Agent Account Index
Server Details
Can an AI agent hold an account at a service? Verdict, owner of record, quoted terms clause.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-06-18
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools serve clearly distinct purposes: one checks a specific service for non-human account eligibility, the other enumerates all such services. There is no overlap in their operations, and an agent can easily choose between them based on whether it needs a single verdict or a full list.
Both names use snake_case and are descriptive, but they follow different conventions: 'can_an_agent_hold_an_account' is an interrogative phrase while 'list_named_non_human_routes' is a verb_noun command. This is a minor deviation in verb style, though still readable and predictable.
Two tools are borderline thin for a server indexing dozens of services. While they cover the core operations (check one, list all), the surface feels minimal and could benefit from additional query or retrieval options.
The tools cover the essential lifecycle: enumerate all services with non-human identity routes and check a specific service in detail. Minor gaps exist, such as no search/filter capability or direct access to the underlying index data, but agents can work around these by listing and checking individually.
Available Tools
2 toolscan_an_agent_hold_an_accountBInspect
Check whether a non-human actor may hold an account at a service. Call this BEFORE creating an account anywhere. Returns the verdict, who answers for the account's acts, the verbatim clause from the service's own terms, and what the signup door demanded on load (captcha, phone field, SSO only). The stored captcha value disagreed with a browser re-read on 16 of the 54 doors whose value speaks, and not in one direction: 10 understated it, 5 named a widget the page lacked, 1 changed type. Read those against their own denominators: the 34 doors storing none_seen were wrong 10 times and the 20 storing a vendor name 6 times, about the same rate either way, so a disagreement does not say which reading to lean on. Where signup_door.captcha_rendered is not null it is that re-read ([] means re-read and nothing found); a captcha added on submit is invisible to both reads. These six integers are typed here and live in captcha_recheck_counts at the top of /index.json, which is the copy to trust.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| service | Yes | Service name, e.g. "GitHub", "Stripe", "Supabase". Case-insensitive, matched on substring. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it does disclose the return contents (verdict, accountability, verbatim clause, signup-door demands) plus data-quality caveats about captcha reads. That is real added context. However, it says nothing about permissions, rate limits, or failure/error behavior, so it is only partially complete for an unannotated tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and the 'call before' directive are front-loaded, which is good. But the bulk of the description is a rambling research aside about captcha disagreement rates across 'doors' and integer counts, referencing fields (signup_door.captcha_rendered, captcha_recheck_counts, /index.json) that are not documented anywhere in the schema. Many sentences do not help an agent invoke the tool correctly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description usefully steps in to describe what comes back. But the captcha-statistics passage refers to opaque output fields with no structure, so an agent cannot reliably interpret the return value. It partially compensates for the missing output schema but leaves the response shape unclear.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There is one parameter with 100% schema description coverage (name examples, case-insensitive, substring matching). The description adds nothing beyond the schema about how 'service' resolves, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence gives a specific verb and resource: 'Check whether a non-human actor may hold an account at a service.' An agent can tell this is an eligibility-check tool. It does not, however, distinguish itself from the sibling list_named_non_human_routes, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an explicit directive: 'Call this BEFORE creating an account anywhere,' which tells the agent exactly when this tool is the right one. There is no when-not guidance or named alternative, so it is clear context without exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_named_non_human_routesBInspect
List every service that documents an identity a non-human actor may hold. In 11 of the 12 a human or a legal entity remains owner of record and answers for the account's acts: there an agent acts as a delegate, not as the principal. 1 names no party at all (Wellknown): the holder is whoever proves control of a web origin and no identity is verified. Each row carries agent_as_principal.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It usefully discloses the result composition (11 of 12 have a human/legal owner of record; 1 Wellknown verifies no identity) and that each row carries agent_as_principal, but it omits operational traits such as read-only nature, format, pagination, or any auth requirement.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, followed by domain context and a field note. It is dense and a touch verbose, but every sentence contributes to interpreting the rows rather than padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, so the description must explain what is returned; it does explain the meaning of rows and the agent_as_principal field, but not the literal return shape or size of the list. Adequate but with clear gaps for a no-annotation, no-output-schema tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes no parameters, so there are no parameter semantics to convey and the baseline of 4 applies. The empty schema is fully self-consistent with the description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: 'List every service that documents an identity a non-human actor may hold.' An agent can tell this is an enumeration of identity routes. It does not, however, contrast itself with the sibling can_an_agent_hold_an_account, so differentiation is left implicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, and the sibling can_an_agent_hold_an_account is never mentioned as an alternative. The reader must infer that this lists routes while the sibling answers a yes/no question.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
2 tool updates
- First observed
can_an_agent_hold_an_account - First observed
list_named_non_human_routes
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