts.
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- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
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TDQS
Scored across 12 tools
The verify family (proofable_verify, proofable_verify_or_guide, proofable_verify_prepare, proofable_verify_submit) has real overlap, and the descriptions rely on careful reading to know which one creates a proof versus returns a 'next step'. Similarly proofable_proofs_check and proofable_verify_or_guide both answer 'do I already have the needed proofs?', which invites misselection. The agent_* tools and proofs_get/update are reasonably distinct.
All names use a consistent proofable_ prefix with snake_case resource_action forms (agent_create, proofs_get, verify_submit). Minor deviations: proofable_context and proofable_verifiers_catalog lack an action verb, and 'verify' is used both as a standalone action and as a family prefix with different semantics.
12 tools is well within a healthy range for a proof/verification platform and each surface area (agents, proofs, verifiers, verification) is small. There is slight redundancy in the four-tool verify family and the two proof-check tools, but nothing feels bloated.
Core lifecycle is covered: agent create/link/mount, context, proof read/update, verifier catalog, and a full prepare/submit verification flow. Gaps exist around teardown — there is no way to unlink or revoke a delegated agent, and no proof deletion — though these are arguably out of scope or handled elsewhere.
Available Tools
12 toolsproofable_agent_createCreate agentAInspect
Create or import an agent on your profile. Default: signed-in account. Optional separate account and controls. Generate and retain any dedicated key outside Proofable, then pass only its public address. Keep the same agentId on retries.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | No | CAIP-2 chain identifier. Auto-detected from wallet format if omitted. | |
| preset | No | Permission preset: "assistant" (default: read, create receipts, run jobs and commands), "advisor" (read only), "operator" (assistant plus saved secrets and receipt management), or "payments" (x402 payments within maxSpend). delegationAllowedActions replaces the preset list. | |
| skills | No | Optional AgentSkillRef[] for agent-identity (id, label, version, provider, kind, configId, enabled). configId is an optional opaque integration reference (not a secret, not an OAuth token, not credential material). | |
| agentId | Yes | Stable agent id (e.g., "my-ai-assistant"): 1-128 letters, digits, hyphens or underscores. It addresses the agent page at /agent/<agentId>. | |
| maxSpend | No | Optional spend cap: whole-number string in token base units (1 to 78 digits, no decimal point). For USDC (typical x402 flows), use six decimal places. See SDK toAgentDelegationMaxSpend. | |
| services | No | Optional services for agent-identity: { name, endpoint (URL), version? }. | |
| agentType | No | Type of agent: "ai", "bot", "service", "automation", or "agent" (default: "ai"). | |
| expiresAt | No | Unix time in milliseconds when the permissions expire. Use 0 for no expiration. | |
| returnUrl | No | Optional callback URL for a browser step. Proofable appends the proof ID (qHash). | |
| agentLabel | No | Display name for the agent (optional, defaults to agentId). | |
| agentWallet | No | Agent account. Omit to use the signed-in profile. For a dedicated account, generate and retain the key outside Proofable and pass only its public address. | |
| description | No | Agent description (optional, max 500 chars). | |
| capabilities | No | Capability flags: "wallet", "signing", "spending", "publishing", "search", "browser", "mcp", "webhooks", "receipts", "proofs", "delegation". | |
| instructions | No | Optional agent instructions stored with the identity proof. Maximum 16,000 characters. | |
| identityQHash | No | After step 1 for a dedicated agent account: the identity proof ID proofable_verify returned. Repeat this call with it and the signed-in session records the agent's access. | |
| defaultRuntime | No | Suggested provider, model, mode, and runtime origin. These values do not grant permission. | |
| controllerWallet | No | Account that approves spend and limits. Omit to use the signed-in profile. | |
| allowedPaymentTypes | No | Payment rails the agent may use when it can make payments (for example ["x402"]). Required with make_payment unless the payments preset supplies it. | |
| delegationInstructions | No | Optional permission instructions signed by the approving account. Maximum 16,000 characters. | |
| delegationDeniedActions | No | Action names the agent may not perform. Denied actions take precedence. | |
| delegationRuntimePolicy | No | Provider, model, and approval limits for this agent. Overrides the suggested runtime values. | |
| delegationAllowedActions | No | Canonical actions the agent may perform. Replaces the preset list; nothing else is granted. | |
| delegationApprovalPolicy | No | Human approval requirements for the agent. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| qHash | No | |
| status | No | |
| agentId | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| agentWallet | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations cover safety (readOnly=false, destructive=false) but do not say anything about key custody or retry behavior; the description adds the important operational constraint that private keys must be generated and retained outside Proofable with only the public address passed in. The retry guidance is valuable context given idempotentHint=false — it tells the agent which field makes repeated calls safe. Does not describe the response or the multi-step dedicated-account flow beyond a hint.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Five short sentences, front-loaded with purpose and scope before the key-handling caveat and retry rule. No filler, though the sentences are telegraphic enough that some ("Optional separate account and controls") are ambiguous on their own.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 23-parameter creation tool with a full output schema and complete param documentation, the description supplies the essential non-schema context: default identity, key custody, and retry identity. It omits any mention of the two-phase identityQHash import flow, which is the one workflow an agent is most likely to get wrong.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 23 parameters in depth. The description's account/key sentence largely restates the agentWallet schema text rather than adding new semantics, and it says nothing about preset, capabilities, or the delegation* policy fields. Baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a concrete verb+resource ("Create or import an agent on your profile") and states the default scope (signed-in account). But it never distinguishes this tool from sibling tools like proofable_agent_link or proofable_agent_mount — an agent can't tell from this text which of the agent-* tools to pick.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"Default: signed-in account. Optional separate account and controls" implies when the optional path applies, and "keep the same agentId on retries" gives a procedural rule. But there's no explicit when-to-use versus proofable_agent_link / proofable_agent_mount, and no prerequisites (e.g., that a dedicated account needs a prior proofable_verify step) stated up front.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_agent_linkCheck agent permissionsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check whether an agent is set up to act for your profile, and what it may currently do. Given agentWallet (plus agentId when one account hosts several), it reports linked:true with the identity proof and active delegation, or link_required with the one next step. It does not create, change, or remove anything; to grant or change authority, use proofable_verify with agent-delegation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | No | Stable agent id. Required when one account hosts more than one agent. | |
| principal | No | Optional owner account or DID. Omit when the signed-in profile is the owner. | |
| agentWallet | Yes | Agent account. Required. Pass agentId when one account hosts more than one agent. | |
| identityQHash | No | Identity proof ID the agent just signed (returned by proofable_verify). Lets the owner link an identity no grant names yet. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| linked | No | |
| status | No | |
| agentId | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| agentWallet | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Adds useful context beyond annotations: it describes the two possible outcomes (linked:true vs link_required) and states it does not create, change, or remove anything, reinforcing the readOnly/non-destructive hints. This edges above baseline, though it slightly restates what readOnlyHint/destructiveHint already convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences, front-loading the purpose and following with inputs and the alternative. Mostly earns its space, with minor overlap between the outcome description and the annotations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Complete for a read-only check: annotations cover safety, an output schema exists, and the description supplies the decision outcomes and the redirect to proofable_verify. No further information is needed to call it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all four parameters. The description restates the agentWallet/agentId conditional but adds no syntax, format, or edge-case detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Check whether an agent is set up to act for your profile') and explicitly scopes what is reported (linked:true with identity proof and delegation, or link_required). It also distinguishes itself from proofable_verify, so the agent can pick it over siblings without opening schemas.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete usage conditions ('Given agentWallet, plus agentId when one account hosts several') and an explicit alternative with the condition that selects it: 'to grant or change authority, use proofable_verify with agent-delegation.' Nothing is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_agent_mountLoad agent contextBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Load the agent identity, permissions, skills, and context into this project.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | No | Agent identifier from the identity record. | |
| agentWallet | No | Agent account (required when agentId omitted). | |
| identityQHash | No | Identity proof ID (qHash). | |
| controllerWallet | No | Owner account. Defaults to the signed-in profile. | |
| requiredResources | No | Optional provider/resource ids that must be present in the resolved mount. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| agent | No | |
| error | No | |
| mount | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is documented. The description adds only that the mount is scoped 'into this project'; it says nothing about failure modes when requiredResources cannot be satisfied, or about the identity proof requirement behind identityQHash. The phrase 'into this project' mildly suggests state changes that the readOnly/idempotent annotations deny, though not enough to constitute a direct contradiction.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One front-loaded sentence with no filler, easy to scan. It is terse relative to the tool's identity-resolution complexity, but nothing is redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema and full annotation coverage reduce the burden, so the description does not need to explain return values. However, for a tool that resolves an on-chain identity proof and optional required resources, an agent still lacks enough context: what a 'resolved mount' means and what happens on failed resolution are missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all five parameters. The description mentions none of them and does not surface the schema's implicit cross-field rule (agentWallet is required when agentId is omitted). Baseline 3 applies when the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a concrete verb ('Load') and enumerates the resources being mounted (identity, permissions, skills, context), so an agent can grasp the operation. It never contrasts itself with near-siblings such as proofable_context, proofable_agent_link, or proofable_agents_list, so sibling differentiation is left to inference.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no conditions for when to use this tool, no prerequisites (identity proof, signed-in profile), and no alternatives. Nothing tells the agent whether to mount first, or whether proofable_context or proofable_agent_link already covers the need.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_contextSession contextARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return the signed-in Proofable profile and its current read-only context: proof index, agents, permissions, and verifier summary. Use once after sign-in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| profile | No | |
| agentsError | No | |
| agentsStatus | No | |
| contextIndex | No | |
| authenticated | No | |
| verifierSummary | No | |
| recommendedWorkflow | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and closed-world scope, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds the useful constraint that the context is read-only and should be fetched once after sign-in, and signals the returned facets; it doesn't discuss auth failure behavior, which is a minor residual gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, zero filler, with the payload description front-loaded and the usage cue second. Every clause carries information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, the description needn't explain return values, and it correctly summarizes them at a high level instead. Combined with rich annotations and a no-arg schema, this is nearly complete; only the signed-out/error case is unaddressed.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so the baseline is 4 and there is no parameter meaning the description could add or omit. Nothing about argument semantics is left ambiguous.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Return') and resource ('the signed-in Proofable profile and its current read-only context'), then enumerates the payload (proof index, agents, permissions, verifier summary). That enumeration also separates it from siblings like proofable_agents_list or proofable_proofs_check, which each return one slice.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Use once after sign-in' gives an explicit timing cue and an implicit anti-pattern (don't poll it repeatedly), which is more than most definitions offer. It stops short of naming alternatives or when-not-to-call conditions, so it is clear context without full routing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_proofs_checkCheck proofsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Does this wallet already have the required proofs? Returns pass or fail, not records. Reading proof bodies needs a signed-in session, which is what unlocks proofable_proofs_get; signed-out callers get this check and can sign in to go further. Omit the wallet when signed in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| gateId | No | Optional hosted gate or listing id. Signed-in owners still get eligible + matchedCount only. | |
| handle | No | Optional handle filter for handle-based verifiers. | |
| wallet | No | Wallet or DID to verify. Omit when signed in to use the current account. | |
| minCount | No | Minimum number of matching proofs. Default 1. | |
| namespace | No | Optional namespace filter for handle checks. | |
| verifiers | Yes | Verifier IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| requireAll | No | Require all listed verifiers. Default false accepts any one. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| eligible | No | |
| satisfied | No | |
| matchedCount | No | |
| unknownVerifiers | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive annotations, the description discloses the auth model (signed-out access, signed-in unlock) and the result shape ('pass or fail, not records'), which is meaningful behavioral context. It could go further on what happens with gateId scoping, but the annotations and output schema already carry the safety and return-format burden.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and the pass/fail result constraint are front-loaded, and each sentence carries distinct information. The middle sentence about sessions and proofable_proofs_get is a bit convoluted, but nothing is filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 7-parameter tool with an output schema and full annotations, the description covers what an agent needs: the question it answers, the pass/fail result shape, and the auth gating. A minor gap is that 'pass or fail' does not align precisely with the schema note that signed-in owners get 'eligible + matchedCount', leaving the exact response shape slightly ambiguous.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter is already documented in the schema, including 'Omit when signed in to use the current account.' The description's only added parameter guidance is the wallet-omission rule, which largely restates the schema. Baseline 3 applies when the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a concrete question the tool answers ('Does this wallet already have the required proofs?') and explicitly limits the output to pass/fail rather than records. It also distinguishes itself from sibling proofable_proofs_get by contrast (that one reads proof bodies). The framing is a question rather than a verb+resource phrase, which slightly weakens the top score.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit routing guidance: signed-out callers should use this check, and reading actual proof bodies requires a signed-in session via proofable_proofs_get. It also notes 'Omit the wallet when signed in.' However, it does not mention other nearby verification siblings (proofable_verify, proofable_verify_or_guide, proofable_verifiers_catalog) that an agent might confuse with this one.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_proofs_getRead proofsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Read a proof by qHash or search proofs by scope, tags, verifier, or text. With no filter, returns an index hint; scope=all pages metadata. Use include=content for proof bodies and includeComments with qHash for discussion. Omit identifier when signed in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | No | Full-text search (by-wallet ?q= when supported). | |
| tags | No | Exact tag values: an array, or one comma-separated string. A proof matches when it carries any one of them; use tagPrefixesAll to require every one. Takes precedence over scope; use values from the proof index. | |
| depth | No | With traverse: how many edges to follow from the proof. Default 1. | |
| limit | No | Records per page. Default 15, max 25. | |
| qHash | No | Optional proof id. When set, returns that one record instead of a vault page. | |
| scope | No | Optional preset when tags omitted: memory | research | rules | instruction | tools | jobs | receipts. Use scope=all to list every proof newest first, and tags for arbitrary tags. Pair a scope with include=content to read a whole page of bodies in one call. | |
| offset | No | Pagination offset (default: 0) | |
| include | No | Default metadata. content requires a known qHash or narrowing filter; scope=all does not unlock bodies. Filtered content pages are capped at source. | |
| traverse | No | With qHash: follow this proof's edges of one kind and return the connected records. | |
| tagPrefix | No | Return proofs with a tag that starts with this prefix. | |
| identifier | No | Wallet address (EVM 0x... or Solana base58) or DID (did:pkh:...) | |
| verifierId | No | Optional check ID filter. Use it to request only proofs from one check. | |
| agentWallet | No | Optional agent wallet for reading proofs under granted permissions. | |
| tagContains | No | Return proofs with a tag containing this text. | |
| tagPrefixesAll | No | Prefixes that must each match the start of some tag: an array, or one comma-separated string. | |
| includeComments | No | Include comments for one known proof. Requires qHash; comment visibility follows proof access. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| data | No | |
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, non-destructive behavior, so the bar is lower, yet the description adds real context: the index-hint fallback with no filter, the metadata paging behavior of scope=all, the content-access constraint, and the auth shortcut of omitting identifier when signed in.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four dense sentences, front-loaded with the primary read/search modes and followed by the parameter pairings that matter. No padding or restatement of the title.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers the main retrieval paths, defaults, and auth behavior for a 16-parameter tool, and the output schema handles return values. However, graph traversal (traverse/depth) is a distinct capability completely absent from the description, leaving an agent dependent on the schema to discover it.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3; the description adds value by explaining parameter interlock rather than definitions — includeComments requires qHash, include=content needs a known qHash or narrowing filter, and identifier may be omitted when signed in.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Read a proof by qHash or search proofs') and enumerates the alternative access modes (by scope, tags, verifier, text). An agent can distinguish this read/index tool from the mutating siblings (proofs_update, proof_revoke) without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives clear mode-selection guidance: no filter returns an index hint, scope=all pages metadata, include=content unlocks bodies, includeComments requires qHash, and identifier can be omitted when signed in. Strong internal routing, though it never explicitly contrasts with sibling tools like proofs_check or context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_proofs_updateUpdate proofADestructiveInspect
Update a proof you own: title, tags, and visibility (public|unlisted|private). Setting visibility to private revokes public access, so confirm before making an already-shared proof private. Or leave feedback on an accessible proof. Send one kind of change per call: metadata, vote, or comment. Owners can vote on their own proofs. Delegated agents need manage_proofs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| vote | No | Upvote, downvote, or clear your vote on this proof. Proof owners can vote on their own proofs. | |
| qHash | Yes | Proof ID to update. | |
| title | No | New title. Omit to keep, null to clear. | |
| addTags | No | Exact retrieval tag values to add. Keep descriptive prose in the title or proof body. | |
| comment | No | Add a comment to this proof. Comments are visible according to proof privacy and access. | |
| parentId | No | Optional parent comment ID when replying. | |
| removeTags | No | Exact existing tag values to remove. | |
| visibility | No | Proof visibility. public = discoverable, unlisted = link-only, private = owner-only. Omit to leave unchanged. Only the owner's own session can change it; a job run cannot. | |
| walletAddress | No | Optional owner wallet. Omit when signed in to use the current account. | |
| disclosePortableProof | No | Allow the full portable envelope on anonymous exact-qHash reads when this proof is public. Default false. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| tags | No | |
| vote | No | |
| error | No | |
| qHash | No | |
| title | No | |
| status | No | |
| comment | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| unchanged | No | |
| visibility | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Goes well past the annotations (destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false): it names the concrete destructive consequence — setting visibility to private revokes public access — and adds an authorization constraint that only the owner's own session can change visibility, not a job run. It also states the mutual-exclusivity rule of one change kind per call, which is behavioral context no annotation provides.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four dense sentences with no filler, front-loaded on the primary update action before the vote/comment modes. The mid-paragraph pivot to 'Or leave feedback on an accessible proof' slightly disrupts the flow and reads as an afterthought, but nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 10-parameter, destructive, multi-mode mutation with an output schema and full schema coverage, the description supplies exactly the missing pieces: destructive consequence, permission gate, per-call exclusivity, and self-vote permission. Return values are covered by the output schema, so no further explanation is needed.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns above that by adding semantics the schema lacks — that metadata, vote, and comment are mutually exclusive per call, and that owners may vote on their own proofs. It leaves disclosePortableProof, walletAddress, and parentId unmentioned, so it does not fully cover the 10-parameter surface.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (update) and resource (a proof you own) and enumerates the mutable fields: title, tags, visibility. It also discloses the secondary modes (vote, comment) that the same endpoint handles, so an agent knows this is a multi-purpose mutation rather than a pure metadata edit, distinguishing it from proofs_get and proof_revoke.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete when-to guidance: confirm before making an already-shared proof private, send only one kind of change per call (metadata, vote, or comment), and delegated agents need manage_proofs. It never names a sibling alternative (e.g. proof_revoke for revocation), so it stops short of the top tier, but the exclusions and prerequisites are explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verifiers_catalogVerifier catalogARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return supported check definitions with the inputs and networks each requires.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| meta | No | |
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| metadata | No | |
| verifiers | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, openWorldHint=false and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds that each entry carries its required inputs and networks, which is meaningful shape information, but says nothing about whether the catalog is static or dynamic or how large it is.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence with no filler, and the resource noun is front-loaded ahead of the returned detail. Nothing to trim.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the description need not explain return values, and there are no inputs to document. The only missing piece an agent would want is where this catalog fits in the verify workflow, which is a minor gap for such a simple tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so the baseline is 4; there is nothing for the description to compensate for. It correctly implies the response is not filterable, which matches the empty schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ("Return") and resource ("supported check definitions" plus their inputs and networks), so the agent knows this is a discovery/catalog read. It is clear on its own, but it never names the sibling it feeds into (proofable_verify / proofable_verify_prepare), so the differentiation is left implicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Calling a zero-argument "catalog" immediately before a verify flow is strongly implied, but nothing is stated explicitly — no "use this before X", no when-not, and no mention of which sibling consumes the result. Usage is inferable rather than guided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verifyCreate proofAInspect
Create a proof directly for the signed-in account. Omit the wallet for your own account. If another signer is required, use proofable_verify_prepare and proofable_verify_submit.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | Inputs required by the selected verifier, named exactly as proofable_verifiers_catalog lists them. ownership-basic saves text in data.content (not summary or contentText) and, when signed in, fills owner from the current account. | |
| chain | No | Network identifier. Omit when Proofable infers it from the address format. | |
| options | No | Optional proof settings. Proofs stay private and offchain unless privacyLevel is "public" or publishToHub is true; a job run can set neither. Pass options.meta.title / options.meta.tags / options.meta.source to label a proof at creation. | |
| verifierIds | Yes | Supported check IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| walletAddress | No | Wallet or DID to verify. | |
| signedTimestamp | No | Unix timestamp in ms (auto-generated if missing) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| path | No | |
| error | No | |
| qHash | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| next_action | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare that this is a non-read-only, non-destructive, non-idempotent, open-world operation. The description adds meaningful context beyond that: creation is tied to the signed-in account, wallet omission is allowed for self-verification, and multisigner cases must use the prepare/submit flow. It does not explain persistence or proof privacy here, but the schema covers privacy options.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the primary action and followed by the two key routing rules. There is no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutation tool with rich schema descriptions, an output schema, and safety annotations, the description supplies the critical routing and account-context information an agent needs. Nothing essential is missing for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already explains most parameters in detail. The description still adds a useful rule not stated in the walletAddress schema: omit the wallet when creating a proof for the signed-in account.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb and resource ('Create a proof directly') plus an explicit account scope ('for the signed-in account'). It also distinguishes the direct path from the prepare/submit flow, so an agent can tell it apart from sibling verification tools without inspecting each schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states when to use this tool directly and names the alternative when another signer is required: proofable_verify_prepare and proofable_verify_submit. It also tells the caller to omit the wallet for their own account, which is a useful selection rule.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verify_or_guideVerify or get next stepAIdempotentInspect
Resolve a verification request for the selected Proofable checks. Returns current qualifying proofs when they exist; otherwise returns the single next step. This tool does not create a proof.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | Inputs for the selected verifiers. Used only when a new Proof is needed. | |
| chain | No | Optional network hint. Omit when Proofable can infer it from the wallet format. | |
| options | No | Optional verification options | |
| requireAll | No | Require all listed verifiers. Default false accepts any one. | |
| verifierIds | Yes | Verifier IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| walletAddress | No | Wallet or DID. Omit when signed in to use the current account. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| action | No | |
| proofs | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| eligible | No | |
| matchedCount | No | |
| hostedVerifyUrl | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Adds real context beyond the annotations: it discloses the two-branch outcome (return existing qualifying proofs, otherwise a single next step) and explicitly scopes out proof creation, which matters given readOnlyHint=false suggests some state may change. The mild tension between the read-leaning description and readOnlyHint=false is not explained, keeping it from a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, zero padding, with the core action and the negative constraint both front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present and full schema coverage on all six parameters, the description carries only the job of explaining the outcome branches and the non-creation constraint, which it does. It stops just short of tying those branches back to specific parameters such as requireAll.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already explains verifierIds, data, chain, options, requireAll, and walletAddress. The description adds no extra parameter meaning (e.g., how requireAll interacts with partial proofs), so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ("resolve a verification request for the selected Proofable checks") and discloses the branch behavior of the result. The closing line "This tool does not create a proof" partially distinguishes it from the verify/verify_submit family, but no sibling is named explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied by "resolve a verification request" and by the exclusion of proof creation, but there is no explicit guidance on when to pick this over proofable_verify, proofable_verify_prepare, or proofable_verify_submit, nor any stated prerequisites.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verify_preparePrepare signature requestARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Prepare a signature request for the selected Proofable checks. Returns the exact signing string, timestamp, chain, and hosted fallback. This call does not submit the check or create a proof.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | Inputs required by the selected verifier, named exactly as proofable_verifiers_catalog lists them. ownership-basic saves text in data.content (not summary or contentText) and, when signed in, fills owner from the current account. | |
| chain | No | Network identifier. Omit when Proofable infers it from the address format. | |
| options | No | Optional proof settings. Proofs stay private and offchain unless privacyLevel is "public" or publishToHub is true; a job run can set neither. Pass options.meta.title / options.meta.tags / options.meta.source to label a proof at creation. | |
| verifierIds | Yes | Supported check IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| walletAddress | No | Wallet or DID to verify. | |
| signedTimestamp | No | Unix timestamp in ms (auto-generated if missing) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| path | No | |
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| elicitation | No | |
| next_action | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered; the description adds real value by enumerating the return payload (signing string, timestamp, chain, hosted fallback) and asserting no proof is created. It does not mention any auth/signing prerequisites, which is the remaining behavioral gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action and followed by the return shape and the explicit non-effect. Nothing redundant and no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With a full output schema and 100% parameter coverage, the description need not explain returns in depth and correctly doesn't. The only shortfall is the missing hand-off to the submit step, which an agent calling a two-phase sign flow would want spelled out.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and the nested options/meta and data fields are documented in detail in the schema itself, so the description adds no parameter-level meaning. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema carries the full burden.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Prepare a signature request for the selected Proofable checks') and immediately defines the boundary: it returns a signing string but 'does not submit the check or create a proof.' That negative scope cleanly separates it from proofable_verify / proofable_verify_submit without needing to name them.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The 'does not submit' clause implies this is a pre-step to a submit call, so usage is inferable. But it never says explicitly when to choose this over proofable_verify, proofable_verify_or_guide, or proofable_verify_submit, nor what the agent should do with the returned signing string next.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verify_submitSubmit signed verificationAInspect
Submit a signed Proofable check using the same wallet, checks, data, and chain used to prepare it, plus the returned signing timestamp and signature. Creates a proof only when verification succeeds.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | Inputs required by the selected verifier, named exactly as proofable_verifiers_catalog lists them. ownership-basic saves text in data.content (not summary or contentText) and, when signed in, fills owner from the current account. | |
| chain | No | Network identifier. Omit when Proofable infers it from the address format. | |
| options | No | Optional proof settings. Proofs stay private and offchain unless privacyLevel is "public" or publishToHub is true; a job run can set neither. Pass options.meta.title / options.meta.tags / options.meta.source to label a proof at creation. | |
| signature | Yes | Signature over the exact signerString returned by proofable_verify_prepare. | |
| verifierIds | Yes | Supported check IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| walletAddress | Yes | Wallet or DID used to prepare the signing string. | |
| signedTimestamp | Yes | Original timestamp returned by proofable_verify_prepare. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| path | No | |
| error | No | |
| qHash | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare that this is a non-readonly, open-world, non-idempotent, non-destructive operation. The description adds important behavior beyond that: proof creation is conditional on successful verification and requires the signature and timestamp returned from preparation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the action and followed by the key success condition. It contains no redundant or filler text.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema, full parameter descriptions, and annotations present, the description covers the essential submission semantics and success condition. It could be slightly stronger by explicitly naming proofable_verify_prepare as the required prior call and clarifying failure behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so most parameter meaning is already documented. The description still adds a critical relational constraint: wallet, checks, data, and chain must match what was used to prepare, and signature/signedTimestamp are the returned values from that step.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource: submit a signed Proofable check and create a proof on success. It clearly separates this from preparation by requiring the same wallet, checks, data, and chain used to prepare, plus the returned timestamp and signature.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context for use: this is the submission step that consumes values from the preparation step. It does not explicitly name proofable_verify_prepare as the prerequisite tool or state when to use proofable_verify instead, so it stops short of full when/when-not guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
8 tool updates
- Added
proofable_agent_create - Added
proofable_agent_link - Added
proofable_agent_mount - Added
proofable_proofs_get - Added
proofable_proofs_update - Added
proofable_verify - Added
proofable_verify_prepare - Added
proofable_verify_submit
4 tool updates
- Changed
proofable_context2 fields changed- removed
Output schema / properties / status / anyOfRemoved value: -[ - { - "type": "string" - }, - { - "type": "number" - } -] - added
Output schema / properties / status / typeAdded value: +[ + "string", + "number" +]
- Changed
proofable_proofs_check2 fields changed- removed
Output schema / properties / status / anyOfRemoved value: -[ - { - "type": "string" - }, - { - "type": "number" - } -] - added
Output schema / properties / status / typeAdded value: +[ + "string", + "number" +]
- Changed
proofable_verifiers_catalog2 fields changed- removed
Output schema / properties / status / anyOfRemoved value: -[ - { - "type": "string" - }, - { - "type": "number" - } -] - added
Output schema / properties / status / typeAdded value: +[ + "string", + "number" +]
- Changed
proofable_verify_or_guide2 fields changed- removed
Output schema / properties / status / anyOfRemoved value: -[ - { - "type": "string" - }, - { - "type": "number" - } -] - added
Output schema / properties / status / typeAdded value: +[ + "string", + "number" +]
1 tool update
- Changed
proofable_verifiers_catalog2 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / metaAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + {}, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / metadataAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": {}, + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" +}
9 tool updates
- Removed
proofable_agent_create - Removed
proofable_agent_link - Removed
proofable_agent_mount - Removed
proofable_proofs_get - Removed
proofable_proofs_update - Removed
proofable_secret_create - Removed
proofable_secret_list - Removed
proofable_secret_revoke - Removed
proofable_verify
25 tool updates
- Removed
neus_agent_create - Removed
neus_agent_link - Removed
neus_agent_mount - Removed
neus_context - Removed
neus_proofs_check - Removed
neus_proofs_get - Removed
neus_secret_create - Removed
neus_secret_list - Removed
neus_secret_revoke - Removed
neus_verifiers_catalog - Removed
neus_verify - Removed
neus_verify_or_guide - Added
proofable_agent_create - Added
proofable_agent_link - Added
proofable_agent_mount - Added
proofable_context - Added
proofable_proofs_check - Added
proofable_proofs_get - Added
proofable_proofs_update - Added
proofable_secret_create - Added
proofable_secret_list - Added
proofable_secret_revoke - Added
proofable_verifiers_catalog - Added
proofable_verify - Added
proofable_verify_or_guide
3 tool updates
- Changed
neus_proofs_check3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / gateIdAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / handleAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / namespaceAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
neus_proofs_get1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / qHashAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
neus_secret_list1 field changed- removed
Input schema / requiredRemoved value: -[ - "walletAddress" -]
1 tool update
- Removed
neus_me
1 tool update
- Changed
neus_proofs_get2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / depthAdded value: +{ + "type": "number" +} - added
Input schema / properties / traverseAdded value: +{ + "enum": [ + "supersedes", + "linked", + "delegation", + "agent-identity" + ], + "type": "string" +}
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