token-oracle — Token Trust Oracle
Server Details
Flags fake/mismatched token contract addresses and hallucinated supply figures before you trade.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 99.9% over 24 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
There is only one tool, so there is no possibility of selecting the wrong one or confusing overlapping purposes. Its description clearly states its single responsibility and when to call it.
The single name verify_token follows a clean verb_noun snake_case convention that matches its purpose exactly. No inconsistency is possible with one tool.
The server's scope (verify a token address before trusting it) is narrow, so a single tool is defensible, but one tool is inherently thin and outside the 3-15 range typical of well-scoped servers. Payment gating adds complexity without adding surface area.
It covers its two stated failure modes (address impersonation via bytecode + CoinGecko cross-reference, and supply hallucination via totalSupply comparison), but a 'trust oracle' omits common trust signals like verified source, proxy/upgradeable detection, holder concentration, liquidity, and honeypot checks. Agents get a verdict but no way to probe further or re-check with different parameters.
Available Tools
1 toolverify_tokenVerify TokenAInspect
Token Trust Oracle. Call this BEFORE trading against, writing code that references, or reporting figures about any token contract address you were not given directly by the user (one you generated, recalled, or inferred). This closes two separate failure modes: address-poisoning/impersonation (an address that doesn't actually match the token name everyone assumes it is), and tokenomics hallucination (LLMs are documented to get total supply, circulating supply, and other figures wrong more often than almost any other crypto data point). Checks the address has real contract bytecode, cross-references CoinGecko for an independent listing, and compares on-chain totalSupply() against CoinGecko's reported figures. Pass expectedSymbol when you believe you know what token this is — a mismatch is the strongest possible signal something is wrong. Returns a synthetic verdict: ALLOW (no issues found), WARN (proceed with caution — read the findings), or BLOCK (do not trust this address — likely not a contract at all, or doesn't match the token it claims to be). First 5 calls per caller are free; after that this tool requires x402 payment (USDC on Base) and will return a payment-required error with the amount and address to pay.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | Yes | Which chain the contract lives on. | |
| address | Yes | The token contract address to verify. | |
| expectedSymbol | No | Optional — the ticker symbol you believe this address corresponds to (e.g. "USDC"). A mismatch is the strongest fraud signal this tool can give. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so richly: it discloses the three verification steps (bytecode check, CoinGecko cross-reference, on-chain totalSupply() comparison), the ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK verdict semantics, and the payment/rate-limit model (first 5 calls free, then x402 USDC on Base with a payment-required error). This is unusually complete disclosure for a mutation-free tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but front-loaded with the core instruction before elaborating on failure modes and return values; each sentence (checks performed, verdicts, payment) adds distinct information. It could be tightened, but nothing is filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite no output schema and no annotations, the description fully explains what the tool checks, how the environment is cross-referenced, what the verdict values mean, and the payment failure path. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly and interpret results.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description exceeds it by explaining the strategic meaning of expectedSymbol — pass it when you believe you know the token, and a mismatch is "the strongest possible signal something is wrong." It adds no extra detail for chain/address, but the expectedSymbol guidance is genuinely decision-relevant.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a concrete verb and resource — verify a token contract address — and immediately frames the tool as a "Token Trust Oracle" with a specific scope (address-poisoning and tokenomics hallucination). An agent can tell exactly what this tool does and what failure modes it addresses without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to call it ("BEFORE trading against, writing code that references, or reporting figures about any token contract address you were not given directly by the user") and implicitly excludes a case (addresses supplied directly by the user). No siblings exist, so no further routing is needed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- First observed
verify_token
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