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The trust harness for AI agents. Set what an agent can do before it acts.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 17.0% over 64 days
- OAuth
- Works in Glama
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP ยท MCP 2025-11-25
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- Repository
- neus/network
- GitHub Stars
- 11
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
proofable_proofs_check and proofable_verify_or_guide both concern whether a wallet has required proofs/verification, creating potential selection confusion despite the descriptions distinguishing pass/fail versus proof-or-next-step. proofable_context and proofable_verifiers_catalog are more distinct, but the overlap in the verification pair keeps this at a moderate level.
All tools share the proofable_ prefix, which helps grouping, but the suffixes mix patterns: noun (context), noun_verb (proofs_check), noun_noun (verifiers_catalog), and verb_conjunction_verb (verify_or_guide). There is no predictable verb_noun convention, though names remain readable.
Four tools is reasonable for a focused, read-only proof-verification surface, with each tool targeting a distinct area (context, check, catalog, resolve). The count is slightly under what the domain implies because a referenced tool (proofable_proofs_get) is absent.
The descriptions reference proofable_proofs_get as the tool that reads proof bodies, but it is not included in the set, creating a dead end for anyone needing actual proof records. The surface covers checking and guiding but lacks the promised retrieval operation, which will cause agent failures.
Available Tools
4 toolsproofable_contextSession contextARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return the signed-in Proofable profile and its current read-only context: proof index, agents, permissions, and verifier summary. Use once after sign-in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| profile | No | |
| agentsError | No | |
| agentsStatus | No | |
| contextIndex | No | |
| authenticated | No | |
| verifierSummary | No | |
| recommendedWorkflow | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, non-destructive and closed-world, so the safety profile is fully covered by structured data. The description reinforces this with 'read-only context' and the once-after-sign-in cadence, but adds little beyond that; with an output schema present it needn't describe the return shape.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences: content first, invocation cadence second. No filler, no repetition of the schema or annotations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
A zero-param, read-only snapshot tool with a full output schema and complete annotation coverage needs only to say what it returns and when to call it, both of which are present. Only a hint about whether it is a prerequisite for other Proofable calls is absent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There are zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate. Baseline for a no-argument tool applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Return the signed-in Proofable profile') and enumerates the payload (proof index, agents, permissions, verifier summary), which is far more than a restatement of the title. It does not, however, explicitly distinguish itself from siblings that also surface this data, such as proofable_agents_list or proofable_verifiers_catalog.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Use once after sign-in' gives a genuine timing cue for invocation. It offers no exclusions or named alternatives, so an agent must infer that agents_list/verifiers_catalog are the scoped-down substitutes when only one slice is needed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_proofs_checkCheck proofsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Does this wallet already have the required proofs? Returns pass or fail, not records. Reading proof bodies needs a signed-in session, which is what unlocks proofable_proofs_get; signed-out callers get this check and can sign in to go further. Omit the wallet when signed in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| gateId | No | Optional hosted gate or listing id. Signed-in owners still get eligible + matchedCount only. | |
| handle | No | Optional handle filter for handle-based verifiers. | |
| wallet | No | Wallet or DID to verify. Omit when signed in to use the current account. | |
| minCount | No | Minimum number of matching proofs. Default 1. | |
| namespace | No | Optional namespace filter for handle checks. | |
| verifiers | Yes | Verifier IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| requireAll | No | Require all listed verifiers. Default false accepts any one. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| eligible | No | |
| satisfied | No | |
| matchedCount | No | |
| unknownVerifiers | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive behavior, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real value beyond that: the pass/fail (not records) return shape and the auth/session constraint that gates richer access. It stops short of describing rate limits or partial-failure behavior, but this is solid added context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three front-loaded sentences that answer the core question first, then qualify with auth context. Slightly dense in the middle sentence but no wasted filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, the description needn't explain return fields, and it caps its return-value discussion at the useful 'pass or fail, not records' distinction. Auth behavior for signed-in versus signed-out callers is covered, leaving little an agent needs that is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so all seven parameters are already documented in the schema, including the 'omit wallet when signed in' rule the description repeats. The description adds no new parameter meaning beyond what the schema provides, matching the baseline for full coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific question the tool answers ('Does this wallet already have the required proofs?') and clarifies the output shape ('Returns pass or fail, not records'). It implicitly separates itself from proofable_proofs_get, but does not differentiate itself from the three actual siblings listed (context, verifiers_catalog, verify_or_guide).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives a clear conditional: signed-out callers get this check, and reading proof bodies requires a signed-in session, which routes the agent to proofable_proofs_get. There is no explicit 'do not use when' for the other siblings, but the auth-based selection rule is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verifiers_catalogVerifier catalogARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return supported check definitions with the inputs and networks each requires.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| meta | No | |
| error | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| metadata | No | |
| verifiers | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare this a safe, idempotent, read-only, closed-world lookup, so the safety profile is fully covered. The description adds that the payload includes per-check inputs and networks, which is useful content context, but says nothing about caching, refresh cadence, or whether the catalog is static.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence with no filler, front-loading the return content and its shape. Every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
A zero-parameter catalog with a full output schema and rich annotations is nearly self-describing; the description covers what the catalog contains. It could be marginally stronger by noting the catalog is the entry point for the verify workflow, but nothing an agent strictly needs is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters and schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 4. There is nothing for the description to disambiguate, and it correctly avoids inventing argument semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (return) and resource (supported check definitions, with the inputs and networks each requires), which distinguishes it from action-oriented siblings like proofable_verify and proofable_verify_submit. However, it never clarifies the relationship between 'check definitions' in the description and 'verifiers' in the name/title, leaving mild ambiguity about whether checks and verifiers are the same concept.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no named alternatives. An agent must infer on its own that this catalog is meant to be consulted before configuring verification, rather than, say, a runtime check like proofable_proofs_check.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofable_verify_or_guideVerify or get next stepAIdempotentInspect
Resolve a verification request for the selected Proofable checks. Returns current qualifying proofs when they exist; otherwise returns the single next step. This tool does not create a proof.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | Inputs for the selected verifiers. Used only when a new Proof is needed. | |
| chain | No | Optional network hint. Omit when Proofable can infer it from the wallet format. | |
| options | No | Optional verification options | |
| requireAll | No | Require all listed verifiers. Default false accepts any one. | |
| verifierIds | Yes | Verifier IDs from proofable_verifiers_catalog. | |
| walletAddress | No | Wallet or DID. Omit when signed in to use the current account. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| error | No | |
| action | No | |
| proofs | No | |
| status | No | |
| message | No | |
| success | No | |
| eligible | No | |
| matchedCount | No | |
| hostedVerifyUrl | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, and the description usefully adds that no proof is created. But readOnlyHint=false signals some write side effect (likely session/state), and the schema note that `data` is 'Used only when a new Proof is needed' sits in tension with 'does not create a proof' โ the description never resolves what actually gets written.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core action and no filler; each sentence carries information (action, branching outcome, non-goal). Minor slack in the vague qualifier 'for the selected Proofable checks', but overall efficiently structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return shapes need not be described, and the schema fully covers the six parameters including the nested `data` and `options` objects. Combined with two of three behavioral hints covered by annotations, the description is nearly complete; the only real gap is sibling routing within a crowded verify family.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so all six parameters are documented in the schema itself (verifierIds sourcing from the catalog, chain as an optional network hint, walletAddress fallback to the signed-in account). The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond that, which is the expected baseline when the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Resolve a verification request for the selected Proofable checks') and clarifies the dual-mode behavior (return proofs or return the next step). It also adds a negative discriminator ('This tool does not create a proof'), but it never names the close siblings proofable_verify, proofable_verify_prepare, proofable_verify_submit, or proofable_proofs_check, so an agent must still infer the boundary from the description alone.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The branching sentence implies when the tool applies ('Returns current qualifying proofs when they exist; otherwise returns the single next step'), which is useful precondition context. However, with four verify-family siblings in the list there is no explicit routing guidance on when to pick this tool over proofable_verify_prepare or proofable_verify, and no stated prerequisites.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- Changed
proofable_verifiers_catalog2 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / metaAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + {}, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / metadataAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": {}, + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" +}
9 tool updates
- Removed
proofable_agent_create - Removed
proofable_agent_link - Removed
proofable_agent_mount - Removed
proofable_proofs_get - Removed
proofable_proofs_update - Removed
proofable_secret_create - Removed
proofable_secret_list - Removed
proofable_secret_revoke - Removed
proofable_verify
25 tool updates
- Removed
neus_agent_create - Removed
neus_agent_link - Removed
neus_agent_mount - Removed
neus_context - Removed
neus_proofs_check - Removed
neus_proofs_get - Removed
neus_secret_create - Removed
neus_secret_list - Removed
neus_secret_revoke - Removed
neus_verifiers_catalog - Removed
neus_verify - Removed
neus_verify_or_guide - Added
proofable_agent_create - Added
proofable_agent_link - Added
proofable_agent_mount - Added
proofable_context - Added
proofable_proofs_check - Added
proofable_proofs_get - Added
proofable_proofs_update - Added
proofable_secret_create - Added
proofable_secret_list - Added
proofable_secret_revoke - Added
proofable_verifiers_catalog - Added
proofable_verify - Added
proofable_verify_or_guide
3 tool updates
- Changed
neus_proofs_check3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / gateIdAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / handleAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / namespaceAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
neus_proofs_get1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / qHashAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
neus_secret_list1 field changed- removed
Input schema / requiredRemoved value: -[ - "walletAddress" -]
1 tool update
- Removed
neus_me
1 tool update
- Changed
neus_proofs_get2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / depthAdded value: +{ + "type": "number" +} - added
Input schema / properties / traverseAdded value: +{ + "enum": [ + "supersedes", + "linked", + "delegation", + "agent-identity" + ], + "type": "string" +}
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