TrustScan
Server Details
Security scanner for MCP servers and skills: Unicode injection, patterns, secrets.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
Available Tools
2 toolstrust_scan_fileTrust Scan FileAInspect
Security scan a single file for invisible Unicode, dangerous patterns, secrets.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| filepath | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It does disclose what the scan checks for, but it does not explicitly state whether the file is modified, what permissions are needed, or how findings are returned. The scan wording implies read-only behavior, but this is not explicit.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence that immediately identifies the action, target, and scan categories. Every word adds value and there is no redundant or filler content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With one required parameter and an output schema present, the description covers the core purpose and scope well. It lacks explicit usage guidance against the sibling, but that gap is already accounted for in the usage dimension and does not make the tool difficult to invoke correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 0% description coverage and only one parameter, filepath. The description adds that the parameter refers to a single file to scan, but it does not explain path formats, file types, or any constraints on the filepath.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('security scan'), a clear target ('a single file'), and the scan scope (invisible Unicode, dangerous patterns, secrets). It also distinguishes itself from the sibling trust_scan_server by focusing on a single file rather than a server.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'a single file' and the sibling name trust_scan_server imply a file-level versus server-level use case, but the description does not explicitly state when to use this tool over the sibling or provide any exclusion conditions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
trust_scan_serverTrust Scan ServerBInspect
Security scan an MCP server or skill package before trusting it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes | directory or file path to scan (on the TrustScan host) | |
| package_name | No | package name for typosquat detection |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of disclosing behavior. It only says 'Security scan', which is vague and does not indicate whether the operation is read-only, what it checks, whether it has side effects, or any other behavioral details. The description adds no context beyond the tool's name and basic purpose.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence that immediately states the action and target. There is no filler or unnecessary detail, making it highly efficient and easy to parse.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the simple two-parameter schema and the presence of an output schema (not detailed here, but noted in context), the description is sufficient for the agent to understand the tool's purpose and how to invoke it. It could benefit from a brief note on what the scan returns, but that is covered by the output schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already provides descriptions for both parameters (path and package_name) with 100% coverage, so the description adds no additional meaning beyond what is in the schema. The baseline of 3 applies because the schema fully documents the parameters and the description does not expand on them.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Security scan') and a clear resource ('an MCP server or skill package'), which distinguishes it from the sibling tool trust_scan_file that likely targets files. It is concise and unambiguous, though it does not explicitly contrast with the sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'before trusting it' provides a general usage context, but there is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus trust_scan_file or any other alternative. The description implies a pre-trust evaluation but leaves the choice criteria to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
2 tool updates
- First observed
trust_scan_file - First observed
trust_scan_server
Frequently Asked Questions
Claiming proves that you control a remote MCP connector. It does not move, proxy, or interrupt the server.
Open the connector listing, choose Claim ownership, and sign in to Glama.
Complete one verification method:
GitHub identity — fastest for official registry listings. For a namespace such as
io.github.alice/server, link the matching GitHub user, then choose Claim with GitHub. An organization namespace such asio.github.acme/serveralso needs that organization to have installed the Glama AI GitHub App and approved its permissions, because GitHub discloses organization membership only to apps it has installed. Use HTTP or DNS when it has not.HTTP challenge — works when you can deploy a public file. Generate a token, publish the exact JSON Glama shows at
/.well-known/glama.jsonon the same origin as the connector, then choose Check HTTP challenge.DNS challenge — works when you control DNS but cannot change the server. Generate a token, create the exact TXT record Glama shows, wait for it to propagate, then choose Check DNS challenge.
After verification, Glama sends a confirmation email and gives you access to listing details, thumbnails, health checks, and analytics. Keep the HTTP file or DNS record in place: Glama periodically checks it and ownership remains verified while the token is discoverable.
The HTTP ownership file has this structure:
{
"$schema": "https://glama.ai/mcp/schemas/connector.json",
"claim": "glama_claim_..."
}Claim tokens are opaque, stable, and bound to the signed-in Glama account. They contain no email address or other personal information. If Glama can no longer discover a verified HTTP or DNS token, it starts a seven-day grace period before removing claim-based access. Restore the same token during that period to keep ownership verified. Never publish an email address, Glama session token, GitHub token, or connector credential as ownership proof.
If verification fails, confirm that you copied the current token exactly. The HTTP file must be public, return valid JSON with a successful HTTP response, and stay on the connector's origin. DNS changes may need more time to propagate. A claim cannot transfer to a different origin or hostname: if the connector target changes, Glama starts the grace period and the new target must be claimed separately after the previous claim is released.
For a connector linked to the official MCP Registry, registry updates continue to replace its name, description, and URL by default. After claiming, open Manage connector and enable Use Glama listing details as the source of truth if edits made on Glama should be preserved. Categories and thumbnails are always managed on Glama; registry linkage and technical connection settings continue to sync.
Control your server's listing on Glama, including description and metadata
Access analytics and receive server usage reports
Get monitoring and health status updates for your server
Feature your server to boost visibility and reach more users
To improve your MCP server's ranking:
Claim ownership of the server listing
Complete the server profile with an accurate description and thumbnail
Provide a test profile so Glama can connect to and evaluate the server
Keep tool definitions clear and complete to earn a high Tool Definition Quality Score (TDQS)
Route real usage through the Glama Gateway; more recorded successful server uses also improve the ranking
For users:
Full audit trail – every tool call is logged with inputs and outputs for compliance and debugging
Granular tool control – enable or disable individual tools per connector to limit what your AI agents can do
Centralized credential management – store and rotate API keys and OAuth tokens in one place
Change alerts – get notified when a connector changes its schema, adds or removes tools, or updates tool definitions, so nothing breaks silently
For server owners:
Proven adoption – public usage metrics on your listing show real-world traction and build trust with prospective users
Tool-level analytics – see which tools are being used most, helping you prioritize development and documentation
Direct user feedback – users can report issues and suggest improvements through the listing, giving you a channel you would not have otherwise
The connector status is unhealthy when Glama is unable to successfully connect to the server. This can happen for several reasons:
The server is experiencing an outage
The URL of the server is wrong
Credentials required to access the server are missing or invalid
If you are the owner of this MCP connector and would like to make modifications to the listing, including providing test credentials for accessing the server, please contact support@glama.ai.
Discussions
No comments yet. Be the first to start the discussion!
Related MCP Connectors
Security scanner for MCP servers. Detect vulnerabilities, prompt injection, and tool poisoning.
Scan agent skills and MCP servers for malicious patterns before you load them
Scan any public GitHub MCP-server repo for security issues. 37 MCP-specific L1 rules, 8 languages.
Scan any MCP server for tool-poisoning, security, auth & license. Trust score before install.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseCqualityBmaintenanceSecurity scanner and MCP server that catches dangerous patterns in MCP servers and AI agent projects, such as leaked secrets, shell execution, and prompt-injection text. Runs as both a CLI and MCP server with CI-friendly severity gates.21MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceSecurity scanner for MCP servers. Detects prompt injection, command injection, auth bypass, and excessive permissions across tools, resources, and prompts.262MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables static security scanning of MCP servers, AI agent skills, and plugins by detecting attack patterns across severity levels and producing SARIF output for GitHub Code Scanning.-
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceSecurity scanner for MCP servers and AI-generated code. Detects leaked API keys, PII, prompt injection, and MCP misconfigs with A-F security grades.MIT
Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
TDQS
The two tools have clearly distinct purposes: scanning a file versus scanning a server. No ambiguity or overlap.
Both tools follow the identical 'trust_scan_<target>' pattern, making the naming convention highly predictable and consistent.
With only two tools, the set is compact but still covers the core scanning targets (file and server). It feels slightly thin but is appropriate for a narrowly scoped security scanner.
The tools cover the primary scan targets mentioned in the description (file and server), but could potentially include other targets like directories or packages. Minor gap but does not hamper the main use case.