pentest-mcp-server
Server Details
Offline methodology engine for authorized penetration testing, CTF, and security research.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
- Repository
- cyanheads/pentest-mcp-server
- GitHub Stars
- 1
- Server Listing
- @cyanheads/pentest-mcp-server
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Usage analytics
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Tool Definition Quality
Average 4.6/5 across 7 of 7 tools scored.
Each tool has a unique, well-defined purpose: analyzing responses, encoding payloads, generating payloads, providing methodology guides, looking up threat groups, looking up techniques, and mapping techniques to a target. No overlap or ambiguity.
All tools share the 'pentest_' prefix and most follow a verb_noun pattern (e.g., pentest_analyze_response, pentest_generate_payloads). 'pentest_encode' and 'pentest_guide' deviate from this pattern, but the overall naming is clear and predictable.
With 7 tools, the server is well-scoped. It covers analysis, payload generation, encoding, methodology guidance, threat intelligence lookups, and target profiling. The count is neither too thin nor too heavy.
The tool set covers the full lifecycle of an authorized penetration test: mapping techniques to a target, generating and encoding payloads, analyzing responses, consulting methodology guides, and looking up threat intelligence. No obvious gaps.
Available Tools
7 toolspentest_analyze_responsePentest Analyze ResponseARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Analyze a server response from authorized probing for information leakage, fingerprinting signals, and exploitation opportunities scoped to the authorized engagement. Accepts raw HTTP response headers and body (paste from Burp, curl, or any HTTP client) and returns structured findings grouped by category. Each finding includes: what was detected, why it matters for an authorized tester, how a defender detects misuse, and recommended remediation. Identifies version disclosures, stack traces, debug headers, internal paths, JWT/cookie patterns, CORS misconfigurations, and other common leakage patterns. Use as the bridge between recon/probing output and the methodology and payload tools.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| context | No | Freeform context about the authorized test target — e.g., "login endpoint", "GraphQL API", "file upload handler". Narrows the pattern matching to relevant categories. Max 2,000 characters. | |
| status_code | No | HTTP status code (100–599). Helps classify the response type. | |
| response_body | No | Response body text. Paste raw HTML, JSON, XML, or error text. Truncate to the first 10,000 characters for very large responses — the first portion carries most leakage signals. | |
| response_headers | No | Raw HTTP response headers (paste from Burp, curl -v, or similar). Include the status line if available. Max 20,000 characters. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| summary | Yes | One-paragraph summary of findings and recommended next steps for the authorized tester. |
| findings | Yes | Structured findings ordered by severity descending (high first). |
| fingerprints | Yes | Technology fingerprinting summary for use in target_context when calling pentest_guide or pentest_map_techniques. |
| nextToolSuggestions | Yes | Suggested next tool calls — typically pentest_guide with fingerprint-populated stack, or pentest_generate_payloads for directly exploitable findings. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that response analysis is for authorized testing only. Rendered first. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds significant behavioral context beyond annotations: it identifies specific detection patterns (version disclosures, stack traces, debug headers, etc.), explains the structure of findings, and notes that it is for authorized probing. This complements the readOnlyHint and idempotentHint annotations with real behavioral details.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured and front-loaded with the main purpose, followed by supported input formats, output structure, and specific detection examples. Every sentence adds value, and the entire description is concise without being terse.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (4 parameters, output schema), the description is complete. It explains what each input is used for, what the output contains (grouped findings with detection, impact, remediation), and the scope of analysis. No gaps remain.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds value by clarifying that inputs should be pasted from Burp/curl, advising truncation for large response bodies, and explaining how status_code helps classify responses. This goes beyond the schema's basic descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: analyzing server responses for information leakage, fingerprinting, and exploitation opportunities. It specifies the verb 'analyze' and the resource 'server response,' and distinguishes itself from siblings like pentest_generate_payloads by focusing on analysis of probing output.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says 'Use as the bridge between recon/probing output and the methodology and payload tools,' providing clear context for when to use it. It does not explicitly state when not to use it or name alternatives, but the sibling tool names imply differentiation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pentest_encodePentest EncodeARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Transform a payload string through one or more encoding layers for bypass research during authorized testing. Accepts a chain of encodings applied in order (e.g., ["unicode", "url", "base64"] applies Unicode → URL-encode → base64). Returns the transformed payload with a step-by-step decoding explanation: how a WAF or server would decode each layer, and why the combined encoding might bypass a specific filter. Use to understand filter bypass mechanics in an authorized engagement and to confirm that a target's decoding pipeline matches an expected bypass path. Payloads are transformed mathematically — no live probing occurs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | Yes | Ordered list of encodings to apply (1–6 steps). Applied left to right. E.g., ["unicode", "url"] applies Unicode escape first, then URL-encodes the result. | |
| explain | No | Include step-by-step decode explanation. Set to false for raw transform output only. | |
| payload | Yes | Input payload string to encode. Max 10,000 characters. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| encoded | Yes | Final encoded payload after all chain steps applied. |
| original | Yes | The input payload. |
| decode_path | No | Step-by-step explanation of how a decoder (WAF, server, browser) would reverse the encoding chain. Included when explain is true. |
| detection_note | Yes | How defenders detect encoded payload variants — decoding normalizers, entropy analysis, behavioral detection. Always included to maintain the dual offense/defense framing. |
| bypass_rationale | No | Why this encoding combination might bypass common filter patterns. Included when explain is true. |
| intermediate_steps | Yes | Intermediate values at each encoding step, for tracing the chain. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that encoding transforms are for authorized bypass research only. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations declare readOnlyHint and idempotentHint, and the description adds that 'no live probing occurs' and explains the output includes a step-by-step decoding explanation. This fully discloses the offline, safe nature of the tool with no contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single 5-sentence paragraph, front-loading the main action and purpose. Every sentence adds essential information without redundancy or fluff, making it easy to scan.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's 3 parameters, presence of output schema, and no nested objects, the description covers all aspects: input constraints (chain order, max items), optional parameter (explain), return value (transformed payload with explanation), and usage scenario. No gaps remain.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 100% schema coverage, baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning by explaining the chain encoding order with an example, describing the explain parameter's effect, and noting payload length limits. This goes beyond the schema's property descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Transform') and resource ('payload string'), clearly distinguishing from sibling tools like pentest_analyze_response or pentest_generate_payloads. It states the tool's purpose for bypass research during authorized testing, leaving no ambiguity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description advises using the tool to understand filter bypass mechanics and confirm decoding pipelines, and notes payloads are transformed offline. It provides clear context but does not explicitly list when not to use or compare to alternatives, though sibling tool names imply distinct purposes.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pentest_generate_payloadsPentest Generate PayloadsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Generate payload templates for authorized testing against systems the tester owns or is permitted to test. Payloads are annotated templates — each includes why it works in the specified context, what vulnerability class it tests, detection signatures that WAF/IDS products might fire, and recommended mitigations. Context-awareness is core: an XSS payload for an HTML attribute differs entirely from one for a JS template literal, and both differ from a DOM-based sink. When a WAF profile is specified, bypass variants reference known public research for that WAF product. All payloads are illustrative templates for authorized testing only.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| count | No | Number of payload variants to return (1–20, default 5). More variants cover different bypass approaches for the same context. | |
| category | Yes | Vulnerability category for payload generation. | |
| encoding | No | Apply an encoding chain to payloads at generation time. Applied in order (left to right). Use pentest_encode for more control over per-payload encoding. | |
| waf_profile | No | WAF or filter in front of the authorized test target. When a specific WAF is named, bypass variants referencing known public research are included. | none |
| injection_context | Yes | Precise injection context. Critical for XSS: an HTML attribute payload differs from a JS string payload. Provide the most specific context for the best results. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| category | Yes | Requested payload category. |
| payloads | Yes | Payload templates ordered by coverage breadth, each annotated with offense and defense context. |
| injection_context | Yes | Requested injection context. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that these templates are for authorized testing only. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond annotations (readOnlyHint, idempotentHint), the description adds rich behavioral details: payloads are annotated with why they work, detection signatures, mitigations, and context-awareness. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, well-structured paragraph of about 150 words. It is front-loaded with the main action and every sentence adds value, though it could be slightly more compact.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given complexity (5 parameters, many enums) and presence of output schema, the description is thorough: covers output structure, context-awareness, WAF bypass, and security considerations. It is complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds meaning by explaining why injection_context is critical and how encoding chaining works, improving parameter understanding.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool generates payload templates for authorized testing, with context-awareness and annotations. It distinguishes from siblings like pentest_encode and pentest_analyze_response by focusing on generation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description specifies use for authorized testing and mentions WAF profiles, but does not explicitly state when not to use or point to alternative tools. It provides clear context but lacks exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pentest_guidePentest GuideARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return a structured attack methodology playbook for the given attack vector and optional target context, for use in authorized penetration testing, CTF, or security research. Covers reconnaissance, enumeration, exploitation, and post-exploitation phases for the vector, filtered to what is relevant given the provided stack and WAF profile. Each phase includes: what to look for, tools to use, common mistakes, detection indicators that would alert defenders, and recommended mitigations. Next-tool suggestions are pre-filled with payload generator and technique lookup calls. Covers 15 vectors via the vector enum. Authorized testing only.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| phase | No | Restrict output to a specific phase. Use "all" for a complete playbook. Use a specific phase when working through a step-by-step flow. | all |
| vector | Yes | Attack vector to retrieve methodology for. Each vector has its own methodology branch covering recon through exploitation. Authorized testing only. | |
| target_context | No | Optional target profile for authorized engagement. Providing this narrows the playbook to what is most relevant for the specific environment. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| phases | Yes | Ordered methodology phases. Contains only the requested phase when phase input is not "all". |
| vector | Yes | The requested attack vector. |
| owasp_references | Yes | Relevant OWASP Testing Guide test case IDs (e.g., "WSTG-INPV-01"). |
| nextToolSuggestions | Yes | Suggested follow-up tool calls with arguments pre-populated from the playbook findings. |
| attack_technique_ids | Yes | Relevant ATT&CK technique IDs for cross-referencing with pentest_lookup_technique. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that this methodology applies to authorized testing only. Included in every response. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations indicate read-only, idempotent. Description adds behavioral details: phases covered, content per phase, pre-filled next-tool calls. No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Single paragraph of five sentences, front-loaded with main purpose. Minor redundancy ('Authorized testing only' twice) but generally efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given high schema coverage and presence of output schema, the description fully explains purpose, usage, and content. No gaps identified.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema descriptions cover all parameters (100%). Description adds context like 'Covers 15 vectors' and explains how target_context narrows the playbook, going beyond schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool returns a structured attack methodology playbook for a given vector and optional target context, distinguishing it from sibling tools that analyze responses, generate payloads, or look up techniques.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It specifies authorized testing context and mentions next-tool suggestions, implying usage flow. However, it does not explicitly exclude use cases or compare to alternatives beyond the sibling list.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pentest_lookup_groupPentest Lookup GroupARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up a MITRE ATT&CK threat group (intrusion set) or software entry by name or ID for authorized penetration testing and threat intelligence. Returns the group or software record: ATT&CK ID, display name, known aliases, type (group vs. software), description, and the techniques it uses with procedure-level context from public ATT&CK reporting. Accepts exact ATT&CK IDs (G0007 for threat groups, S0002 for software) or keyword/name search (e.g., "APT28", "Mimikatz", "Lazarus Group"). Equally useful for defenders building detection coverage around specific adversary tradecraft.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | Yes | ATT&CK threat group ID (e.g., "G0007"), software ID (e.g., "S0002"), or name/keyword (e.g., "APT28", "Mimikatz", "Lazarus Group"). ID lookup is exact and case-insensitive; name/keyword search returns the best match. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | ATT&CK ID (e.g., "G0007" for a group, "S0002" for software). |
| name | Yes | Primary display name (e.g., "APT28", "Mimikatz"). |
| type | Yes | "group" for intrusion sets (threat actors), "software" for malware and tools. |
| aliases | Yes | Known alternate names from ATT&CK. |
| description | Yes | ATT&CK description (truncated to 800 characters). |
| attack_version | Yes | ATT&CK dataset version used (e.g., "Enterprise v19.1"). Included so callers know the data vintage. |
| techniques_used | Yes | Techniques this group or software is known to use, with procedure-level context from public ATT&CK reporting (up to 20 entries). Use pentest_lookup_technique with each technique_id for full technique details including detection and mitigations. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that threat group data is for authorized testing and research only. Rendered first. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already indicate readOnly and idempotent. The description adds detailed behavior: returns ATT&CK ID, display name, aliases, type, description, techniques with procedure context, and explains exact ID vs. keyword search behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Concise three-sentence description that front-loads the core purpose. Every sentence adds value without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema exists, the description covers all necessary aspects: purpose, input format, output fields, and usage context. Annotations and sibling tools provide additional context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Single parameter with 100% schema coverage. The description adds significant meaning with examples (G0007, S0002, APT28) and explains exact vs. best-match behavior, going well beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool looks up MITRE ATT&CK threat groups or software entries by name or ID, specifying the verb 'look up' and the resource. It distinguishes from siblings like pentest_lookup_technique by focusing on groups and software.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides context for authorized penetration testing and threat intelligence, and mentions it's useful for defenders. Input types are detailed, but lacks explicit exclusions or direct comparison to sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pentest_lookup_techniquePentest Lookup TechniqueARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up a MITRE ATT&CK technique by ID or keyword for authorized penetration testing and security research. Returns the full technique record: name, associated tactics, description, detection opportunities (log sources, behavioral indicators), real-world procedure examples from public reporting, recommended mitigations, and related sub-techniques. The detection and mitigation sections make this equally useful for defenders building detection coverage. Accepts exact IDs (T1190, T1059.001) or keyword search (e.g., "sql injection", "pass the hash", "web shell upload").
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | Yes | ATT&CK technique ID (e.g., "T1190", "T1059.001") or keyword describing the technique (e.g., "sql injection", "pass the hash", "web shell upload"). ID lookup is exact; keyword lookup returns the best match plus related techniques. | |
| include_subtechniques | No | Include sub-techniques in the result. Set to false when only the parent technique summary is needed. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | Technique name. |
| tactics | Yes | ATT&CK tactics this technique belongs to (e.g., "Initial Access", "Execution"). |
| detection | Yes | Detection context — directly useful for blue team detection coverage. |
| platforms | Yes | Target platforms (e.g., "Windows", "Linux", "Web Application"). |
| description | Yes | ATT&CK description of the technique. |
| mitigations | Yes | Recommended mitigations from ATT&CK. |
| technique_id | Yes | ATT&CK technique ID (e.g., "T1190"). |
| attack_version | Yes | ATT&CK dataset version used (e.g., "Enterprise v19.1"). Included so callers know the data vintage. |
| sub_techniques | Yes | Sub-techniques of this parent technique. Empty when querying a sub-technique itself, or when include_subtechniques is false. |
| procedure_examples | Yes | Real-world usage examples from ATT&CK public reporting. Useful for understanding adversary application of the technique. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that technique data is for authorized testing and research only. Rendered first. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint/idempotentHint. Description adds value by detailing the return content (tactics, detection, mitigations, examples) and noting dual value for defenders. No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with purpose. First sentence is somewhat lengthy but includes essential details. No unnecessary words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists, so return values are documented. Description covers all key aspects: input types, output sections, and use cases. Complete for a lookup tool with good schema and annotation support.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with descriptions. Description adds meaning: ID lookup is exact, keyword returns best match plus related, and explains default behavior of include_subtechniques.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Clear verb 'Look up' with specific resource 'MITRE ATT&CK technique by ID or keyword'. Distinguishes from siblings like pentest_lookup_group (groups) and pentest_map_techniques (mapping). Includes context 'for authorized penetration testing and security research'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
States when to use (authorized pentesting/security research) and explains ID vs keyword lookup behavior. Does not explicitly list when not to use or compare to alternatives, but the sibling set provides context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pentest_map_techniquesPentest Map TechniquesARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Given a profile of the authorized test target (technology stack, exposed services, authentication type, OS), return a ranked list of ATT&CK techniques and OWASP test cases most relevant to that profile — not a generic dump of all techniques. Ranking factors: platform match, service match, auth type exposure, technique prevalence. Each result includes why it is relevant to this specific profile, the detection opportunity, and the recommended mitigation. Use when starting an authorized engagement to prioritize the testing scope; pair with pentest_guide to get the full methodology for each top-ranked vector.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| os | No | Target operating system. Narrows to OS-specific techniques. | |
| limit | No | Maximum number of techniques to return (1–50, default 15). Higher values give broader coverage; lower values focus on highest-relevance items. | |
| stack | No | Technology stack components (e.g., ["Node.js", "Express", "PostgreSQL", "Redis"]). Each element matched against technique platform and procedure examples. | |
| services | No | Exposed services and interfaces (e.g., ["REST API", "GraphQL", "file upload", "admin panel"]). Narrows technique relevance. | |
| auth_type | No | Authentication mechanism in use. Surfaces auth-specific attack techniques. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| attack_version | Yes | ATT&CK dataset version used for technique data. |
| profile_summary | Yes | One-sentence summary of the target profile as interpreted by the ranking algorithm. |
| owasp_test_cases | Yes | Relevant OWASP Testing Guide test cases for the profile (up to 10). |
| ranked_techniques | Yes | Techniques ordered by relevance_score descending. |
| authorized_use_reminder | Yes | Reminder that technique mapping is for authorized testing engagements only. Rendered first. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already indicate read-only and idempotent; description adds key behavioral details: ranking factors, output contents (relevance, detection, mitigation), and the non-destructive mapping nature.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four sentences, front-loaded with core action, no filler, efficiently conveys purpose, usage, and output behavior.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers most aspects: purpose, usage, parameters, ranking logic, output structure, and sibling relationship. Minor gap on edge cases (e.g., no matches) but still solid.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with clear descriptions. The description reinforces parameter roles (e.g., ranking factors) but adds minimal novel semantic beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description clearly states the tool maps a target profile to ranked ATT&CK and OWASP items, distinguishing it from siblings like pentest_guide (full methodology) and pentest_lookup_technique (single technique details).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to use ('starting an authorized engagement') and what to pair with (pentest_guide), guiding the agent's decision process effectively.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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