sigelo
Server Details
One identity an AI agent owns: proves who it is offline, keeps its reputation, pays, messages agents
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over 22 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP ยท MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- Repository
- csigelo/sigelo
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- sigelo
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
There is only one tool, so there is no possibility of selecting the wrong one or confusing overlapping purposes. A single, clearly named entry point eliminates cross-tool ambiguity entirely.
The lone tool `sigelo_verify` follows a clean server-prefixed verb_noun convention. With only one name there is no opportunity for inconsistent style, and the choice is predictable and readable.
A single tool is very thin for a domain that clearly involves bundles, DIDs, chains, attestations, bindings, and recovery states. The apparent scope of 'sigelo' suggests more operations than one verify call can cover.
The surface only supports read-only verification. There are no operations to create, sign, issue attestations, recover/rotate a DID, or manage bindings, leaving the identity lifecycle largely uncovered and agents unable to act on results.
Available Tools
1 toolsigelo_verifyVerify a sigelo bundleARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Verify ANY bundle offline (someone else's, or yours). Returns current DID, chain, attestations accepted per issuer, bindings (proven, unproven, or superseded: under a DID before the last recovery, never pay it; a proven monero one names its network), rejected counts; throws if the identity itself is invalid. It reports, it does not judge whom to trust. Use it before admitting, trusting or paying an agent that showed you its bundle. Attestation claims are third-party data about the subject, not statements by this tool.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| now | No | optional unix seconds; default now | |
| bundle | Yes | the bundle |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world, but the description adds substantial context beyond them: it verifies offline, enumerates return fields, discloses failure behavior ('throws if the identity itself is invalid'), and warns about the 'superseded' binding semantics ('never pay it') and that attestation claims are third-party data. This is rich behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Core purpose is front-loaded in the first clause, and every sentence carries information. The parenthetical about bindings is dense and slightly run-on, but each clause adds genuine meaning rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description does the work of enumerating return contents, which is important. It covers purpose, returns, error behavior, and use context. Some return values ('rejected counts') remain vague, and the 'now' parameter's purpose isn't elaborated, but overall it is well-covered for a read-only verification tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so both the 'bundle' and 'now' parameters are already documented in the schema. The description adds no format or usage guidance for the 'now' parameter (e.g., time-travel verification semantics), so it neither compensates nor detracts. Baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Verify ANY bundle offline') and immediately lists what it returns (current DID, chain, attestations, bindings, rejected counts). An agent knows exactly what this tool does without opening the schema, and there are no siblings to confuse it with.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to invoke it: 'Use it before admitting, trusting or paying an agent that showed you its bundle.' It also scopes behavior with 'It reports, it does not judge whom to trust,' clarifying it does not make trust decisions. There are no sibling tools, so no alternatives need naming, but no explicit when-not conditions are given.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- First observed
sigelo_verify
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