Guardrail MCP
Server Details
Deterministic preflight checks for credentials, fund transfers, writes, and prompt overrides.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over 21 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-06-18
- URL
- Repository
- kadopi/guardrail-mcp
- GitHub Stars
- 0
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools have clearly distinct purposes: one assesses action risk, the other describes the guardrail's capabilities. There is no overlap or ambiguity between them.
Both tools use a consistent verb_noun pattern: 'assess_action_risk' and 'get_guardrail_capabilities'. The naming is predictable and follows a clear convention.
With only two tools, the server feels thin even for a narrowly scoped guardrail checker. The count is borderline, but the limited purpose partially justifies it.
The core workflow of checking capabilities and assessing risk is covered. Minor gaps exist, such as no explicit way to list individual guardrail rules, but the surface is not a dead end.
Available Tools
2 toolsassess_action_riskAssess action riskARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Runs a deterministic, read-only preflight check. It never executes the proposed action.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | ||
| content | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Adds behavioral guarantees beyond the annotations: 'deterministic' and 'never executes the proposed action.' This clarifies call safety and repeatability even though readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint already cover some of the same ground.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short, front-loaded sentences with no filler. Every sentence adds behavioral or safety-relevant information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Annotations and the 'preflight check' phrase establish safety and rough purpose, but with no output schema the description still does not say what the tool returns. The content parameter is also left to guesswork. Given the tool's simplicity this is adequate but not complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 0% description coverage, and the description only weakly maps 'the proposed action' to the action parameter. It says nothing about the optional content parameter, its format, or how it affects the risk assessment.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific action ('runs') on a distinct resource ('preflight check' / 'action risk'), and emphasizes that it does not execute the proposed action. It is clearly differentiated from get_guardrail_capabilities by intended purpose, though it does not name the sibling explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Preflight check' implies the tool should be used before executing a proposed action, and 'read-only' signals it is safe to call. However, there is no explicit when-to-use guidance or mention of when to prefer the sibling get_guardrail_capabilities.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_guardrail_capabilitiesGet Guardrail MCP capabilitiesARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Returns the scope and safety boundary of this free, deterministic preflight checker.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and non-destructive behavior, and the description adds 'deterministic' and 'preflight' context plus a concrete return purpose. It does not contradict the annotations and adds useful behavioral context beyond a bare read flag.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence, no filler, with the key information front-loaded in the first phrase. Every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
This is a very low-complexity invocation: no parameters, no output schema, and a robust set of annotations covering side effects. The description's high-level statement of what is returned is sufficient for an agent to call it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to explain; the empty schema already covers this fully. Baseline 4 applies because no parameter documentation is needed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb ('Returns') and a specific resource ('scope and safety boundary' of the preflight checker), so an agent can see this is a read-only capability/metadata tool. It does not explicitly contrast itself with assess_action_risk, so it stops short of full sibling differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrasing implies the tool is used to inspect the checker's scope and safety boundary before or instead of running risk assessment. There is no explicit when-to-use versus assess_action_risk guidance, so selection must be inferred from the name and description.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
2 tool updates
- First observed
assess_action_risk - First observed
get_guardrail_capabilities
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